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Essays without a title are presumably by Parvus. I believe this is also true for most articles allegedly by members of the public, ie workers who agree with their full positions.

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p. 737 (#757) Economic News from Russia. 737 WILHELM JANSSON: Economic News from Russia. The Russian giant empire, so close to us, was already quite alien to us in peacetime, and it is naturally even more difficult to gain a clear picture of its true conditions now in wartime. This applies to political processes, which are at least externally visible, and even more so to economic life, the complexity of which cannot be overlooked if the reporting is inadequate. Furthermore, this reporting cannot be spared the accusation that it is biased, that it chases sensationalism, and that it tells everyone what they want to hear. The idea of Russian economic conditions that is thus suggested to us is, however, very difficult to verify for its accuracy. Nevertheless, the consular reports of several neutral states, supplemented by existing official data, offer us the opportunity to draw some conclusions. The first and foremost indisputable facts are the crisis-like conditions in the transportation system and on the food market. The army is demanding the full capacity of the railways, which are barely able to meet these demands. Poor organization, corruption, usury, and smuggling exacerbate the situation. Cultivation of the land could not be maintained at its previous level during the war, and the harvest conditions in 1916 were mediocre, and in some cases poor, for various products. Sugar production, for example, barely covered 75 percent of demand, which, with 105 million poods deployed, could only be met with 70 to 80 million poods. The shortfall was exacerbated by the observed trend toward an increase in sugar consumption as alcohol consumption declined. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Russian industry is strengthening during the war. It exhibits certain similarities with developments in Germany, insofar as Russia's partial isolation from foreign countries forces industry to produce goods that were previously supplied by foreign countries, and on the other hand, makes this production possible because prices are no longer important. Since foreign competition has largely disappeared, the prices paid are those that domestic industry demands, or those it needs to be able to start production. Official Russian figures for 1915 are available in the trade inspection reports. It is certainly significant that, despite the war, which called millions of workers to the flag, the number of workers in the supervised factories remained almost constant, or 572 in 1922 compared to 977 in 1942. The number of supervised factories fell from 13,858 to 12,649. There is unanimous agreement that there has been a significant increase in labor intensity. Attempts have been made to promote this development successfully by importing skilled workers from abroad. First and foremost, of course, the war industry was well employed. The explosives industry, the canning industry, and the leather and shoe industries received enormous military orders and were extremely busy. The

development in the metal industry is of particular interest because it will have an impact on the post-war period. This industry increased its workforce from 342,658 to 416,713, or 21.6 percent, in one year. The number of factories experienced only a slight increase (1975 compared to 1951 the previous year), but there are reports of an expansion of factories, which enabled industry to expand its production considerably. The wool industry, which was particularly heavily supplied with army orders, increased its output by around 45 percent. The shortage of weavers was made up for by overtime, and all legal restrictions on Sunday and holiday work, as well as night work for women and minors, were lifted. New manufacturing methods were introduced to stretch raw materials. The weaving mills working for the open market were worse off because they had a shortage of raw materials. In many cases, they helped themselves by switching to the production of cotton goods. But even this activity could only be maintained on a limited scale because both cotton and dyes were in very short supply. The state of transport hampered activity. This industrial development continued in 1916, despite increased difficulties in the supply of raw materials and transport. Admittedly, this increase in Russian industry during the war would not have been sufficient to meet the country's enormous wartime needs. Imports had to be added as a supplement. Since the Baltic Sea was closed off, only three transport routes were possible: the one via Vladivostok in the far east, whose capacity is limited due to the enormous distances; the route via Sweden; and finally, Russia's own connection to the Arctic Ocean. At the beginning of the war, there was a railway connection to Archangelsk, but it was inadequate, partly because the railway was narrow-gauge and unable to cope with the increased traffic, and partly because the port of Archangelsk iced over during the winter months. As early as the winter of 1915, the Russian government began building a railway line to the Murmansk coast, where a harbor, ice-free even in winter, would ensure traffic with the outside world. This railway connection does not appear to be complete yet, but large stretches have already been built and are in use, including newly constructed roads between the Norwegian coast and the Finnish railway network, effectively supplementing the Archangelsk line. Traffic through the Scandinavian countries has been of greater importance. The Swedish government's ban on the transit of war materials through Sweden has caused some disruption to this traffic, but this has been remedied partly through organization and partly through detours. "War materials" is a broad term; they can also be broken down into sub-products that do not directly fall under the term. 46/2 p. 740 (#760) 740 Economic News from Russia. manufactures that do not directly fall under the term. What could be brought through Scandinavia in this way

was routed via these countries, the direct war materials via Archangelsk. Exports also followed the same route, which shows an upward trend. Including trade with Finland, Russian foreign trade in the first nine months of 1915/16 amounted to: Imports Imports Commodity group (in 1,000 rubles) Exports (in 1,000 rubles) 1915 1916 1915 1916 Foodstuffs. 52,159 89,329 116,661 127,180 Raw materials, semi-finished products. 187,078 348 702 86 821,222,779 Live animals. 751,255 5,128 Finished goods 149,594 477,856 10,672 17,824 Total 389,582,916 142,214 159,367,911 The increase in export value is not so significant overall that it necessarily requires an increase in the exported quantity, because higher commodity prices must result in increased value figures even with the same quantity. Nevertheless, the increase in the value of exported raw materials and semi-finished products from 86,821 million rubles in 1915 to 222,779 million rubles in 1916 is striking; it shows that export trade has indeed found ways by which an increase in quantity must have been possible. The slight increase in the total value of foodstuffs despite enormously increased commodity prices, on the other hand, shows that In reality, there must be a decrease in quantity, which corresponds to the internal food shortage. The food embargo against Finland was also intended to starve this country in order to make it more compliant. Of greater interest are the import figures, which show an increase from 389,582 million rubles to 916,142 million rubles. The increase in imports of raw materials and semi-finished products as well as finished products is enormous, or in the first group from 187,078 million rubles to 348,702 million rubles, in the second from 149,594 million rubles to 477,856 million rubles. Essentially, in both cases, this concerns war material in direct and indirect form, but also tools and agricultural machinery, for which the market is said to have shown great receptivity. On the other hand, a comparison of import and export figures shows Figures show a rapidly growing passivity of the Russian trade balance during the war. In addition to Russia's direct indebtedness through foreign loans (from the allied Western powers and in America), there are obligations for trade debts. England and America demanded and received ample security for their services. Railway pledges, including the Petersburg-Moscow line, mining concentrations in the Urals and elsewhere, gold deposits with the Bank of England, etc., were the equivalents that Russia had to offer its creditors. In important administrative offices, the Russian bureaucracy has to put up with English control officials who monitor the business that Russia's allies do with it. It is slowly approaching the fate of Turkey under Abdul Hamid, if this development continues for a few more years, and serious voices are already being raised against it. This situation finds its mathematical expression in the exchange

rate of the ruble. Given Sweden's lively trade relations with Russia during the war, the state of the The ruble exchange rate in Stockholm is a valuable indicator. The Swedish Reichsbank quoted the following rates for bills of exchange on Petersburg per 100 rubles: January December 1913 Kr. 1914 1915 1916 192.61 Kr. 191.98 Kr. Kr. 170.00 108.63 192.04 171.30 113.90 101.75 These figures speak for themselves. But they will also acquire significance for the development of trade relations after the war. In particular, Sweden will lose some of its hopes for the Russian market if these exchange rates become decisive for the movement of goods in the free market. p. 742 (#762) 742 Marx, Kautsky and the Balkan Confederation. The relatively high level of the English sterling exchange rate and the American dollar (the sterling fell in Stockholm from 18.23 Kr. in January 1914 to 16.38 Kr. in December 1916, the dollar in the same period from 3.76 Kr. to 3.47 Kr.) will not work to Germany's disadvantage when normal trade conditions return. It is obvious that Russia must primarily promote the exchange of goods with those countries where it can get the most for the ruble. On the other hand, for the same reasons, German purchasing will also have to take the Russian market into account, so that all threats of economic warfare after the war will not, at least with regard to Russia, have the desired effects on the British side. But it is advisable for Germany to become aware of this weakness in the enemy's position, which finds its expression in the exchange rates. HEINRICH CUNOW: IN Marx, Kautsky and the Balkan Confederation. N of No. 18 of the scientific review of the Social Democratic Working Group, the "Neue In the "Zeit," which, strangely enough, still describes itself on its title page as the "weekly journal of German Social Democracy," Karl Kautsky objects to my review of the recently published two volumes of Marx-Engels writings, published in the "Glocke" (Nos. 38 and 39). Kautsky rejects being counted among the vulgar Marxists and presents himself as a true "classical" Marxist. I consider it pointless to argue with him about this claim. The extent to which Kautsky can be considered a true interpreter of Marx's views or a mere vulgarizer will be decided by the future. In my opinion, the war has already exposed as naive utopianism so many of his theoretical interpretations and wise oracles, which he once proclaimed as a bearded Pythia from his classical Marxist tripod (p. 743 (#763) Marx, Kautsky and the Balkan League. 743), and further dismissals are likely to follow after the war, that in a few decades it will hardly be possible to understand how this man was once able to play a role as a theoretician in the social democratic movement, just as today one can only conclude from the total theoretical backwardness of the Social Democracy in the 1870s is capable of understanding that a Dühring and a Most could be considered great

luminaries at that time. Nor do I wish to argue with Kautsky about whether Marx, like some of his "true" interpreters, suffered from Anglomania or Anglophobia. I am only interested here in Kautsky's attempt to deduce from a fleeting remark in an article in the "New York Tribune" of August 5, 1853, a commitment by Marx to the project of a general league of the Balkan states, which only emerged much later. Kautsky cautiously quotes only three lines from the article—probably due to the well-known lack of space. The article in question concerns the Russian plan to advance to Constantinople and "gain access to the Mediterranean," a plan which, in Marx's view, the Western powers of Europe must oppose with all their might in the "interests of European civilization." In this context, Marx writes: "The Western powers, on the other hand, fickle, faint-hearted, always distrusting one another, always encourage the Sultan at first to oppose the Tsar, whose encroachments they fear, only to force him to yield in the end for fear of a general war, which might lead to a general revolution. Too weak and too cowardly to undertake the reconstruction of the European Turkish Turkey by establishing a Greek Empire or a federal republic of the Slavic states, their entire effort is directed only at maintaining the status quo, that is, that stage of decay which forbids the Sultan to emancipate himself from the Tsar and the Slavs to emancipate themselves from the Sultan." What Marx is demanding here is that the Western powers should in any case oppose Russian activities in the Balkans more energetically and abandon their efforts to maintain the status quo, whether they try to restore the Greek Empire or establish a federal Slavic republic. From this p. 744 (#764) 744 Marx, Kautsky and the Balkan Confederation. To conclude that Marx agreed with the much later project of a general Balkan confederation, or even considered it a goal to be pursued by social democracy, is to attribute to Marx views he never held. If it follows from the above quotation that Marx desired the establishment of a federal Slavic republic, does it not follow with exactly the same justification that he also called for the restoration of the old Greek Empire (in the original English text it says: establishment of a Greek Empire)? Moreover, Marx does not speak of a federation of all Balkan states, but of a "Federal Republic of Slavonic States" (at that time, only two Slavic states existed: Serbia and Montenegro), that is, of a republican union of the Balkan Slavs, to which the Romanians, Albanians, Turks, Greeks, Kutzovalachs, etc., certainly do not belong. Is the establishment of a federal republic of the Slavic Balkan tribes identical with a confederation of states of all Balkan peoples? What Marx considers possible here is the founding of a great empire of the South Slavs as a defense against Russia's advance towards Constantinople, as Engels calls for on various occasions in his articles and letters. However, Engels

leaves aside the question of whether this Slavic empire should be a republic or a monarchy, while Marx here speaks of a federal republic. It takes the inability to distinguish conceptually, which repeatedly appears in Kautsky's theoretical writings, to simply confuse a Slavic federal republic with a confederation of all Balkan peoples, including the non-Slavs. - - Enough of that. Today, when German Social Democracy faces more important questions, I don't feel the slightest inclination to discuss whether the confederation envisioned by Kautsky could be excellent, useful, and peaceful. In my opinion, the plan for a general Balkan confederation has even less chance of being realized in the decades after the war than it did before the war, and discussing hopeless utopian projects for the future is pointless, even if Kautsky considers utopianism an integral part of classical Marxism, p. 745 (#765) Reorientation in Social Insurance. 745 KARL MOESSINGER: THE Reorientation in Social Insurance. The war demonstrated that the RVO's institutions were not up to such elementary events; therefore, drastic changes had to be implemented with urgency. As a very significant improvement, the expanded maternity allowance was introduced. It is already certain that maternity allowance will remain in place and be expanded after the war. The reconstruction of our national strength, the recovery of the people, and their strengthening necessitate not only the maintenance of maternity allowance, but also expanded infant protection. Another social institution, necessitated by production restrictions in certain branches of industry and trade, are the ordinances for the support of groups of workers who have become unemployed. These ordinances and decrees, too, will not disappear immediately after the war. On the contrary, it will be necessary to offer further assistance to all those who remain unemployed for a long time after the war through no fault of their own, until our trade, commerce, and industry are productive again, receive new sales areas, and a regulated supply of raw materials is possible. This task cannot be achieved through an immediate change to our entire social insurance system; special legal interventions will be necessary. The diversity of social protection institutions will thus initially increase. It therefore becomes all the more urgent to create uniform social law and uniform protection on the most uniform basis possible for future times. I can also assume that our social insurance institutions are very diverse. It should only be recalled that there is health insurance, disability and old-age insurance, widows' and orphans' insurance, accident insurance, employee insurance, and special insurance for miners. Within the aforementioned insurance institutions, there are largely special types and groups of insurance. For example, in health insurance: local health insurance funds, rural health insurance funds, special

provisions for servants, nursing homes... p. 746 (#766) 746 Reorientation in Social Insurance. workers, home-based tradespeople, etc. Then there are provisions for subsidized or independent auxiliary health insurance funds, and other special types. Accident insurance is also not uniform. It is divided not only into special types for trade and agriculture, but also into occupational groups. For example, the special legislation for inland and maritime shipping should also be mentioned. In my opinion, the reorientation of social insurance should create uniform insurance law and uniform insurance obligation within the framework of only uniform legislation, only one form of administration, and only one legal process. The uniform insurance should include: health insurance, medical treatment, hospital and home care, funeral insurance, maternity allowance (maternity allowance, maternity benefit, breastfeeding allowance), infant care, pensions for temporary or permanent incapacity for work, combined with medical treatment, institutional care, and home care, old-age provision, retirement benefits, widows' and orphans' insurance, unemployment benefits, job placement, and proof of employment. These types of insurance should be regulated by a completely uniform legislation. Compulsory insurance should cover all persons, regardless of gender or age, who are employed in any profession. Compulsory insurance should extend to all persons whose income is up to 6,000 marks per year. This should include: farmers, artisans, traders and businesspeople, agents, artists, as well as all employed and self-employed persons whose income does not exceed 6,000 marks per year. Only income earned from professional activity is considered income. The right to insurance should be granted to the unemployed wives of the aforementioned groups and to all persons who are employed and achieve an income of over 6,000 up to 10,000 marks per year. Private insurance would remain reserved for life insurance, dowry insurance, pension insurance, liability insurance, fire insurance, supplementary insurance, burglary insurance, etc. 747 (#767) Reorientation in social insurance. 747 The extension of compulsory insurance to self-employed craftsmen, farmers, merchants, etc. would meet an urgent social need. The extension of voluntary insurance options would likely significantly expand the circle of insured persons. However, this will only be the case if the insurance benefits are sufficient. The benefits should include: free medical treatment in case of illness, including dental treatment. Treatment through hospital or institutional care; home care; provision of medication and remedies; subsidies for larger remedies, orthopedic appliances, dentures, etc. Sick pay for up to 26 weeks amounting to two-thirds of the basic wage. The basic wage is calculated based on average income. In the event of death, payment of a death benefit,

calculated based on basic wages and at least 60 marks. For uninsured dependents (children without income up to the age of 14), free medical treatment and, if necessary, free hospital treatment or home care. A death benefit in the event of the death of children. Specially defined benefits should be provided for wives if they themselves are not subject to compulsory insurance but have exercised the right to voluntary insurance. These benefits could include, in addition to medical treatment and free medication, sickness benefit. Maternity allowance: provision of pregnancy support, maternity allowance, maternity allowance, and breastfeeding allowance. These benefits should be provided to all compulsorily insured persons, as well as to voluntarily insured wives and other female voluntarily insured persons. Infant care through free medical advice and treatment of infants. Cash subsidies for infant nutrition. In addition, maternity allowance benefits. I would like to point out here that the care of those sick and disabled persons who require extended medical treatment in a sanatorium, spa, etc., to restore their health and ability to work, must be uniformly regulated. This should also be achieved through admission to convalescent homes, granting rural residence, or stays in spas or climatic health resorts for those merely in need of convalescence. Medical treatment should only be ordered and approved by a single authority. It should not be the case that sickness and disability insurance, or sickness and accident insurance, have to work together, or that one type of insurance should order medical treatment—no, only a single type of insurance should be responsible for this. Of great importance, in my opinion, is the granting of pensions in the event of temporary or permanent limitation of employment, and this should also be ordered from a single authority and based on a similar calculation. Currently, such pensions are granted or can be granted by disability insurance, accident insurance, and later, employee insurance. Miners' insurance also grants pensions for long-term employment restrictions. The requirements for pension eligibility vary considerably. Accident insurance grants pensions for employment restrictions of 10 percent caused by an industrial accident. The pension is calculated based on the injured person's annual earnings, with the full pension amounting to two- thirds of earnings. If annual earnings exceed 1,800 marks, only one-third of the excess is taken into account. Disability insurance, on the other hand, grants a pension only if the employment restriction exceeds 66 percent. The prerequisite for approval is the completion of a certain waiting period. The pension is calculated based on the number and value of the stamps affixed. A Reich subsidy is paid in addition to the pension. Disability pensions are quite low. Pensions in miners' insurance are calculated differently. Pensions are not currently considered in

salaried employees' insurance because the waiting periods have not yet been met. The calculation method is different again; for example, a pension can be granted with a 50 percent reduction in earning capacity or upon reaching the age of 65. These few examples show us how extraordinarily diverse the granting of pensions is and how widely different the requirements are that can justify a pension claim. The reorientation of social insurance should now aim to uniformly regulate pension granting under similar conditions. Pensions should be granted regardless of whether the limitation in earning capacity is caused by a work-related accident, occupational disease, or other illness or weakening of physical and mental strength . What is provided today by accident insurance, disability insurance, miners' insurance, and later by salaried employees' insurance should be provided in a uniform manner through only one type of insurance. The many different types of insurance would disappear, a uniform insurance scheme would take its place, and only one administrative apparatus would remain. p. 749 (#769) Reorientation in Social Insurance. 749 With goodwill and a non-bureaucratic approach to the matter, the desired standardization can certainly be achieved. The decisive factor should be that in the case of an employment restriction of more than 10 percent, a corresponding pension is granted depending on the degree of the disability and for its duration. Annual earnings would have to be used to calculate the pension. In the case of complete employment restriction, at least two-thirds of annual earnings would have to be granted as a pension. The granting of a pension would have to be linked to the provision of medical treatment and remedies. This brings me to a brief discussion of the question of how the granting of old-age pensions and retirement benefits should be regulated. The old-age pension is now granted from the age of 65, provided that the prescribed conditions are met. Employees' insurance provides for the granting of pensions. Both types of benefits should be merged. At the age of 60, every insured person should receive a pension, calculated based on the value of the contributions made and with state subsidies. The pension would be granted if the person's ability to work was still present; if the ability to work was completely lost, the pensions mentioned in the previous section would apply. In the case of partial limitation of employment and the corresponding approval of a partial pension, the pension would be calculated according to special conditions. Widows' and orphans' benefits should also be regulated uniformly. My demand to grant widows' and orphans' pensions to all insured persons and their survivors would seem rather far-reaching. Today, very different types of pensions are considered. In accident insurance, pensions are much higher than in disability insurance, although accident insurance only applies if the

insured person's death was caused directly or indirectly by an industrial accident. The orphan's and widow's pensions under disability insurance are low, and widow's pensions are only available to disabled widows. Employee insurance, on the other hand, provides higher survivors' benefits. These few examples alone demonstrate the various types of widow's and orphan's benefits; in fact, even more variations could be listed. But why this diversity? Can't this be regulated uniformly and for the benefit of all insured persons and their survivors? Standardization would eliminate many injustices and hardships caused by the current diverse insurance and benefits. Insurance against limitation of employment due to unemployment should also be regulated uniformly under the same legislation. We don't have state unemployment insurance; municipal unemployment insurance partially disappeared during the war, but we did receive state and municipal support for unemployed textile workers, etc. Municipal unemployment benefits also began on a broader basis. No one will deny that the experiences during the war and earlier experiences call for state regulation of unemployment benefits. It would be advisable to combine all types of insurance with proof of employment on a uniform basis. The uniform proof of employment would have to be established by state and municipal institutions within the framework of and in conjunction with the social insurance system. The funds are raised through a uniform contribution from the insured, through subsidies from employers, municipalities, municipal associations, and the Reich. The insured's contribution share would be calculated based on their earned wages. The employer's contribution share would have to cover at least half of the insured's benefits. Currently, the employer pays half of the disability insurance contributions, one-third of the health insurance contributions, and half of the employee insurance contributions. The employer alone is responsible for accident insurance contributions. Similar subsidies are possible for miners' insurance, etc. A standardization of contribution payments for insured persons and employers would certainly contribute to saving a great deal of labor. The administrative apparatus would also operate far more cheaply and efficiently with a standardized contribution rate. The Reich already provides subsidies, e.g., for disability and old-age insurance. These subsidies should be expanded, because the state has a strong interest in maintaining public health and strength. The funds must be raised, since completely different services are now being provided for uncultural purposes. It would be worth examining whether those classes that enjoy secure protection in all circumstances through higher income should not be made to contribute to the costs of social insurance through special tax surcharges. The municipalities would be greatly relieved by the benefits of the unified

social insurance, especially with regard to poor relief - p. 751 (#771) On the History of Trade Unions. 751 and unemployment benefits, etc. Consequently, it is justified to demand special subsidies from the municipalities and municipal associations. - All types of insurance combined in one law and with a uniform design and presentation naturally also require a unified administration. The unified organization would have to be divided into various sub-administrative units according to the various insurance benefits. Other state institutions prove that this is possible. The main thing, however, is that organization and administration are filled and guided by a social spirit. Employers and employees would not only have to retain the electoral and administrative rights they enjoy today, but these rights would have to be expanded. It goes without saying that the legal process, which is very diversely structured in existing laws, would also require standardization. PAUL BARTHEL: On the History of Trade Unions. Since the abolition of the Anti-Socialist Law, the German trade union movement has experienced a tremendous upswing. While at that time it comprised 227,773 members in 53 central associations with 3,150 branches, plus 350,000 workers organized in the five organizations based on the shop steward system and in the local trade associations, the free trade unions in the last year of peace had 2,573,718 members in 49 associations with 12,296 branches. And with this external growth, internal expansion has kept pace: the purely union work to improve wages and working conditions was crowned with the victorious implementation of the collective bargaining concept, in which the attainment of the workers' right to co-determination in the design of employment contracts found its documentary expression; the scope of the associations was constantly expanded through the development of support facilities, through the systematic development of the educational system, and through the consistent influence of German social policy. A great deal of work had to be expended on this external and internal development and expansion, which fully absorbed all available resources. p. 752 (#772) 752 On the history of trade unions. Until now, there has been a lack of energy and time for a fundamental historical appreciation of this development, for a historical account of the development and growth of the German trade unions. It is therefore no wonder that a comprehensive history of the German trade union movement has not yet been written, despite its enormous importance for German economic life and German culture. Fortunately, however, at least individual professional associations have been able to collect, process, and present their historical material to the public. In doing so, they have saved valuable treasures of trade union history from being lost and made fundamental contributions to the general history of the trade union

movement as a whole in Germany, a history that has yet to be written. The professional associations that have published their histories include the Carpenters' Association (History of the German Carpenters' Movement by A. Bringmann, Hamburg 1909, Volume 1), the Association of Bakers and Confectioners (History of the German Bakers' and Confectioners' Movement by O. Allmann, Hamburg 1910, 2 volumes), the Bookbinders' Association (History of the German Bookbinders' Association by E. Kloth, Berlin 1910 and 1913, 2 volumes), the Coppersmiths' Association (History of the Association of Coppersmiths in Germany by J. Saupe, Berlin 1911, 1 volume), the Stonesetters' Association (History of the German Stonesetters' Movement by A. Knoll, Berlin 1913, 3 volumes, of which the second has been published so far) and the Tailors' Association (The Tailors' Movement in Germany by Eduard Bernstein, Berlin 1913, Volume 1). Hue's large-scale, two-volume work "The Miners" (Dietz, Stuttgart) should also be mentioned here. Almost all of these works were published on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the respective organizations. They are not limited to the pure history of the association, but also cover the history of the profession represented by the respective association and that of the pre-union professional associations and organizations. In many cases, important documents were extracted from the dust of the archives, incorporated into the works, and thus rescued from oblivion. Of course, not every association historian has been equally successful in making this material available. But nevertheless, one can express satisfaction that by opening up these valuable, yellowed treasures, one has delved deep into the pre-union era and attempted to build a bridge from the past to the present of the various professions. The aforementioned association histories were followed by two more thick volumes in the war year of 1916. They concern the Association of Brewery and Mill Workers (History of the Brewery Workers' Movement by E. Backert, Berlin 1916. Publisher: Association of Brewery and Mill Workers and Related Professional Associations. 1 volume, 606 pages) and the Book Printers' Association (The Association of German Book Printers. Fifty Years of German Trade Union Work with a Prehistory. By Willi Krahl. Published by the Board of the Association of German Book Printers. Berlin 1916. Commission Publishing House of Radelli and Hille, Leipzig. 1 volume, 528 pages). While the history of the brewery workers' movement, like the aforementioned association chronicles, was published on the occasion of the organization's 25th anniversary, the history of the printers' association, which was already thoroughly praised in Blasenbrei's article "A Document of Trade Union Cultural Work" in the "Glocke" (II. Year I, Vol. p. 911), owes its origins to the organization's half-centenary celebration. For, as is well known, this year the Association of

German Printers was able to look back on 50 years of existence and activity, a circumstance that will ensure its historical work receives special attention in the circles of all trade unionists and far beyond. ---- Here are a few words about the history of the brewers' association! Its organizational chronicle extends far beyond the developmental history of the brewers' union; it reaches back to the origins of beer and, in its opening chapters, offers an overview of the history of brewing from ancient times to the present day. The concept, type, and origin of beer, medieval brewing in individual cities and regions, and the role of beer in the Middle Ages, the working methods of the time and technical developments up to modern times, and the use of beer as a taxable object are presented in the first chapter, devoted to the history of beer and brewing. Many interesting details are rescued from oblivion, and many cultural-historical curiosities shine a spotlight on the darkness of bygone times. This also applies to the next section: Apprentices and Journeymen's Relationships in the Middle Ages, in which the author discusses the admission requirements for apprentices, the journeyman's piece and acquittal, apprenticeship and journeyman's certificates, the journeyman's period of travel, the working and organizational conditions of journeymen, and becoming a master. 46/3 p. 754 (#774) 754 On Trade Union History. The third chapter provides a summary of wage and working conditions in breweries and related businesses, taking into account the influence of improved technology on working conditions and comparing the economic situation of brewery workers in other countries. The next chapter then moves on to the history of the modern brewery workers' movement and the association. After an account of the local brewers' associations before the association's founding, the Berlin Brewers' Strike in 1874, and the founding of the Berlin Brewers' Journeymen's Association in 1884, it discusses the development of the central organization from the association's founding to its reorganization and its integration into the modern labor movement. In the following chapters, the association's development in various fields of activity is presented in detail, not only chronologically but also subject-wise. To provide at least a general overview, we mention the main topics: The planned old-age and disability support fund; Important events in 1889 and 1890; the development of the association from its reconstitution to the present; local brewery workers' associations and sections; agitation committees, regional and district organizations; membership development; the development of the association's finances; the association's organ; obstacles in the struggle for better wages and working conditions; the history of the merger with the former Mill Workers' Association; our international relations; strikes and wage movements after the reconstitution; the struggle

for co-determination in job placement; struggles for Sunday rest; the history and development of our collective bargaining agreements; protest action against the government's tax plans. A retrospective and prospective look ahead, and brief biographical notes on the association's employees, conclude the work, whose individual sections are richly documented. It is undoubtedly a commendable, industrious piece of work, although one cannot shake the impression when studying it that it would have been significantly improved by better preparation, a tighter structure, and a more consistent layout. Despite some weaknesses, which the author himself recognized and admitted in the preface, the book, which is also adorned with numerous illustrations, was produced with impeccable printing technology by the Berlin Vorwärts printing press, and features a pleasing, durable blue linen cover, will be of the utmost value to the Brewers' Association. It will provide members with profound insight into the association's prehistory, its origins and growth, and the driving forces behind its organizational development, thereby greatly stimulating its promotional activities. - EDGAR STEIGER: WENN Karl Books. On his 70th birthday. (February 16.) If the new era dawning with the current world war has found a new generation outside the ranks of the working class that understands how to interpret the signs of the times, we owe this solely to those few men of science who, undeterred by the conflicting opinions of the day and the changing whims of the prevailing politics, have dedicated their entire lives to the service of truth to the best of their knowledge and conscience. Among these straightforward and upright individuals, who do not consider themselves the spokesmen of a particular social class, is first and foremost the Leipzig professor of economics Karl Bücher, who is currently celebrating his 70th birthday. He is one of the few university professors in Germany who not only read Karl Marx but also truly digested his groundbreaking ideas. Far from being an uncritical imitator of the great socialist thinker, he, like the author of " Capital," found the true meaning of the present and the near future in the social question and its solution. Therefore, he did not view the labor movement of our day with the half-anxious, half-contemptuous eye of the property owner, but clearly recognized its historical necessity and high cultural significance. It is much more convenient for a university professor to content himself with Roscher and the so-called historical school of economics by simply collecting the economic facts, without drawing the necessary conclusions for legislative action from the evidence. But Karl Bücher, although he emerged from this school, had learned from the old masters of 46/3 p. 756 (#776) 756 Karl Bücher. From the classical economists Adam Smith and Ricardo and the Germans Liszt and Thünen, he inherited the scientific spirit that seeks out

the laws of economic life hidden behind the abundance of facts and thus elevates economic description to economic theory. This tendency toward generalization can undoubtedly often be disastrous for the researcher himself; for the imaginative thinker—without imagination, no creative science is conceivable—sometimes lacks the patience to await the delayed result of the slow establishment of facts, but rather rushes ahead of the collector's work and, from a few isolated observations, establishes a law that later proves untenable. Even Bücher has sometimes succumbed to this temptation: cautious ethnologists have repeatedly shaken their heads at his assertions about the prehistoric economic life of peoples. But given the wealth of new insights that the scientific mind of this fine mind has gifted us, we are willing to accept these occasional deviations, especially when the results of his thinking are presented to us in such a clear, simple, and beautiful form. Karl Bücher studied journalism before becoming a university professor. This was just as important for the development of his personality as the previous seven years of teaching at the Gymnasium in Dortmund and at the Wöhlerschule in Frankfurt am Main, which taught him to be young with his youth. As editor for economic and social policy at the "Frankfurter Zeitung," he had the best opportunity to come into contact with economic life itself and to observe, day after day, the workings of industry and commerce in bare figures. At the same time, however, it may well have been precisely in the newspaper's daily work that he had already shed that intellectual slowness that all too often characterizes the German scholar and acquired a certain dexterity in finding the right word for every subject at a young age. At least the witty lectures that make up his main work, "The Origin of Economics," strike us as artistically rounded feature articles that captivate the reader as much with their symmetrical structure and vivid language, p. 757 (#777) Karl Bücher. 757 as with the wealth of new ideas. Even in this book, which already poses the question: "What is economics?" Karl Bücher has remained true to his first love, as he did after completing his studies in history, philology, and political science in Bonn and Göttingen. After completing his studies in Dortmund, which were devoted to history, philology, and political science, the 27-year-old philologist described "The Revolts of the Unfree Workers 143 to 129 BC." Five years later, the teacher at the Wöhler School in Frankfurt translated E. de Laveleye's "Primal Property" into German and infused it with his own ideas. Just as the 34-year-old Munich lecturer illuminates "The Woman Question in the Middle Ages," and two years later the Basel professor of statistics expresses himself on "On the History of International Factory Legislation," the Leipzig professor of economics now jumps from the pre-economic existence of primitive man, after his extremely

witty characterization of the three main economic stages—housekeeping, urban economy, and the actual national economy, or, better said, trade economy—to the decline of crafts, the occupational structure of the present, and the history of the newspaper industry. Thus, we already see the intellectual bond that intrinsically links all these seemingly unrelated lectures. Prehistoric times and the present, the most distant and the most immediate, are repeatedly brought into relationship with one another, so that the cultural-historical course of each phenomenon plays out before our eyes once more, as it were, and the present learns to understand itself from the past. But this does not yet characterize the thoroughly modern character of this remarkable book. What makes us feel so good about it, I can only describe figuratively. to understand: when reading, we feel, as it were, that we are breathing the psychological air of the present. One involuntarily senses the proximity of Wundt and Lamprecht, with whom Bücher worked for many years at the Leipzig University. With the founder of Völkerpsychology and the master of German historiography, Bücher shares the universal knowledge and the liberating vision that spans the centuries, but at the same time, he also pays homage to the same scientific method. For him, too, history in the deepest sense of the word is applied psychology and the transformation of the national psyche from the close ties of the clan to the liberation of the individual in the age of the monetary economy and the awakening of the subjective human being at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries and its development into the social future, the true content of national economy, which, according to Marx, is only the substructure of culture. And so it came about. Finally, when this economist followed in the footsteps of Herder and the Brothers Grimm and listened to the songs of the people, the steady swing of the sower's arm, the eternal back and forth of the weaver's shuttle, the blow of the hammer of the blacksmith, the creaking of the carpenter's plane, the "Hoiho" of the boatmen and the "Holz her" of the beam-pulling carpenters told him the secret of the birth of rhythm, how it, which was in the beginning and is still considered the primal source of all art, owes its origin solely to work. Thus, as the crowning achievement of his entire work, his wonderful book "Work and Rhythm" was created, in which—looking back and, we hope, also prophesying—he who was a lifelong worker and therefore always gave work its due—glorifies work as the mother of all art. The glosses. A request from the field. Somewhere on the Eastern Front, at the end of January 1917. Dear bell! Despite your short existence, you have already rung many a bell and sounded many a signal. Now please ring the bell too! End of the argument!" Not: end of the debate! But of the argument. Listen to why: Yesterday, I returned to our resting position, tired and half-

frozen, when I found "Vorwärts" No. 18, dated January 19, in our field bookstore, with the report from the Party Committee. How I devoured the contents! (And with me several comrades who were going back into the trenches tomorrow.) Finally, a step! Finally, an action! Finally, a clear "either/or"! Finally, consequence! Up until now, we out here had the feeling that the Party Executive and the other authorities wanted to show the world what phenomenally thick skin they had! We heard the barrage of the three (or is it already five?) opposition batteries from all sides and never a response from Berlin. We felt similar to how we felt at Verdun, where we listened nervously to the rear amidst the French barrage: to the salvos of our artillery. And every time we breathed a sigh of relief when our keenly honed ears recognized our own shells in the hellish roar of the guns and missiles. Then we faced what was to come, announced by the barrage, with much more peace of mind. Now, finally, we hear, in the resolution of the Party Committee of January 18, the long-awaited answer from behind. And we now face what is to come more calmly than before. The situation, in which only one side fired and the other responded only half-heartedly or not at all, got on our nerves just as much as the situation in the West, where our "Ari" often took pleasure in letting the Frenchman fire alone for fifteen minutes. Now, at last, the Party Committee has spoken, and, as it seems to us out here, has spoken clearly. For in the statement that we consider the organized opposition to stand outside the Party lies the present and the future. But now, since the path is once again clear before us, the quarrel, the daily rehashing of old issues, should be over for the time being. Now it's time to get back to work in the party, to the tactics for winning the war and for paving the way for peace. You back there simply have no idea of the feelings that fill us when, at or close to the front, after a long, tense wait, after nervous impatience, we finally get a newspaper in our hands and hear nothing positive, nothing encouraging, nothing foreshadowing the future, but only unpleasant things about the party. That's depressing! It's discouraging! It's almost bitter! Children, one might say, don't you really have anything better to do at this moment? Doesn't your subconscious (when your mind is already completely occupied with the argument) tell you that this is a damned bad time for musing? No? Then let me tell you something about our Eastern Front, about the life we are forced to lead here in temperatures of 19-25 degrees Celsius (which we have had quite often recently), and above all: listen to all four wind directions on our fronts! You will hear a hammering, a roaring, a preparation for coming battles such as world history has never heard before. And you will certainly hear the furious madness that is rolling against our lines like an avalanche; just open your ears and eyes. p. 760

(#780) 760 Glosses. We are somewhat closer to the war than you; we hear and see more of some things (not everything) than you. Have you ever been in the high mountains in May, when the avalanches are released? When the uncanny whistling and whooshing of the air resounds long before the eye sees the plunging avalanche? We out here can already hear the whistling and hissing! We see how the waves are being broken, the protective dams are being prepared, and massive preparations are being made to ward off any disaster. We see it and are deeply moved, even shaken by the premonition of what is to come. And when we pick up a newspaper in such a mood, we find in it fragments of the tapeworm of your dispute over the policy of August 4th. It's almost grotesque! It could be laughable if it didn't make us furious and angry! Children, you should finally stop that! Don't spoil our enthusiasm for the party! Don't drive us into the ranks of those who, although good Social Democrats, stand angrily on the sidelines! Come here just once, and you'll be in for a big surprise! I think I can say: if you only knew how little, how tiny little interest people up here have in your argument, you would surely stop it! Back in June 1915, when the enemy was preparing for a major offensive on all fronts, the article by the Three Gatekeepers "The Command of the Hour" hit us like a bolt from the blue. This proved to us that at home they were not at all in tune with the times, that they had no idea what was being prepared. Let this one embarrassing surprise be enough for us! Don't run alongside the events of the time a second time! Believe us, those of us in the West and East who have lain in the front positions with open eyes and ears and listened: the Party will thank you if you now listen a little more to the current events around us. You yourself will not want to claim that your navel is the world or the center of all being. Item: There are currently more important things; Hindenburg's words apply: Not everyone seems to have yet understood that it is about being or non-existence is possible! Franz René. Church matters. In the press of the Social Democratic opposition, people are concerned about the fact that Fendrich gave a lecture in a church . They apparently do not know that the National Assembly of 1848 met in St. Paul's Church and that Robert Blum addressed the people in St. Peter's Church in Leipzig in 1848. What a distorted picture would emerge if historiography were determined by the views that emerge in the opposition press! p. 761 (#781) DIE GLOCKE 47th Issue February 17, 1917 Year 2. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source references is permitted. DR. PAUL LENSCH, M. d.R.: NOCH Hic Rhodus, hic salta! CH did not follow the severance of diplomatic relations between the American Union and the German Reich with a declaration of war. It appears as if Wilson had hoped, for a second time, to use his threat of to achieve a German withdrawal from the war. Now that this

hope has been dashed, he himself is evidently shying away from the consequences of his stance. He is waiting until a German-American incident, such as the destruction of American lives as a result of the submarine war, forces him to draw the final conclusions. The Union's military weakness is too obvious to be the basis for a policy of bluff, and the support that America could provide to the Entente through its fleet is not what the Entente needs. Here, the superiority of the British fleet suffices even for the most far-reaching demands. Likewise, the support of the alliance powers in the financial field or through material deliveries could not be significantly increased by America's entry into the war. America has already done so much here that almost nothing remains for it to do. In truth, it is less immediate dangers that have arisen for the Central Powers as a result of America's participation in the war than vague possibilities whose scope one cannot cannot yet be estimated, and which, precisely because of their indeterminacy, represent a serious burden. 47/1 p. 762 (#782) 762 Hic Rhodus, hic salta! But even beyond that, there is no reason to take the expansion of the Entente to include such a monstrous world power as America lightly. We have seen in this war with England and its empire that armies numbering millions can be trained even in states that, up until the outbreak of the war, never had any significant armies on their feet, if they are given time to train and equip them. We do not see why America should not also be able to assemble a fairly sizeable army in perhaps a year. What is important is to bring about the decision of the war so early that the Union no longer has time to militarize itself. To this end, however, the intensification of submarine warfare, now that it has been decided upon, seems to us a suitable means. to be, especially measured by the successes he has achieved so far in the short time he has led. Among these successes, one can also count the negative replies that the neutral powers unanimously and with remarkable haste gave Mr. Wilson to his friendly request to follow his example and also break off diplomatic relations with Germany. Wherever one is closer to the theater of war than in America, one certainly has the impression that the intensification of the naval war is not a "coup of desperation" by Germany, as the Entente countries would like to portray it, but rather a coolly considered means of ending the war, held back until the most effective moment. That in England, in particular, the terrible seriousness of the situation brought upon the Entente by the intensified submarine warfare has been clearly recognized is clearly evident from Lloyd George's speeches. Evidently, people there had no longer really expected this new form of warfare, partly because they relied on the impression the threatening American storm would make on Germany, and partly because

they doubted the technical capability of Central Europe for such a gigantic feat. Such a monstrous blockade, simultaneously in the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean, had never existed before, as far as we know from human history, and one cannot blame our enemies for doubting the possibility of such an undertaking. And who are the powers that have dared to attempt it? They are powers that for centuries, up until very recently, had hardly existed at sea at all or at all. Since the days of the Hanseatic League, there has been no German naval power. When a book on improving shipping was presented to the French Convention, the famous assembly laughed aloud when they heard that the book was written by a German. What did a German know about seafaring! And it is well known that the traditions of the Austrians, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and the Turks are not exactly rooted in the sea. And this alliance of traditional land powers, of all countries, has now set out to exert a stranglehold on the world's greatest naval power, whose smallest naval ally was more powerful than the countries of the current central alliance have been for centuries. Just consider this fact and the tremendous historical transformation it represents, and you will appreciate the full weight of the responsibility that those men took upon themselves who decided to intensify submarine warfare. Thus, Germany itself is forced by circumstances to attempt the monstrous feat, something that until recently, as an incomprehensible thought, found no place at all in the mind of any serious politician. In the first edition of his book, "Germany Among the World Nations," published in 1903, Dr. Rohrbach places at the head of his last chapter the anxious question: "What can help us?" and concludes: "The only truly serious and acute problem that threatens us is the possibility of war with England." Today, this possibility has become reality, under conditions that are as brilliant as possible for England, but as difficult as possible for Germany. And yet, the power that Germany is developing in this situation far exceeds the ideas that even the most determined world politicians and imperialists in Germany harbored a dozen years ago. It was the enemies who first showed this tiny empire, measured by the standards of its enemies, how strong it is, who forced it with whips and scorpions into that world-historical situation in which it is now preparing to achieve world-historical things. For the decision of February 1, 1917, is fundamentally even more momentous than the decision of August 1, 1914, and one is tempted to apply to the revolutionary role played by Germany in this war the well-known words that Marx coined about the character of proletarian revolutions: they constantly criticize themselves, continually interrupt their own course, return to what they appear to have accomplished, cruelly and thoroughly mock the half-measures, weaknesses, and

wretchedness of their first attempts, seem only to overthrow their opponent so that he can suck new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, against them, constantly recoiling anew from the indefinite enormity of their own aims, until the situation is created which makes any reversal impossible and the circumstances themselves cry out: hic Rhodus, hic salta! On February 1, the situation arose that made any reversal impossible, and only now does the indefinable enormity of Germany's own world-historical task stand inescapably before it: the shaking of English world domination. It must solve this task, under penalty of its own downfall. And therefore it will solve it. Irony and satire are the spice and the squeak of a good speech. The poet must sometimes close his eyes where the scientist must open them, and vice versa. H. Sonntag. p. 765 (#785) Delphic Oracles. 765 LITTLE-SWIFT: Delphic Oracles. In his article "In der Mauser," issue 44 of "Glocke," he describes the "constant struggle against utopia" and characterizes the intellectual structure of the theoretical greats of the Haase-Hoffmann-Bernstein group as a remnant of a bygone utopian era. Indeed, in that "genuine" Marxism, as preached in Germany by Kautsky in particular, there is a strange mixture of superficial Marxist thought with a utopianism that unhesitatingly disregards the historically given realities of political life, so that Kautsky can be called simultaneously a Marx epigone and a belated descendant of the French utopians—both, admittedly, in miniature; for the conceptual abstraction of a Marx, trained in Hegel, remains just as alien to his sober, pedagogical nature as the colorfully glowing fantasy of a Fénélon or Fourier. The humorous comparison of Kautsky with the prophetic Pythia on the Delphic tripod, which Cunow recently permitted himself in "The Bell," may perhaps be malicious, but no one who has traversed the colorful series of Kautsky's prophecies, which have been obliterated by historical developments, from his first literary attempts to his last war pamphlets, will be able to deny its accuracy. Somewhat satirically inclined, I compiled a small collection of earlier and more recent oracles from various of our living and former church saints some time ago. Naturally, I dedicated the largest part of the folder to our doyen of pure Marxism in recognition of his outstanding prophetic talent. As the following small selection shows, this folder already contains many interesting contributions to the humorous theme of "Kautsky as a bewildered Pythia." In order not to take up too much space in the Glocke, I will limit myself for the time being to a few oracles of our great theoretician on revolution and world war. More perhaps later. - p. 766 (#786) 766 Delphic oracles. The year was 1900. The Boer War was still raging when, inspired by newspaper reports, Kautsky took up his pen and, full of prophetic spirit, proclaimed the next consequences of the Boer War to

be the dominance of militarism in England, the disappearance of English liberalism, and the emergence of a powerful English Socialist Party. In his article "Militarism and England" ("Neue Zeit", 1899/1900, Volume 1, p. 593), he prophesies: "In view of all this, one may well expect that the urge for militarism, which the South African failures must arouse in the English bourgeoisie, will provoke energetic resistance from the working classes and bring about an era of severe class struggles in England, which will powerfully promote the political separation of the labor aristocracy from the bourgeoisie and thus the development of an independent socialist workers' party." Therefore, one can finally count on the "strengthening of the social-democratic spirit" in the English proletariat; for "the strength of the English proletariat guarantees us that that movement will not be stifled like this one (the Russian one)." The disappearance of English liberalism did not occur, nor did the emergence of a large socialist workers' party in England. On the contrary, the English working class, despite its vaunted strength, tolerated the blows inflicted against it. In contrast to the above proclamation, two years later, Kautsky's "Social Revolution" (p. 55) states: "Even the latest lashes of their opponents fail to rouse the proletarians of England. They remain silent when their unions are violated, silent when their bread is made more expensive. As a political factor, the English workers today stand lower than the workers of the most economically backward, politically unfree European state: Russia. It is their living revolutionary consciousness that gives the latter their great practical power; it is the renunciation of revolution, the limitation to the interests of the moment, the so-called realpolitik, that makes the former a nonentity in real politics." But this harsh judgment is not enough for our seer, who, as a great theoretician, always observes daily phenomena sub specie aeternitatis. He adds angrily: "Even bourgeois mouths complain about the moral and intellectual decline of the elite of English workers, who faithfully share in the decline of the bourgeoisie and are today hardly anything other than petty bourgeois, who differ from the others only in their somewhat greater lack of culture and whose most sublime ideal consists in aping their masters, imitating their hypocritical respectability, their admiration for wealth, however it may have been acquired, their mindless manner of killing their free time. The emancipation of their class appears to them as a foolish dream; in comparison, football, boxing, horse racing, and betting are activities that excite them profoundly, absorbing all their free time, their mental energy, and their material means. This assessment , however, did not last long. In February 1904, Kautsky was already of the opinion that the Russian proletariat was "far weaker and more immature than, say, the German or English"; nevertheless, the Russian

proletariat already had enough strength to overthrow Russian absolutism and establish a democratic regime: "A revolution in Russia could not initially establish a socialist regime. The country's economic conditions are still too immature for that. For the time being, it could only establish a democratic regime, behind which, however, would stand a strong and impetuous, forward-moving proletariat that would win considerable concessions." ("Neue Zeit", 1903/04, Volume I, p. 625.) But if the revolution breaks out in Russia, then, Kautsky further prophesies, Poland will be restored, Austria will be destroyed, and the German lands of Austria will be annexed by the German Empire: "Austria will then be destroyed, for with the collapse of Tsarism, the iron hoop that still holds together the diverging elements today will crumble. But if it comes to that, then the German Empire will be compelled to accept into its community the lands and regions of the Habsburg monarchy inhabited by Germans, insofar as they constitute a coherent whole." ("Neue Zeit", 1903/04, Volume I, p. 626.) -- Thus, the revolution will spread throughout Europe. The Balkan countries are drawn into it, the Belgian workers establish a socialist republic, and France and Germany are also caught up in the revolutionary maelstrom: "A republican Belgium ruled by the proletariat means a permanent center of revolution, an invitation to the proletarians of the other countries of Europe to imitate this example, a source of constant ferment among the lower masses outside Belgium. The governments of Germany and France must hurry to stamp out the firebrand from which such threatening sparks fly onto the patched thatched roofs of the agrarian and industrial agitators in the neighboring countries. But the very attempt to extinguish the fire could only cause it to flare up again." (Neue Zeit, 1903/04, Volume I, p. 653.) However, the destruction of Austria, the establishment of a Belgian Republic, and the revolutionization of Western Europe were all but lost. Such failures, however, cannot frighten great minds in the realm of airy imagination. Kautsky found a substitute. He quickly relocated the seat of revolution from Russia to East Asia, where Japan had meanwhile defeated Russia. Now it says: "Whatever the price of the Japanese victory may be, it must in any case entail consequences for the proletarian struggle for emancipation, the significance of which can hardly be overestimated even today. Above all, and this is the most obvious and striking point, this victory has shaken Russian absolutism so much that it will be impossible for it to regain its equilibrium. One could say that the theory of catastrophes and collapses celebrated its finest triumphs here, if such a theory had existed. But one must not allow the enthusiasm over this collapse to mislead us into forgetting that it would be impossible without the tireless, slow, and unnoticed work of undermining absolutism that had preceded it for

decades." ("Neue Zeit," 1904/05, Volume II, p. 460.) From the East comes the light. With prophetic vision, Kautsky now recognizes Japan as the country where the great proletarian revolution will certainly break out: "With Japanese capitalism, Japanese socialism must also develop, and we may assume that it will express the same energy and the same need for expansion as the entire Japanese nation, although, of course, in a completely different way and in completely different areas than the ruling classes. In keeping with the peculiarities of its capitalism, its socialism will also have to be a peculiar one; But like the former, the latter will also obtain its tools from Europe and the United States, and the more Japan enters world trade through its economic development, the more Japanese socialism, despite all its peculiarities, will acquire a p. 769 (#789) Delphic oracles. 769 develop an international character." Volume II, pp. 529/30.) ("Neue Zeit", 1904/05, And from the beautiful land of the rising sun, the revolution then inevitably spreads to China, Russia , and finally even to England: "We may still hope that the tremendous upheaval in the political and social conditions of the entire globe, which the Russo-Japanese War has unleashed, will not pass the British proletariat by without a trace, and that it will be able to draw each of the three great conservative powers, which seemed impervious to any revolution - China, Russia, and England - into the midst of the great emancipation struggles of our time, and thus enormously accelerate their pace. . . . . An era of revolutionary development has begun; the age of slow, laborious, almost imperceptible progress will give way to an epoch of revolution. . . . (Neue Zeit, 1904/05, Volume II, p. 537.) " Busch, however, was right this time too: Firstly, things turn out differently, and secondly, than one expects. Kautsky's prophetic view had once again been thoroughly mistaken. But a true prophet gives up prophesying as little as a lovesick cat gives up his longing arias. Since Japan hadn't worked out either, Kautsky once again placed his hopes on the future world war: "The world war is now moving dangerously close; but war also means revolution. In 1891, Engels still thought it would be very unfortunate for us if a war broke out that brought about revolution and brought us to power, since this would happen prematurely. For a while, the proletariat could advance more securely by exploiting the existing state ground than by risking a revolution brought about by war. Since then, the situation has changed greatly. The proletariat is Today it has grown so strong that it can face war with more calm. And it can no longer speak of a premature revolution when it has drawn as much strength from the existing state soil as it could have derived from it, when a transformation of this soil has become a condition for its further rise. The proletariat hates war with all its might; it will do everything in its power to

prevent a warlike mood from arising. Should war nevertheless break out, the proletariat is today the class that can look to its outcome with the most confidence. ("Road to Power," Berlin 1909, p. 97.) p. 770 (#790) 770 The "Finnish Question." This sounds somewhat uncertain at first. Just two years later, however, Kautsky already knows with the utmost certainty that the result of the impending world war will be social revolution and, incidentally, the founding of the great European republic: "War will be followed by revolution with inescapable certainty, not as the product of a social-democratic plan, but of the iron logic of things. Today's statesmen are counting on this outcome. - Whether the revolution emerges from the arms race or from war, it will be an international phenomenon, and its first concern will be to put an end to the horrors of war forever. It will not content itself, like our bourgeois peace enthusiasts, with the palliatives of arbitration and arms restrictions that can be breached at any moment, but will strive to create a situation that makes war impossible from the outset. It can only achieve this through the establishment of the United States of Europe. Governments that would or could oppose this will then no longer exist. ("Neue Zeit", 1910/11, Volume II, p. 106.) But since the World War became a reality, it is precisely Kautsky who is the least "confident" of all about the victorious revolution and great European republic that will soon come with "inevitable certainty." Just as he prophesied the revolution before, so he now prophesies the blackest reaction. Credit where credit is due. No one will want to deny, on the basis of such testimonies, that our doyen of Marxism can compete with any Pythia when it comes to prophesying the future. Among the old ladies who once oracled in the opisthodom at Delphi, few are likely to have possessed such a natural aptitude for prophecy. A. TOSI: FI The "Finnish Question." The Finnish Question? Is there still such a thing? Yes! Despite the World War, there is still a "Finnish Question," and it remains unresolved! Let's look back to the 1990s and the beginning of the present century. What do we find? Back then, p. 771 (#791) The "Finnish Question." In 1771, the entire civilized world was concerned with the "Finnish Question," especially the liberal circles of England and France. It was the bourgeois circles of Finland who addressed the civilized world with complaints against Russian power, and their voices were gladly heard. The measures taken by the Russian government against autonomous Finland at that time were so monstrous that the whole world took note of them with indignation. In Finland itself, a mass petition was carried out. Hundreds of thousands of signatures were collected and sent by a deputation to Petersburg, where they were presented to the Tsar with the request that he restore the Finnish constitution. The Tsar refused even to receive the deputation. Instead, the Governor-General was

invested with dictatorial power. The Finnish bourgeoisie then turned to the "most famous men in the world," famous constitutional law teachers and politicians, men of science and art, who were to condemn Russia's injustice against Finland. determine, duly examine, and suggest to the "Tsar of Peace" that he reverse the destruction of Finland's constitution. The Tsar also ignored this global petition. Russian policy had set itself the goal of oppressing Finland like the rest of Russia, degrading it to an ordinary Russian governorate, and completely depriving the country of its independence. This is the core of the Finnish Question. When the country was subjugated in 1808/1809, the Russian Emperor solemnly vowed to the representatives of the Finnish estates that he would inviolably uphold and protect the country's constitution and its unique character, the general and special rights and freedoms of the people and individuals. Every Tsar repeated this solemn vow to Finland upon his accession to the throne. But even repetition was of no avail. The entire history of Finland under the suzerainty of the Russian Tsars as Grand Dukes of Finland is simultaneously the history of Russian efforts to destroy Finland's autonomy. Russia's aim was always to completely eliminate this weak state independence. This constant goal of Russian policy towards Finland differs only in its severity, but it was never abandoned. Russian power was at its most ruthless in the 1890s up to 1905. In the years from 1901 to 1904, p. 772 (#792) 772 The "Finnish Question" -- the dictator Bobrikov completely did away with Finland's constitution. The bitterness of the people knew no bounds at that time. In June 1904, Bobrikov was mortally wounded by Eugen Schaumann, the son of a senator. Schaumann's act was highly valued as an attempt at redemption . But the dictatorship continued until it was broken in October 1905. The general strike from October 28 to November 6, 1905, radically abolished it, but unfortunately only for a few short years. This general strike united all classes of the country in the fight against the hated Russian power. The Social Democrats were in charge. The revolutionary strike was an extraordinarily successful success. For the Finnish workers went on general strike when the revolutionary movement in Russia, at its height, forced the government to capitulate. This was the time of the Tsar's proclamation of the Russian Constitution and the "Freedom Manifesto." In view of the changed situation in Russia, the reactionary bureaucracy in Finland saw itself deprived of security for the future; it became headless under the impending pressure of the general strike and left the battlefield in the dead of night, like a thief. One fine morning, Finland no longer had a single gendarme, a policeman, or a Russian governor. The rout was so complete that the Social Democratic police were able to occupy police buildings throughout the country without the slightest struggle. On

November 4, the Tsar felt compelled to announce to the Finns by manifesto that the Finnish Constitution had now been restored and that the constitutional authorities would once again administer the country. He gave new assurances regarding the rights and freedoms of the people, which would no longer be restricted. The bourgeoisie was satisfied with these assurances, but the workers demanded more: they demanded the election of a National Convention with the task of basing the constitution and the form of government on democratic principles. The bourgeoisie threatened to use force, and the workers called off the general strike on November 6 because they did not want civil war. Bourgeois circles of all stripes have always advocated the preservation of the country's autonomy within the borders that seemed advisable to them. However, until 1906 the constitution corresponded particularly to the interests of the propertied classes. In 1906, the Estates Parliament was replaced by the p. 773 (#793) The Finnish Question". 773 The struggles of social democracy were buried, and popular representation was born on the basis of universal suffrage. In 1916, social democracy achieved an absolute majority there. The great importance of social democracy in Finland suggests that we examine the position of the Workers' Party on the core issue of the "Finnish Question." This question is of particular importance because one can say that the defensive struggle cannot achieve its goal in the long run, for Finland's defensive means are very small in view of the Russian means of power and therefore promise no success. Therefore, it is advisable to join forces with the Russian proletariat and fight together against Russian power for the sake of the faster achievement of democracy in Russia. The Finnish proletariat, on the other hand, takes the position that it is its duty, especially, to stand up for the country's autonomy and not to allow Russian power to prevail. This was already established as a principle at the party's founding, with the first party congress (1899) unanimously declaring that the economic and social liberation of the Finnish working class presupposed Finland's national autonomy as one of its most important foundations, meaning that only on this basis could the liberation struggle be successfully waged. The same idea was emphasized again at the following congress (1903). And in 1906, after the dictatorship had been crushed and democratic voting rights had been achieved, the party congress in Helsinki adopted an election platform in which the demand for "full realization of the democratic principle in the political life of the country" was established as a principle. Following this, the following was declared: "Since Finland's autonomy must be considered endangered under the present Russian regime, the party declares its solidarity with the freedom movement in Russia, but reserves the right to

always keep Finland's special position in mind." When the questions of party tactics were discussed at the party congresses (1909 and 1911), the following decision was made regarding this question: "The class struggle of the Finnish working class is determined not only by the bourgeoisie of its own country, but also very essentially by the reactionary efforts of the ruling classes in Russia and their government, which are aimed at restricting our right to our own legislation and the right of self-taxation of the Finnish people, as well as at p. 774 (#794) 774 The "Finnish Question". Aim to diminish other rights and freedoms of Finnish citizens and, in addition to destroying the country's autonomy, also aim at its economic exploitation and work towards undermining public education. Therefore, the working class must also direct its struggle against these efforts and continue to tirelessly advocate for the expansion of all the rights mentioned." The report of the Party Executive to the Vienna Congress contained a very good commentary on these resolutions of the party congresses. It included, among other things, the following statements: "Finnish Social Democracy considers a decisive resistance to the current policies of the Russian rulers and their Finnish accomplices to be absolutely necessary. It is true that the Finnish constitution can by no means be called democratic, and the proletarians of Finland, like those of all countries, suffer under the pressure of class rule. But despite all its shortcomings, the Finnish legal system represents a more advanced standpoint than Russian absolutism and bureaucratism. Universal suffrage, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association are the valuable achievements of our political development to date, which the Russian people unfortunately do not yet possess. And thanks to these rights of ours, our labor movement has been able to develop vigorously. Such Achievements must be vigorously defended against the onslaught of reaction. Finnish Social Democracy has always advocated this fundamental standpoint.... The defensive struggle of the Finnish proletariat (with regard to the country's autonomy) is, of course, directed against the Russian rulers and not against the Russian people. Finnish Social Democracy has often declared that the Finnish working class would welcome the opportunity to enter into closer relations with the Russian people, both economically and politically, and in the sphere of intellectual life. We regard such relations as extremely valuable and indulge in the pleasant hope that such relations will arise and develop in the future, once the chauvinistic policies of the present rulers have been removed as an obstacle. At its congresses, Finnish Social Democracy has often expressed its fraternal solidarity with the class-conscious Russian proletariat in the conviction that the progress of Russian ar- workers' movement will also promote and secure the inner freedom of the

Finnish people." - In accordance with the congress resolutions, the Social Democratic parliamentary group in the state parliament has always made the defense of the country's autonomy a priority. And the opportunity to do so presented itself very frequently. For the reactionary onslaught of Russian power resumed soon after 1906. Even under the current state of siege, the Finnish people are striving to preserve their autonomy and defend themselves against Russian power. However, this struggle has remained almost fruitless. For with the outbreak of the World War, Russian power has taken over, and constitutional rights and freedoms have been suspended. The state of siege was not imposed on the basis of Finnish law; rather, military power is based on Russian law. Thus, another open violation of the constitution! In the autumn of 1915, all sections of the population demanded, through their organs, the convening of the people's representatives. The Russian authorities brazenly ignored this. With this demand, as well as with the result of the July election, the people reaffirmed their continued determination to defend their rights. Whether the World War will bring a solution to the "Finnish Question," who can say? However, it seems certain that a strengthening of Russian power would only worsen Finland's situation. HUGO POETZSCH: England as the protector of small nations. As is well known, England intervened in the war only to protect small nations from German greed for conquest. How it understood this protection can be seen in the treatment it accorded to little Greece during the war. The actions of the English in Egypt, South Africa, and other countries have also rightly been pointed out. The manner in which England drove the Boer states to war has long been clearly established in history; but it seems appropriate to recall the events of 1899 once again, especially now. Four months after the Hague Peace Conference, England found itself in the midst of a war against the Boer states. How did this happen? The answer in England at the time was simply that the blame lay with the unwise and unjustified ultimatum of the Transvaal government, p. 776 (#796) 776 England as protector of small nations. which had forced the English into war. It is true that the ultimatum was the immediate cause of the war. Did the Boers want to achieve supremacy over South Africa, or did they fear that the English would oppress them? In investigating this question, we follow English sources, particularly the documents published during and after the war by the Manchester Transvaal Peace Committee. In 1886, the South African gold fields were discovered. From this time on, there was a strong immigration of all kinds of nations, but especially of Englishmen, to the South African Boer states. Like all other foreigners in all other states, they had no participation in government. And it cannot be denied that, over time, various grievances had developed for the

Outlanders. At the time of Jameson's Raid, it was said in England that the foreigners were in despair over the injustice they had endured. However, Sir Robinson, an English official in South Africa, wrote to Chamberlain that if civil war broke out, over half of the Outlanders would side with the Boers. In June 1899, a conference took place in Bloemfontein between Sir Alfred Milner, the The conference took place between the then Governor of the Cape Colony, and President Kruger. Milner proposed that after five years of residence in the Transvaal Republic, a foreigner should be granted the right to vote, retroactively, so that those who had already been in the country for five years would be granted the right to vote immediately. Foreigners should receive at least seven seats in Parliament. Although no agreement was reached at the conference, President Kruger introduced a bill upon his return that made significant concessions to the Outlanders. According to this bill, foreigners would be granted the right to vote after seven years of residence, with retroactive effect. The London Times declared at the time that the crisis could thus be considered over, and Mr. Chamberlain himself said in the House of Commons that Kruger's proposals were suitable to form a basis for an agreement. A joint commission of representatives from both governments should consider the matter further. Perhaps the Boers had acted wisely in accepting Chamberlain's proposal; But they saw it as a violation of their independence and rejected it. After all, they had been granted full self-determination in internal affairs at the Convention of 1884. Chamberlain himself had described the Boer states as a foreign state in a "friendly contractual relationship" with Her Majesty (Queen of England) Government. Now—as on p. 777 (#797)—England as the protector of small nations. In 777, one of the aforementioned documents states that one does not go to a foreign state and demand that it participate in an investigation concerning its own laws. A foreign state of greater power would have regarded such a request as an insult. For two years, Chamberlain had been trying to obtain general suzerainty over the Boer states, and in October 1897, when the Boers proposed submitting the matter to arbitration, he replied that a suzerain could not turn to strangers to mediate between him and a vassal. To avoid all this hassle, on August 19, 1899, the Boers made an offer regarding the right to vote that went far beyond Milner's demands. Compare: Milner's proposal: Voting rights after 5 years. 7 seats for the Goldfields. At least one-fifth for the Goldfields. Boer proposal: Voting rights after 5 years. 8 seats for the Goldfields. One-quarter of the seats for the Goldfields. The Boers made these concessions subject to the following conditions: 1. that there should be no further interference in their internal affairs; 2. that the English government should no longer insist on assuming suzerainty over the Boer

states; 3. that the other disputed issues should be submitted to arbitration. This dispatch arrived in London on August 22, and Chamberlain described the offer as "extraordinarily promising." As late as August 26, one day before the reply to Kruger was sent, Chamberlain said in a speech that President Kruger was dripping with concessions like a "soaked sponge"; but the accompanying conditions were impossible. The reply itself was couched in ambiguous terms. The arbitration was accepted. Regarding suzerainty, he (Chamberlain) maintained his own view; but he attached no importance to restating it. The reply, on the whole, had to be regarded as an acceptance of Kruger's conditions, and in a speech in the House of Commons, Chamberlain declared it to be so. The note continued, saying that England must reserve the right to refrain from future interference, for a civilized state has a duty to protect its citizens in foreign lands from injustice. 47/2 p. 778 (#798) 778 England as protector of small nations. Reitz, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Transvaal, hastened to explain that the Boers had not meant this either. The note to Kruger then spoke of "other questions" that could not be submitted to arbitration. The result was that the Transvaal government withdrew its offer and now agreed to the establishment of a mixed commission. It had previously assured itself with Milner that its new offer did not override the earlier proposal of the English government. To its astonishment, it had to watch the English government withdraw its own proposal on September 8. This also convinced the Orange Free States government that the English were not concerned with resolving the grievances, but rather with destroying the South African republics. President Steyn expressed this in a telegram to Milner. The English government then demanded its own proposals from the Transvaal government, and when these failed to materialize, the British government promised that it would now formulate proposals on how the grievances should be resolved in detail. This was on September 22. In the meantime, large numbers of English troops were amassing in South Africa, and reinforcements were arriving continuously. The promised English proposals never materialized. On September 27, and then on October 3 and 4, President Steyn (Orange Free States) sent telegrams to Milner, offering negotiations but simultaneously demanding that troop buildups on the border cease as long as peaceful negotiations were underway. On September 30, the Transvaal government again urgently demanded that the English proposals be transmitted. The response was the dispatch of an army corps to South Africa and the call-up of the reserves. The Boers sent an ultimatum in which they once again declared their willingness to resolve all outstanding issues through arbitration, but that they would have to regard the continued massing of troops on their

borders as a declaration of war. This was, in fact, the end of the diplomatic war. This leads to the following: The Boers had repeatedly made concessions in matters in which the English had no right to interfere. When the Boers accepted the English proposals, the English withdrew them. And when the Boers then made an offer that the English government had described as extraordinarily promising, they received such an insulting and p. 779 (#799) Employee policy and social democracy. 779 ambiguous answer that they had to interpret this as a rejection, and no attempt was made by the English side to correct this error. Then, the proposals promised by the English side were not made; instead, military preparations were hastily made on a large scale. And when the Boer government finally urgently demanded the English government's proposals, the latter responded by sending an army corps. If the Boers truly intended to unleash a war against England, they would have acted incredibly foolishly by waiting until the English had made all their military preparations, because they would have had to start the fight when the English colonies in South Africa were still completely undefended. It became clear that all the English diplomatic maneuvers had been carried out solely to gain time to make military preparations. The intention of truly reaching an understanding with the Boers while maintaining the Free States was completely nonexistent on the English side. No less a figure than Sir Edward Clarke expressed this in the House of Commons. During the Address debate on October 20, 1899, he said, referring to the English Blue Book: "We have heard from the Right Honorable Gentleman (Chamberlain) the assurance that he has worked for peace. But if he has worked for peace, then, I cannot help saying it here, a more clumsy correspondence cannot be imagined." It is clear that England wanted war to achieve the subjugation of the Boers, which could not be achieved voluntarily. The South African republics were to be destroyed and incorporated into the English Empire. This is how England protects small nations. W. SOLLMANN: Employee Policy and Social Democracy. The still young class of private employees has grown from around 500,000 members in 1882 to around 2 million at the last occupational census in 1907. Of these, approximately 1,100,000 were male citizens over 25 years of age and constituted seven percent of the 1907 Reichstag voters, thus representing an important factor in the votes of political parties. Private employees are proletarians, since they own nothing but their labor, from the sale of which they live. The fact that their income does not exceed that of qualified workers is once again demonstrated by the statistical data contained in the report of the Reich Insurance Institute for Employees for the year 1915. Of the 1,205,945 male employees recorded, 757,389, or 62.80 percent, had a salary of up to 2,000 marks. An annual

income of just under 2,000 marks proved to be the average salary even in the 25- to 30-year-old age group. Only in the older age groups did the average salary rise to 2,300 to 2,400 marks. However, the overall average annual salary for male employees was only 1,870.75 marks. Only 16.5 percent of employees were under 20 years of age. The average age, in contrast, was 28.51 years. The statistics are made even more noteworthy by the finding that the average annual salary has fallen by 70 marks in the last two years, and this sharp decline in income can be observed for both male and female employees of all age groups. According to the unanimous opinion of all strands of the white-collar workers' movement, strong tendencies toward a further deterioration of white-collar workers' incomes have been at work during and after the war. Women's work, especially in commerce, has increased enormously, and there is no prospect of its wage-depressing effects being curbed any time soon. Numerous war-disabled individuals who are no longer capable of manual work are, after brief training in courses offered by the War Disabled Persons' Welfare Service, pushed into offices, warehouses, and technical bureaus. This not only reduces the number of jobs available for employees returning from the field and for the young people trained in the country, but also poses a particular danger of wage suppression, because they, and especially employers, are all too inclined to reduce wages by the amount of pensions. Two clearly visible phenomena have so far emerged from this unfavorable situation: a widespread radicalization of employees and the zealous efforts of the leaders of almost all bourgeois employee associations to achieve a permanent cessation of the feuds between these organizations. p. 781 (#801) Employee Policy and Social Democracy. 781 The radicalization of employees is not a claim based solely on vague conjectures. The archives of the civil servants' associations contain evidence of this from members in the field and at home, some of which is also in our possession, but cannot be published at present. Suffice it to point out that the leader of the 1858 Commercial Association of Hamburg, one of the most tame employee organizations, admits in his wartime pamphlet "Private Official Policy after the War" (Marcus and Weber in Bonn): "That a certain hardening of views has emerged cannot be denied. The organizations will in any case have to reckon with this mood, which they are familiar with from field post letters, even after the war." In other places, the author sadly admits the "more radical mood" of the private employees, who had mostly been so gentle before the war. It is also a fact, for which documents will be available in due course, that the "hardening of views" has perhaps occurred most strongly among the members of the German National Association, who, during the two years of war, experienced a complete

collapse of their hurrah-fueled, unpleasantly remembered peacetime zeal. Is the rapprochement of most bourgeois employee associations now taking place in order to exploit the more radical mood, nurtured by the worsening economic situation, for a fight for better living conditions? Not at all. While the workers' organizations, including the Christian Nationalists, are already expressing a willingness to wage potentially difficult struggles between capital and labor after the war, one senses absolutely nothing of this in the rallies of the employee organizations, insofar as they are significant in terms of membership. They merely refer their members to the legislation that must help the beleaguered employees. While the Central Association of Sales Assistants and the Association of Office Employees contrast sharply with the combat fatigue of their bourgeois competitors, their decades of courageous and tenacious work have yielded so few organizational successes that their fighting spirit is in no way capable of overcoming the resistance of the large bourgeois associations. It would be unfair and superficial to seek the explanation for the bourgeois employee associations' tactics of avoiding all serious conflicts solely in their lack of union training, as is often done in agitation work. p. 782 (#802) 782 Employee Policy and Social Democracy. If the free trade unions have been able to achieve a free trade union technician movement—there is still no such thing as a free trade union movement—and despite admirable agitational efforts over many years, they have barely been able to reach a fortieth of the membership of the bourgeois sales assistant movement, and this primarily among cooperative employees, then the trade union activity of sales assistants, who form the important core of private employees, must face obstacles that cannot be explained by the slogan "class prejudice." These obstacles lie less in the fact that a steadily decreasing proportion of sales assistants are able to become self-employed, than in the fact that developments have indeed created a larger number of "better-paid" positions, even if they usually only bring in 2,400 to 3,000 marks annually. Advancing to this position is the ambition of precisely the more capable and determined sales assistants. Since, however, higher positions are only available to a limited number of white-collar workers, the applicant sees every competitor as his rival, with whom he may organize in a support and job-placement association, but not in a strike club. The worker's situation allows him to increase his income, which is generally the same for all workers in his line of work, only through joint action with his colleagues. The sales assistant, on the other hand, sees a great diversity of positions and salaries. He therefore seeks to outdo his colleague through more thorough training and better performance, and often enough through intrigue. These and similar obstacles to union organizing among white-collar workers will

continue to exist for the time being even after the war, until the progressive economic leveling of white-collar workers works more in the hands of the unions. This leveling is already more advanced among technicians, who are therefore showing better tendencies toward union activity, but also only beginnings, which were weakened again during the war by an unnecessary split in the Association of Technical-Industrial Officials. While it seems questionable whether the more radical mood after the war will soon lead to a strengthening of union organizations, it can be safely assumed that it will accelerate the politicization of white-collar workers. Even before the war, there was growing zeal for their votes. In numerous large cities, they tip the scales. Reichstag constituencies such as Cologne, Magdeburg, and similar cannot be won even by the Social Democrats without a large number of white-collar votes. Reflecting their limited economic knowledge and political training, the majority of white-collar workers oscillated between the bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats in the elections. An election with a colonial slogan drew them into the nets of the "national" parties, and an anti-consumer financial reform based on the methods of the liquor store drove them into the social democratic electorate. Meanwhile, the political orientation of the white-collar workers' associations made progress over the last decade. However, this continually placed the politically active leaders of the white-collar workers in the most embarrassing predicament, because they could not find a bourgeois party that fully satisfied the masses of their members. Thus, the German nationalist leader Wilhelm Schack, elected to the Reichstag in 1907, joined the agrarian-petty-bourgeois Economic Association. The leader of the clerks' workers, united in the Leipzig Association, took a seat on the National Liberal benches in 1912 as a very modest figure. The technicians' union remained without parliamentary representation; its leading figures had made the hopeless attempt to force entry into the Reichstag as candidates of the democratic association. A personnel union between one of the major employee associations and the Center has not yet been attempted. The strong religious mix of the members precludes this. It is certain that after the war, the "sharpened views" and the "more radical mood" of the white-collar workers could not find satisfaction in either an agrarian, guild-based, anti-Semitic party or a national-liberal representation of the educated and propertied classes. After all, decisive demands for alleviating economic hardship naturally arise from the more radical mood of the white-collar workers. None of the essential demands of the white-collar workers contradict the interests of the entire working class, of which the white-collar class is only a part, or the programmatic demands of social democracy. In contrast, almost every important wish of the white-

collar workers encounters stubborn resistance from the bourgeoisie and its parties, albeit often masked for electoral reasons. A complete economic and political community of interest between white-collar workers and workers also exists on the major general problems: economic, customs, and financial policy, democratization of the electoral law (p. 784, #804). 784 White-collar policy and Social democracy, and administration, housing reform, and whatever the major issues of the near future may be called. As wage earners dependent on the owners of the means of production and under the ever-increasing pressure of the capitalists, white-collar workers are no less interested in the speedy overcoming of capitalism by socialist democracy than all other groups of the proletariat. It is to be hoped that commercial assistants, in particular, will now show greater understanding of socialist ideals, now that the war economy has shown them that the elimination of "free trade" does not make the forces for the distribution of goods superfluous, but merely blocks these forces from the possibility of private enrichment, which, after all, is only possible for independent merchants, not for their employees . The fact that bourgeois associations can only refer their members to legislation will be a boost to our political recruitment and educational work. The grotesque distortion of international aspirations as a lack of nationality greatly helped the bourgeois white-collar leaders until August 1914 to divert masses of white-collar workers from the path to social democracy. This grotesque will no longer frighten them. The assertion now pressing in its place that social democracy is only the party of the industrial proletariat will be refuted by our postwar recruitment efforts through the most powerful counter-evidence. It is necessary, however, that the political conquest of white-collar workers becomes a zealously cultivated special area of our work, as was repeatedly demanded in motions to the Party Congress in the last years before the war. While there is no special class of private employees, as the proclaimers of a "new middle class" still claim, it is true that the class of employees, due to their origins, their particular economic traditions, their working methods, their social position, and other existing imponderables, requires a special kind of advertising activity. The derogatory slogan "stand-up collar proletarian," which has cost us the sympathy of many employees, is really not enough. Just as we cannot attract agricultural workers and small farmers with the same methods as the urban industrial proletarians—as is generally understood—just as private employees cannot be won over with the same means as, say, bricklayers or transport workers. A clever differentiation of our agitation, not according to professions, but according to social classes, is not a violation of the principles of a socialist people's party. This is not the place to develop these methods of advertising

in detail. It is sufficient if these sketchy references to the problem stimulate thought and stimulate the will to act in organizations and in the press. All the best also to the efforts to organize and train private employees in unions! More promising and therefore more important is their political conquest. The battle for the soul of private employees will not be fought through unions, but politically. FRIEDRICH KLEEIS: Fight against common diseases! The war presented social policy with many new tasks. In particular, it gave new impetus to the fight against common diseases. There are two reasons for this. First, the war has spread some common diseases even further, and second, it has given increased impetus to nurture public health as one of the nation's most precious assets. Thus, we see a number of the agencies responsible for this effort to establish new measures to limit the diseases that appear as mass phenomena. These agencies are primarily private corporations . Unfortunately, the state and local governments have not yet participated in the fight to any significant extent, either through legislation or administration. This explains why the measures taken are often still piecemeal. Besides a few non-profit organizations, it is primarily the social insurance agencies that have taken up the fight and devoted funds to it. The Reich Insurance Code (§§ 363, 1269) also permits the allocation of funds for "general purposes of disease prevention" to a greater extent than the previous individual insurance laws. This also follows, however, that since then, the fight against contagious diseases has largely remained limited to the population subject to compulsory insurance. Of the individual types of disease, venereal diseases in particular have recently earned increased attention. This is no surprise: Wars, which intervene so deeply in family life, have always enormously increased these diseases. From the beginning of the war, the German Society for the Control of Venereal Diseases has developed extensive educational activities and distributed many millions of instructive leaflets and information leaflets in the garrisons at home and out in the field. However, it has also, in the awareness that such warnings are often ignored Constant contact with the military and civil authorities has been sought in order to gain a direct influence on reducing the incidence of disease through appropriate administrative measures. Measures such as the closure of bars and brothels, the shortening of curfews and evening leave, the creation of alcohol-free soldiers' hostels, the monitoring of street prostitution and corner hotels, regular medical examinations of soldiers, and ample opportunity for careful and thorough specialized medical treatment have been suggested and implemented. Among practical institutions, the "Advice Centers for Sexually Transmitted Persons" deserve particular mention. These were approved at a major conference held on October 25, 1915, at the Reich

Insurance Office. Their purpose is to provide free and strictly confidential advice to persons suffering from, or at risk of suffering from, venereal diseases or their sequelae. The advice center covers all persons residing or permanently employed in their district who belong to, or are closely related to, the population insured under the Reich Insurance Code and the Insurance Act for Employees. The costs of establishing and maintaining the advice centers, as well as the travel expenses of the insured, are borne by the disability and insurance institutions. Currently, over fifty such advice centers are already in operation. They are being prepared in a large number of other cities. Based on an agreement with the insurance institution, the health insurance funds report all cases of which they become aware to the advice center. Tuberculosis was also affected by the war. The long-standing struggle against this insidious disease was not without success. In the German Empire, 18.93 out of 10,000 people died of tuberculosis in 1906, compared to only 15.34 in 1913. It is a general observation that the war increased the incidence of tuberculosis and deaths. For those who fought, the many exertions (exhaustion, colds, etc.), but also the possibility of easier infections, contributed to those who stayed at home suffering from poor nutrition. However, the Army Administration immediately initiated welfare measures for soldiers with lung diseases, primarily by placing them in pulmonary sanatoriums. On March 1, 1915, 3,500 soldiers were accommodated in this way. Care for those discharged from military service with lung diseases, as well as for the civilian population suffering from lung diseases in general, is organized by the German Central Committee for the Fight against Tuberculosis. This committee has implemented special measures for those discharged from the military with lung diseases within the framework of the war invalids' welfare program. These measures aim to provide the earliest and most extensive treatment possible. The number of adult pulmonary sanatoriums now stands at 161 with 16,083 beds, allowing 64,332 patients to be admitted annually for an average three-month treatment period. Furthermore, 163 children's sanatoriums, 139 forest recreation centers, 314 tuberculosis hospitals, etc., are in operation. The number of information and welfare centers for pulmonary patients is approximately 1,900. In 1914, the Reich granted the Central Committee a subsidy of 110,000 marks. Furthermore, the funds for combating tuberculosis are primarily provided by the disability insurance institutions, which have treated approximately 450,000 patients with lung disease in sanatoriums since 1897 at a cost of nearly 250 million marks. Cancer is experiencing a steady increase; in 1913, 54,253 deaths from cancer were recorded in the German Reich. In recent years, state committees for the research and control

of cancer have been established in individual states. Their purpose is to bring patients to medical care as early as possible. The number of lupus patients is also not insignificant, estimated at around 8,000. The Central Committee for the Control of Tuberculosis has expanded its activities into this area and established specialized sanatoriums. Welfare for alcoholics has been organized by the "Central Office for Alcoholics' Welfare," founded in 1915, which operates more than 200 alcoholics' welfare centers. Through systematic treatment, a large proportion of patients have been persuaded to abstinence. Much more could be done to further perfect what has already been undertaken. In addition to the social measures that are paramount here, such as improving nutritional conditions, rational housing policy, etc., other measures that should be mentioned include the creation of uniform health statistics, the introduction of mandatory reporting for certain infectious diseases (tuberculosis, syphilis), the establishment of diagnostic institutes, public education through traveling exhibitions, lectures, free distribution of publications, the introduction of family assistance through health insurance funds (free medical treatment and medicines for uninsured family members of fund members), expanded care in sanatoriums and convalescent homes, etc. A generous regulation of the entire medical care of the people in accordance with the Social Democratic program is also proving increasingly urgent. Dr. CONRAD SCHMIDT: ARNE Garborg - Arne Garborg. The name is half-forgotten in Germany today. And yet, despite his premature eclipse, this man, in whom such great hopes were pinned at the end of the 1880s and the beginning of the 1890s, during the time of the young naturalist movement, remains one of the most striking figures in modern literature, and of the Norwegians who came after Ibsen and Björnson, arguably the most significant in his own way. A brooding and pessimistic figure, who, in his tumultuously melancholy inwardness, at the height of his creativity, created a work that, as a psychological document of its time, can certainly claim the same status as the young Goethe's Werther. The poet, born in 1851, grew up in humble circumstances in a strictly pietistic home. It's reasonable to assume that these childhood impressions were partly the reason why he later, especially after his major work, "Tired Souls," in which the hero's despair ultimately culminates in a kind of fervent longing for faith, was driven to depict religious spiritual struggles and conflicts. His last novel, "Peace," published in 1893, a few years after "Tired Souls," paints a grim picture of the development of religious madness in a lonely, sectarian peasant. And in the few works that have appeared in German since then, and which, like "Peace," already reveal a noticeable decline in plastic creative power, a turning to "The Lost Father," in the drama "Paulus" - in the sketch

"The Lost Father," a clear turn toward a Tolstoyan-tinged Christianity of sacrificial renunciation emerges. The hero of the drama, a wealthy farmer, gives all his possessions to the poor and is socially ostracized for it. After a brief preparation in the seminary, Garborg becomes a primary school teacher for a while, but soon gives up the position to study penniless in Christiania, driven by a thirst for knowledge. There he switches to the camp of radicalism, which in Norway has a particularly pro-farmer and national character, and as editor of a radical newspaper, he already advocates for the Landsmaal, the Norwegian folk dialect that has been pushed back by the Danish written language. He also wrote his later books and is still active as a journalist today. His contemporary novel "Bauernstudenten" (Farmers' Students), for which he drew material from his own Christian student experiences, caused a great stir. A significant book for that period, in which naturalism did not yet have a solid tradition, also in the form of its detailed, accurate depiction of reality. The story tells of a peasant boy who, discovered and taught by a pro-people, nationally romantic teacher, reaches university with all kinds of support, only to oscillate between the most diverse "directions," incapable of any independent thought, ultimately striving only for the goal of a well-paid parish and a profitable marriage. Bright light is shed on the nature and life, ideals and practices of the peasant student body of that time. But the intellectual emptiness of the central figure and the broad episodic nature of the whole preclude it from generating strong interest in today's reading. Alongside this, he writes a trait reminiscent of related inclinations of Ibsen and Björnson in their earlier years: Old Norse tales and legends. Then came, a mighty advance, "Mannslüd," a sketchbook whose German translation was published under the title "Aus der Männerwelt" by a poorly appointed Budapest publisher and is today (presumably for this reason) in It is almost impossible to find in bookstores anymore. Not even the Berlin Royal Library, which is so rich in fiction, owns a copy. p. 790 (#810) 790 Arne Garborg. Anyone who was young at that time and belonged to the circles that saw in naturalism a revolutionary intellectual phenomenon related to the great current of socialist social criticism will still remember the eminent impression of that little book. There, sexuality, which in the usual novellas and novels appears only aesthetically sublimated, was portrayed in its unexplained, dull, instinctive compulsive power, with all the mental struggles, depressions, and cynicism that are associated with it, especially in adolescence. And at the same time, it was completely different, much more intimate, more individual than in Zola's social novels. As new as the material was also the impressionistically vibrant style, which vividly reflects the flow of impressions and thoughts. Compare this abundance with

the monotony of Wedekind's erotic marionette figures, which lack a language of their own. Already here in these sketches, Gabriel Gram appears: unable to restrain himself, a reclusive person, half cynic and half aesthete, who, for all the intelligence that sets him apart from his comrades, nevertheless seems destined to suffer shipwreck in life due to his weakness of will. We meet him, who later becomes the hero of "Tired Souls," also in the novel "At Mama's," which tells the sad, in many ways typical, youthful story of a poor, intellectually active, middle-class girl. If one opens this book again today, often reprinted in the German working-class press at the time and exudes the same resolute and harsh sense of truth as "Mannslüd," one initially fears that it will not live up to the promise of memory. There is no longer much interest in the naturalistic detail that lingers on depicting small everyday occurrences, and which, after the much more concise "Mannslüd," is noticeable here just as it was earlier in the Bauernstudenten (farmer students). The description of little Fanny's childhood does carry a lot of baggage. But then interest grows stronger and stronger, and memory proves right in the end. Down to the very last fibers of her being, the undercurrent of unsatisfied erotic need that she tries to conceal from her own consciousness in anxious, vague shame, reveals the fundamentally healthy and lovable nature of a girl. Alone next to her embittered mother, divorced from her husband, clings to p. 791 (#811) Arne Garborg. 791 Fanny, sometimes almost despairing in the grind of empty daily work, instinctively clings to anything that lets the glimmer of something higher, a distant hope, linger in the gray. At one point she seeks solace from enthusiastic sectarians. Then, under the influence of an eager student, she converts to radicalism and women's emancipation. Ibsen's "Nora" becomes a gospel to her. But her attendance at workers' meetings is suspicious to her boss. She must fear losing her job. The spun threads loosen. And after this brief period of relief, the paralyzing feeling of complete purposelessness descends upon her young soul with doubly oppressive force. Her feminine organism, weakened by inner torment and by standing still in the office, collapses in a nervous breakdown. She perceives the doctor's insinuations that her condition will only improve permanently after marriage as an outrageous insult. There she meets Gram by chance at a friend's house. He is so different from the students she used to know. His very personal way of looking at things and people, the flow of his ideas and images impresses her, sets her imagination in motion. His reputation as a nasty, slovenly man and an even worse free spirit increases the power of their attraction. Nothing is sacred to him, and he has a particular fondness for mocking the gods of her latest faith, which seems to her to be the epitome of enlightenment. And in turn, the fact that

she , the handsome curly-haired boy, can laugh so merrily at his jokes draws him to her. "You can go to the pub," he discovers with sympathetic admiration the very first time. In the description of this very peculiar relationship, which the author allows us to see only from the girl's perspective, thus fragmentarily and incompletely, the novel's subtle analysis of the soul reaches its climax. The long, familiar wanderings with her new companion speed up the young blood's circulation through her veins, filling her with an indefinite hope for life. She is not thinking of a lifelong commitment and, according to his statements, cannot think of it. But even the possibility of a free, unconstrained love affair, which her good friends take for granted in such relationships, does not even arise seriously in her mind. Her self-confident p. 792 (#812) 792 Arne Garborg. Girlish pride allows her to compromise herself in the opinion of others, but not to do what is forbidden, what appears forbidden to her own feelings. If it's If only things would stay as they are for much longer, all her hope is concentrated in this wish. She has no idea what is going on in her friend's soul, what might underlie his attempts to evade her, and the sudden outburst of his wild desire surprises her like something painfully terrible. She tears herself away. And the angry letter the offended man writes finishes off her confidence. Her strength is broken. Why want anything anymore when every hope fails miserably again and again? Mama may be right that in the end, all that matters is provision. And she sells herself to the repulsive old boss, the "Death of Lübeck," who has been lying in wait for her for years, in the marriage pact. This love story, extinguished in the hopeless misery of everyday life, seen only through the eyes of the man, winds its way through the wonderfully moving portrait of self-destruction and hopeless pessimism in "Tired Souls" as one of the leitmotifs. While poetry usually only reveals the inner workings of characters in the course of external events, on the occasion of which, under whose pressure, the being and essence of the individual express themselves in certain reactions, here the external framework shrinks to a minimum. The individual emerges not in the form of action, but above all and primarily in the way it reacts to life's events with moods and general reflections. This internalization—precisely the source of the generous originality of the work—reaches into the sphere of reasoning, otherwise avoided because of its brittleness and abstractness, into the realm of worldviews, whose insoluble fundamental questions continually hammer the consciousness. Life-affirming and life-denying moods, which call for reflection, naturally exist side by side in every age and are also expressed in fiction, often in very rapid succession, whose rapid pace of change is sometimes reminiscent of a change of fashion. It is certainly a welcome ,

favorable sign that that literary intermezzo, which at the beginning of the 1890s and earlier had been drummed up under the slogan of fin-de-siècle decadence, has faded so quickly and so thoroughly that it is hardly remembered anymore. But if one can rightly call Garborg's "Tired Souls" the novel of decadence - Gram wants to see in it the sign that European humanity has lost its way - then it must be added that this poetic reflection strips away all those artificially giggly traits that played such a role in the movement, and grasps the underlying humanity behind the fuss of fashion, which can be of lasting interest. That Gram, who so loves to reason, is ultimately certainly no "thinker," that his logic often performs the strangest somersaults, is no more a deficiency in the work than the hesitancy, indeed the downright pathology, of the tendencies evident in Gram's outlook. Does the poet, by presenting a view of life in a poetic manner—that is, presenting it as the expression of a living individual—want to propaganda for this view?! How the poet himself stands in relation to the thoughts he presents in this way—whether they appear to him to be true, false, supportive, or inhibiting—is a question that leads away from the realm of poetry. The value of the work is determined, entirely independently of this, by the degree to which it succeeds in individualizing the universality of ideas, in giving it the moving and stimulating expression of life of a truly self-contained personality. Moreover, every unbiased reader, when he The question of the poet's own position raises the impression that Garborg's intention is nothing more than to gloss over illness in a whitewashed way. The words which Goethe has the shadow of his Werther speak: "Be a man and do not follow me," could also stand as a motto for this book. Gram, from whose diary entries the novel is composed, is a man who, through his bachelor solitude and the indifferent job of a draftsman in the ministerial office, which requires only a few hours, has been detached from the real yoke of everyday worries, which leaves no room for further brooding, and for whom this very freedom becomes his downfall. In his monologue, the sparks of his dazzling spirit, trapped in the circle of eternal doubt, sparkle. Sneering remarks about friends who fall off like hair with age, jotted down at midnight after a visit to Jonathan, the rationalist Anglomaniac and utilitarian, form the first atmospheric opening. And immediately, morbid hallucinations follow. He thinks he hears footsteps, perhaps Fanny's, on the stairs outside. "A good glass of toddy and then off to bed!" The image of the dear curly-haired man with the deep, sucking eyes has completely thrown him off track. Despite all the arts of skeptical reflection, he cannot banish it from his imagination. "Resignation was humbug." Up until the age of 30, you can wander around and console yourself with the thought that people will be happy someday; but as you

approach your forties, a voice inside you begins to speak louder and louder: You, you, you yourself should be living! I am a note, a single, poor melody that demands, demands to be harmonized... For me, it was harmonization, unfortunately not entirely, not fully enough... and now the solitary melody sounds even lonelier, duller, more godforsaken through my desolate existence... " --- The fragility of his nature, endowed with the richest gifts but deprived of any firm resolve by the habit of undermining his emotions, which has become a mania, is expressed just as convincingly in the entire type of his other thinking as in the mental games into which this love evaporates within him. The prose of the diary has the compact abundance of poems, in which each rereading discovers striking new turns of phrase. Nowhere is there a single unrelated dead space. And all this, despite the fact that, as already mentioned, there is hardly any mention of hope. One would have to fill pages upon pages with quotations to give even a hint of the abundance and richness that is lavishly scattered everywhere. Romantic enthusiasm, playful paradoxes, lacerating cynicisms, disgust with life and longing for peace, the escape into debauchery and abysmal melancholy, -- p. 795 (#815) Arne Garborg. 795 Dithyrambs of love and the feeling for nature, observations of marital status of grotesque comedy, blasphemies, and moods of surrendering religious need pass before life's imagination in an eternally changing flight and, always maintaining an individual resonance, the basic tone of this Gramian personality. It is a subtle touch that just as his sharp-eyed mind so often fails to see the forest for the trees, so too does his intimate understanding of women's characters fail precisely at crucial points. Just as his tormenting mistrust of Fanny goes astray, he is just as thoroughly mistaken about the clever companion with whom he discusses the advantages of marriages of convenience. He thinks she is only waiting for him; only to learn, as he prepares to propose, that, despite all those sensible theories, she has just become engaged to her childhood sweetheart. He, for whom Fanny was not enough, is now Not even good enough for a philistine marriage! What is there left in life? "Art, art—what is art after all? One more delicacy for those who have an appetite, and one more mockery for those who are weary of life... And science? An excellent guide in unimportant matters; a complete doctor. Helpless when things go wrong. ... And love? Our most painful illness. And marriage? The cure that is worse than the illness. And everything? Everything? Everything?" — — - --- -- What Hermann Bahr attempts to portray in his latest novel, "Ascension," with an expenditure of all kinds of artificial casuistry—the return of a free-spirited bon vivant to the bosom of the church—takes place in Garborg's work as a process of entirely closed inner coherence. It is a slow descent, which, in the desire for peace

(which grief certainly won't find in faith either), wearily closes its eyes to every contradiction. The ending lies in the character itself. Not a trace of pious tendencies creeps in. The poet remains as objective as he is in his depiction of pessimism. Georg Jonathan, the rationalist, who also harbors a kind of socialist faith in the future , bids him farewell: "You're going to the priest. I thought you were a man, one of those who bend but don't break. So you were too weak after all; you had the dangerous kink in your spine. Fin de siècle; agony of the bourgeoisie . . . I'm sorry, Gram. But it must be so. The weary go to the priest. Farewell." FITZEBUTZE: MEAL DISTRIBUTION. Encounters. In the barracks yard, soldiers stand in long rows: old ones with gray beards, young ones searching for the first fuzz above their lips. They hold the mess tin in their hands. Or an earthenware bowl. They're all hungry. Those who've lost their "platoon" hurried to the mess hall. Their noses eagerly sniffed the warm aroma of the soup. An old soldier cautiously steers his mess bowl through his comrades. He's only old in years; as a soldier, he's still a newcomer. Clumsily and awkwardly, he picks his way. When he passes a superior officer, he puffs out his chest as required. His face is beardless, but it hasn't been shaved for several days. The brown and gray stubble is spreading everywhere. On his head, he wears an old, worn, and washed-out field cap. Many a soldier has worn drill trousers and a drill jacket before him. And not all traces of previous rifle cleaning and housecleaning have always disappeared with the laundry. A sergeant major walks by and looks sharply at the soldier. Doubly at attention and with anxious haste, the soldier tries to get past the stern man. "Aren't you Mr. Wimar?" "Yes, sir!" "You don't recognize me, do you?" The soldier looks somewhat fearfully at his superior's face; until then, he had only seen his uniform. He searches, and then a ray of recognition flashes. Slowly, the military rigidity leaves his features. "Mr. Maurer?" p. 797 (#817) Encounters. 797 "But of course, have I changed that much?" "Not that, but the uniform." 66 "Yes, yes, you look different in the uniform than usual." In the afternoon, the two sit together over a cup of coffee and chat about the good times before the war: when Mr. Wimar, a popular reciter in claque, patent leather, and tails, stood on stage and, with his elegant agility, sometimes deeply moved hundreds of people, sometimes made them laugh out loud. And when Mr. Maurer, the feature editor, sat before him and, the next day in the newspaper, sometimes friendly-looking, sometimes benevolently ironed him. A recruit depot with the radio operators. Telegraph operators, metalworkers, carpenters, lawyers, students, all mixed together. A sergeant lieutenant, a telegraph assistant by profession, is giving a class. He feels that he is no match for most of the recruits in terms of general education. He therefore bites his superior all the more and demands

the strictest observance of all the outward attributes of their subordinates. Woe to the one who doesn't answer loudly enough. Woe to the one who doesn't jump up from his stool like an arrow when answering. Woe to the one who doesn't hang rigidly on the lips of the powerful man during his instructive explanations. "You back there in the second row with the big glasses, pay attention so you learn something!" "Yes, Sergeant Lieutenant!" 99 "What is your profession?" "Full Professor of Physics, Lieutenant Sergeant, specialist in wireless telegraphy!" Close behind Verdun. The infantry regiment has taken up rest positions after several days of fierce fighting at the front. Groups of soldiers stand in the street, chatting and smoking and smoking and chatting. p. 798 (#818) 798 glosses. Among them is a Social Democrat from the extreme left. He would have been with the Spartacus Group if he hadn't been drafted. Since then, he has performed his service with the same conscientiousness with which he fulfilled his political and union duties before the war and, until his conscription, operated underground leaflet channels against the factional majority. No superior can find fault with him. He never lacked anything, especially not "courage in all his duties." And it certainly wasn't easy, there in front of Hill 304. A car roars up and stops close to the chatting and smoking soldiers. They stand at attention, and those lying down jump up. Because the army commander, the German Crown Prince, is getting out of the car. "Hello, folks!" "Good day, Your Royal Highness!" And then he approaches the groups and speaks with this and that soldier: how they are, whether the food is good, where they are from. And then he shakes everyone's hand vigorously. Even the Social Democrat from the far left. Glosses. The Nationality Principle. A very nice illumination of the famous "nationality principle," as advocated by the Entente in its reply note to Wilson, was already given in 1848 by the Heidelberg newspaper "Deutsche Zeitung" (in its editorial of August 15). The article, apparently written by Gervinus, reads like a response to the Entente note, anticipated by seventy years, and is therefore reprinted here in its most essential part. First, Gervinus describes with subtle irony how all the turmoil in this world will dissolve into luminous harmony if the nationality principle is realized. But then he continues in a more serious tone. continued: "It's just a pity that practice has not kept pace with theory. The two European powers that have grown the most in power and scope over the past hundred years, and that also enjoy some prestige in political affairs, Russia and Great Britain, demonstrate absolutely no desire to accommodate the humane doctrine. The former, in addition to the Baltic provinces, are taking Finland, almost also the Danube countries and the rest of Poland. The latter are almost taking possession of the two Indies, the Ionian Islands, and Malta, and one could not

say that all these acquisitions were made with the will and desire of those involved. The theory of nationality remained unquestioned. Indeed, the French themselves, who formally proclaimed the aforementioned principle in their first revolution, in fact abandoned it again and for 20 years fell into a paroxysm that forms the sharp contrast to the humane theory of nationalities. To us Germans alone, the philosophical people, should the It was our honor to pull the very hot coals of the new theory out of the fire at our own expense. As born ideologists, we threw ourselves into the new doctrines with all our might. The serious men and the fools, with silly enthusiasm, made themselves the targets of the new doctrine, and that Anarchasis Cloots, who played the ridiculous character in the cosmopolitan drama of the French Revolution, was our compatriot. Robespierre had to sneer at the man of the universal republic, the representative of the human race, as he introduced himself in 1780: "How can he be interested in France when he is a citizen of the world! Should we spread propaganda around the globe? Should we elevate Monomotapa to a sister republic?!" One gradually feels that the new theory still lacks all reciprocity, and that we are supposed to be the good-natured fools and its victims. We have not yet heard that Russian statesmen are considering surrendering the German and Polish possessions, or that England even wants to throw Heligoland, Gibraltar, or Malta into the masses, let alone Ireland or the East Indies, for the will would certainly be present among the subjugated nations. France will follow the same path as England or Russia and would rather use the most terrible force than allow theory to triumph at its own expense. The practical people at the helm of the aforementioned states would laugh at us if we were to insist on a general reckoning according to strictly "national" principles. Here follows a thorough refutation of the nationality principle, for reasons familiar to readers of this journal from the works of Lensch and Cunow. Gervinus's treatise concludes with the words: "The politics of all European states, from Russia to Denmark, would provide us with this proof: we Germans would be left with the role of political Cinderella; we would be stripped of our clothes until we were beggarly if we were foolish and senseless enough to submit to this. We are expected to expose our eastern borders to the barbarians by surrendering Posen; we should at most also give up Bohemia, and thus open the way to the enemy's heart. And yet we have developed this soil for centuries with German diligence and German education, and yet nowhere does one hear that those who make the demand are willing to do the same. As long as this reciprocity is lacking, this demand is one of the naive impudence that the old politics has become accustomed to against us. . . . Cosmopolitan philosophers who expect us to destroy the young freedom with

it begin, that we throw the last bundle of our possessions into the air, naked and penniless, would be found neither in France nor in England. . . . " KARL BRÖGER: Munitions workers. The lever screeches, the drill creaks, the clamped iron groans and always, always the belt whirs along without rest or peace. It sings a song of a new tone, a song full of blood, a song full of scorn, the song of the grenade. The women who stand at the support, who walk between wheel and belt, do not hear the mad song that sounded between steel and iron. "I greet you with a clear cry, I greet you, you stand by me, Mothers of the Grenade! The world is sick, time is confused, Man within man goes astray. I, King Death, am master of the world, Woman herself is subject to me. Once she only gave birth to life, Now she is, bent under my yoke, Mother of the Grenade!" So the wild song sounds fragmented. Then the lever is disengaged. . . . The iron groans in its last gear, the grim song has faded away. . . . ... p. 801 (#821) DIE GLOCKE 48th Issue 24 February 1917 2nd Year Reprint of all articles permitted with detailed source references AUGUST WINNIG: FUEN Opposition and Opposition. 150 years of fierce political struggle, such as the German working class was forced to wage, do not pass without a strong influence on the minds of those who took part. The oppositional stance was absolutely natural for the working class, once it had found political expression for its special existence. For it entered public life as a new, young, rising power with claims, in which all property titles had already been assigned. The principalities, the landowners, and the bourgeoisie had divided power among themselves and were unwilling to give in to the demands of the new class, which was nothing but aspired to become much. Wherever the working class begins to move, it initially finds all other powers against it. The oppositional position of the workers' parties is thus something historically given, something that recurs at this stage in every country. The working class is born politically as the opposition. Even the period of the formation of its political system, its political maxims, its political phraseology, is still marked by the oppositional struggle. The significance of this process for the mental world of the working class is obvious. Its oppositional stance does not appear to it as a historically conditioned necessity, subject to the changing conditions of history, but as an inevitably given consequence of its innermost being, to which it must adhere in time and eternity. 48/1 p. 802 (#822) 802 Opposition and Opposition. Our entire way of thinking, our entire way of viewing the world, has become so accustomed to the oppositional position that we can hardly imagine any other as possible. How easily we are resolved to rejection, to negation, when a newly emerging question arises, and how difficult it is for us each time to force ourselves to an affirmative stance! This is precisely the

expression of the fact that in our understanding, opposition is the rule, and assent the exception, usually surrounded by zealous protestations. Naturally, there is an inner logic to this phenomenon. The weaker a country's labor movement, the less it plays a role in the political system, the less its needs and demands are taken into account and accommodated in politics and legislation. Even if it has already become a respectable force, it still takes a long time before the ruling powers feel compelled to make concessions to the new demands. They hold on to their privileged position as long as they can , and only when every other path seems impassable do they reluctantly agree to concessions. But ultimately, in every country, the time comes when the ruling powers can no longer manage with the old methods. Depending on the given situation, the upheaval of the political system takes place in barely perceptible transitions or in sudden change. This also compels the labor party, which has previously been in fundamental opposition, to adopt a different tactic. For tactics are never determined solely by the goals and interests of a party, but always also take into account the conditions of its environment. The tactics of Danish Social Democracy are different from those of German Socialism, the tactics of French Socialists are different from those of Russian Socialism. Despite the similarity of goals, the manner in which they are pursued varies greatly between the socialist parties of the individual countries. This reflects the influence that the environment exerts on our tactical behavior. p. 803 (#823) Opposition and Opposition. 803 The diversity of tactics is extraordinarily great: what Danish Social Democrats do and can do without objection would not infrequently be branded "party treason" in Germany, although it may be overlooked that such an accusation is very loosely accepted among us. This shows us the degree to which tactics depend on the circumstances of the environment. This is, in essence, a perfectly self-evident fact that no one will dispute, which even Karl Kautsky would most likely admit and, if necessary, substantiate with a series of articles. But in reality, this self-evident truth has not yet been fully accepted by German Social Democracy. If it had, our current differences could not have taken on the passionate character that finally led to the separation of the individual groups. German Social Democracy has been forced by the war into a completely sudden and only inadequately prepared tactical shift. By recognizing the duty of national defense, it found itself compelled to also approve the necessary means and to cease fighting that could undermine the people's defense capacity. As a result, it has—at first only outwardly—ceased to be an opposition party. This fact has been enough to trigger the worst accusations of abandoning old principles, of betraying the party, etc., etc. To the extent that the minority groups themselves affirm the duty of

national defense, their behavior is proof of how accustomed they have become to regarding opposition as the only correct position of the party. In their opinion, no matter how much one agrees with the government's goal at a given moment, that cannot change the fact that we must reject, protest, and oppose. Since party tactics have been geared exclusively to opposition for half a century, their tactical thinking has become rusty; they know nothing else, considering any other policy to be anti-social democratic, and the idea of siding with the government in any case acts on them like a red rag to the good animals, of which we unfortunately have too few in the country these days. This hypnotism by the idea of opposition has caused the party endless difficulties, has given its politics a clumsiness, its tactics a stiffness that often seemed abnormal. Meanwhile, much remains to be done for the party's political education. One can criticize the Center Party for much, but one must give it credit for having an excellent understanding of how to politically educate the masses of its supporters. Whatever the party leadership did—and it did many things that were believed to whip up the masses of its supporters—it succeeded in every case in convincing its voters that its actions were required and justified by the higher party interest. We certainly do not want to take the Center as a model, but in educating its voters, in awakening and sharpening their sense of the changing tactical requirements of the daily political struggle, it has achieved something that we must first emulate. There can be no question: we need this elasticity of the tactical thinking of party members much more than the Center or any other party, because we are and must be much more democratic. No other party presents its policies to its voters so often and so openly. We, as the party of the masses and of democracy, are much more dependent on the permanent maintenance of a close spiritual connection with the masses of the party members. If we wish to retain this and still be able to maintain flexible tactics, we still have a great deal to do. One involuntarily thinks of the political tasks of the future. Two major complexes of tasks lie before us: the reconstruction of the German economy, with its individual trade, colonial, and financial policy issues, and the democratization of domestic politics. How easily it can happen that we support the government's policies today and, a few months later, offer them the sharpest opposition ! If we wish to have the masses behind us in every phase of this presumably highly changeable policy with a full understanding of the respective tactical task, we still require very thorough education and training. There are two kinds of opposition. The first stems from the conviction that we have no common interests whatsoever with the ruling powers, and that where such interests do exist, cooperation even in a single area is made impossible by general

contradictions. This is the opposition that determined our policy in the early stages of the party's development. It does not look to the right or left, it simply says no; one can call it fundamental opposition. It is the political method of parties that are practically excluded from any influence on legislation and administration and occupy an unfavorable, exceptional position in every respect. It is the expedient for a period in which the conditions for social democratic policy have not yet developed, in which the entire political energy of the party is still exhausted in agitation and demonstration. The other type of opposition is oriented towards the particular case and the particular political situation. It emerges and recedes depending on the political task and its accompanying circumstances. It can only be adopted by the party when the class that this party represents has reached a stage in its rise where the general political and economic fate of the nation also affects it. The resulting commonalities of interest then force their expression in political tactics. German Social Democracy has reached this point. Developments have forced it to abandon the first type of opposition. If it is to successfully apply the higher form of politics, ● which is expressed in the second type , its members must grasp these connections . p. 806 (#826) 806 Bismarck's Legacy. ADOLF KÖSTER : Bismarck's Legacy. I. Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary. When Bismarck was dismissed from all offices on March 20, 1890, he left behind an elaborate system of alliances, treaties, and friendships in foreign policy that virtually ensured the existence and peaceful development of the German Empire. The main pillars of this system were the Triple Alliance and the (then unpublished) so-called Reinsurance Treaty with Russia; this and the three following articles will outline Bismarck's legacy. First, we will deal with the relations between the three great European empires. After the German-Austrian conflict of 1866, Austria's relationship with the North German Confederation was initially very brittle, despite Bismarck's skillful policy of combating the old emperor's desire for annexation. Austria's need for revenge played a major role in all of Bismarck's war considerations. More than once, the specter of a repetition of Kaunitz's old coalition of Austria-Russia-France against Prussia loomed over him. And quite naturally, during the War of German Unification, the Austrian Prime Minister, Count Beust, belonged to that group of neutral statesmen who, especially during the critical period of the Siege of Paris, sought every opportunity to thwart German policy. The victorious outcome of the War of German Unification, however, initially buried any Austrian hopes of revenge for Königgrätz. Driven out of Italy and away from Germany, Austria could only pursue an expansionist policy toward the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina, then still Turkish provinces, attracted Austrian policy early on.

They were the hinterland for the narrow Dalmatian coast. And they harbored a strong Serbian population, p. 807 (#827) Bismarck's Legacy. In 807, Austria feared that a future liquidation of Turkey could result in it merging with the Principality of Serbia, which was still under Turkish sovereignty at the time, to form a threatening Greater Serbia. This "danger" was already imminent in 1875, when the Turkish tyranny unleashed a bloody uprising in the two provinces. At that time, Austria, through its Foreign Minister Andrassy, persuaded the Sultan, at the urging of the Great Powers, to promise vigorous economic and tax reforms. The two provinces remained Turkish despite the unrest in the Serbian Skupshtina. But Austria's interest in them was greater than before. In this expansionist tendency toward the Balkans, Austria-Hungary clashed with Russia, whose ancient dreams of the Balkans and Constantinople (just think of the – admittedly apocryphal – testament of Peter the Great) had been newly strengthened at that time by the Pan-Slavism that had emerged, not without the influence of the victory for German unification. Russia's expansionist tendencies essentially went in all directions: in the north toward the mouth of the Vistula, Sweden, and Norway; in the west toward Galicia; in the southwest toward the Balkans and the Straits; in the south toward the Caucasus and Armenia, toward Persia and through Afghanistan to India; in the east toward Mongolia, China, and Japan. Always active in all these areas simultaneously, at certain times it pursued certain of these problems with particular zeal. The impetus for its expansionist policy came neither from a surplus population nor from the need of domestic industry for foreign markets. After the unfortunate Crimean War, it was primarily reasons of prestige and military ambition, along with those of a mystical-religious racial consciousness, that drove the absolutist country to pursue foreign conquests. (Tsar Alexander II once explained to Bismarck the necessity of a Russo-Turkish or Russo-Austrian war with the need to keep his army busy!) p. 808 (#828) 808 Bismarck's Legacy. In the period from the Crimean War to the Russo-Turkish War, Russia had significantly consolidated its position in Central Asia. Under General von Kaufmann, it had successively conquered Tashkent and Samarkand, the fertile khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand (Turkestan), and was preparing to bring the land of the Turkmen under its control. With all this, it threatened Afghanistan and India. Just as the Balkan turmoil in the 1870s called Russia to the battlefield westward, this development in Central Asia made the antagonism between England and Russia very strong. In the various groupings of the three central powers—Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia—this Russian antagonism toward England, which included a certain Russian need for support from Germany, must always be taken into

account. Russia's Balkan interests initially focused on the east of the peninsula. Here, in the Turkish province of Bulgaria, at the same time as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a bloody uprising raged, in which Russia was not uninvolved. This uprising, too, was brutally suppressed by the Turks. The province received promises of reforms but initially remained Turkish. Russia fought (initially diplomatically, then militarily against Turkey) for a "free" Bulgaria, i.e., one dependent only on it. Its distant goal was the Dardanelles and the Slavic Balkan League with a Greater Serbia. Austria wanted to prevent this Greater Serbia by laying its hand on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its distant goal was a railway connection with Thessaloniki, which would finally cut Serbia off from the sea. Austrian and Russian interests were sharply opposed. This Balkan rivalry between the two empires became one of the roots of the Triple Alliance, insofar as it forced Germany to "opt" between Russia and the Danube Monarchy, to choose one or the other. Germany made this decision very reluctantly, and only when Russian politics brusquely demanded it of it. In Bismarck's view, Germany had no warlike interests of its own at that time, either in Constantinople or in Salonika. The Balkan rivalry between the two empires could only be of interest to Germany in its repercussions on the European grouping of states and Germany's position within it. Germany would have preferred to continue to maneuver skillfully between the two. Russia forced it to choose. This happened in 1876, when Turkey was waging a victorious war with Serbia and Montenegro, both of which had used the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an opportunity to become independent. Austria's interest lay in a Turkish victory that would suppress Serbia; Russia's interest in a Serbian victory that would have forced Austria out of Bosnia and given Russia a free hand in Bulgaria. When Turkey victoriously crushed the uprising and forced Serbia to make peace, Russia sided with Montenegro. The Russo-Turkish War was imminent. In this situation, the then Tsar Alexander II, through the German military plenipotentiary in Russia, General von Werder, telegraphed to Bismarck a query as to whether Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria. After several unsuccessful attempts to avoid answering this embarrassing question directly, Bismarck gave his famous reply: Germany's first need was to preserve the friendship between the great monarchies, which had more to lose from the revolution than to gain through fighting. But if, to our sorrow, this goal could not be achieved, we could certainly bear to see our friends win and lose battles against each other, but not to see one of them so severely wounded that its position as an independent great power with a voice in Europe would be jeopardized. This, to the great satisfaction of the pro-French Russian Chancellor Gortschakoff, who was personally

resentful of Bismarck, drove a wedge into the always very close German-Russian relations. The anti-German clique at the Russian court could triumphantly point to the "Platonic" nature of German friendship. Russia abandoned its anti-Austrian plans for the time being and even concluded a convention with Austria on January 15, 1877 (secretly from Germany), in which, among other things, Russia guaranteed Austria's future possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russian weapons were fired against Turkey instead of the Danube Monarchy. Germany, however, ran the risk of losing both by deciding to side with both powers. In this situation, the three powers met at the Congress of Berlin after the end of the Russo-Turkish War, which, after heavy fighting, had brought Russia close to the gates of Constantinople. (June 1878) We know from Bismarck's thoughts and memoirs that even then the possibility of a German-Russian (rather than a German-Austrian) alliance was seriously considered (although more by Russia than by German side). The outcome of the congress, however, shattered such plans for Russia once and for all. Germany's role at the Berlin Congress was the difficult and thankless one of an "honest broker" between Russian claims and Austrian interests. Under pressure from England (Disraeli), Russia was forced to accept a thorough revision of the Treaty of San Stefano and thus to abandon its far-reaching Balkan plans. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania did indeed become independent. But Greater Bulgaria, intended as a Russian Balkan province, was severely curtailed, torn in two, and remained tied to Turkey, which remained the main power in the Balkans even after the peace. England received Cyprus and once again enforced the closure of the Dardanelles to all warships. Austria-Hungary was allowed to lay its hands on Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of Novibazar. This brought it closer to its anti-Serbian Balkan goals. p. 811 (#831) Bismarck's legacy. 811 Russia, however, remained pushed away from Constantinople. As if on command, the entire Russian public blamed Germany for this Russian failure. The Pan-Slavists, under government censorship, organized a veritable smear campaign against Germany. Russia brusquely demanded that Germany vote on Russia's side once and for all in the Oriental Commission, and in August 1879, the Tsar sent a letter to the head of the German Empire that contained threats of war in two places. At the same time, Prince Gorchakoff began to make his declarations of love to France more explicit. Troop buildups on the border against Germany drove the critical situation to a head. Then a "consoling" trip by Wilhelm I to his nephew, the Tsar, calmed the raging waters. This journey ran counter to Bismarck's feelings and judgment about what was necessary. All of this combined to make the choice between Russia and Austria easier for German policymakers. Nevertheless, Bismarck's

decision was not without misgivings. A certain unpredictability of Hungary, the strong clerical influence at the Viennese court, Austria's policy toward Poland, which was directly opposed to that of Germany, and finally, the concern that this alliance would sooner or later drag him into the Balkan turmoil and drive him to an aggressive anti-Russian policy—all of this caused grave concerns for the German Empire's foreign policy at the time and was only somewhat offset by the prospect that a German-Austrian alliance was popular with all parties in Germany. In addition, a break with Russia would have provoked the utmost resistance of the German Emperor. — How threatening the Russian danger must have been at that time can be seen from the fact that Bismarck, apparently without the intimate knowledge of the German Emperor, held the fundamental discussions for the future German-Austrian agreement in Gastein with the then Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Andrassy at the same time that the latter was meeting with his nephew in Alexandrovo to settle the conflict that had broken out - p. 812 (#832) 812 Bismarck's Legacy. When Bismarck decided to take this step, he was under the impression—as is evident from his "Memoirs" as well as from his well-known letter to King Ludwig of Bavaria—that a Russo-French agreement was a serious threat, and that, on the other hand, an agreement between Austria and Russia that would isolate Germany was not impossible. Therefore, Bismarck was the pressing party in the first Gastein negotiations. He obtained from Andrassy a mutual agreement on a purely defensive alliance against a Russian attack on either party. However, his proposal to extend the alliance to include attacks other than Russian ones met with no response. How hard it was for the then ruling powers in Germany to break with Russia, the stronghold of all European reaction, is demonstrated by the response of the then King of Bavaria to the announcement from Gastein of the anti-Russian shift. On the other hand, Bismarck already had the later policy of his Reinsurance Treaty in mind when he described it as the purpose of his The agreement with Austria stipulated: "to continue to carefully maintain peace with Russia, but to assist each other if either power were attacked despite this." The German-Austrian treaty of alliance for mutual support against a Russian attack was formally concluded on October 7, 1879. The resistance of the German Emperor had to be broken first by a threatened resignation. However, on his orders, the Tsar was immediately informed of the alliance, while Europe only learned the wording of the treaty on the occasion of another crisis (1888). In addition to mutual support in the event of a Russian attack, the alliance stipulated that the two counterparties should practice mutual benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack by another power (e.g., Germany by France or England, or Austria by Italy). However, if

Russia were to support Germany's or Austria's adversary in any of these combinations, military support would again be necessary. In addition to these military agreements, the alliance included the conclusion of a most-favored-nation treaty between the two states. This alliance, as it stood on paper and as Germany had to interpret it according to its interests at the time, was a purely defensive alliance, an insurance, not an acquisition, partnership. A German or Austrian war of aggression—even against Russia (for example, in the Japanese War)—was not even considered in its calculations. Even less so was a German war of aggression against France, which was generally considered possible at the time (and was actually considered by the Prussian General Staff in 1875—against Bismarck). Just as Austria did not want the alliance to be abused for the expansion of Germany, Germany did not want the alliance to be abused for the expansion of Austria-Hungary. For post-Bismarck German policy, the alliance had a completely different character at times. For Bismarck, the alliance at that time had such a less aggressive tendency toward Russia that he saw one of its effects in the pressure it forced Russia to reestablish friendships with Germany. Russian friendship was just as important to him after the alliance was concluded as it had been before. Even after the alliance, he did not consider it impossible for Austria to desert Germany under changed political circumstances. He continued to side with Russia because of the conviction that there were no real conflicts of interest between Germany and Russia. The idea that Russia protected the eastern Balkan peninsula, including the Dardanelles (as Austria protected the western one) seemed to him quite tolerable from the German point of view - p. 814 (#834) 814 Bismarck's Legacy. Thus, even after the alliance was concluded, he essentially continued the old tactic of playing the two Balkan rivals off against each other. By maintaining the connection to Petersburg, he prevented a possible Austro-Russian understanding, curbed any anti-Russian expansion by Austria in the Balkans to the extent necessary for Germany to exploit its balancing power between Austria and Russia, and reduced Russia's need to seek a permanent ally in France. Conversely, by guaranteeing Austria its possessions against Russia, he ensured that Russia itself had certain reliance on Germany and that it directed its expansionist forces not one-sidedly toward the Balkans, but just as strongly, and if possible more strongly, toward the East. It was here in the East, however, that Russia faced the world-historical entanglement that, to a certain extent, repeatedly drove the Tsar into the arms of Bismarck's policies: the antagonism between Russia and England. In addition to these purely objective motives, which were to secure Germany's foreign policy existence, other reasons of a more domestic nature also played a role in Bismarck's pro-Russian orientation of the

German-Austrian alliance: in addition to the anti-Polish needs shared with Russia, it was above all the "traditional dynastic solidarity" in contrast to all "subversive tendencies" that repeatedly determined him to lean on Russia, despite all the difficulties Petersburg presented him. Bismarck maintained the relationship between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, thus briefly outlined, at least in general, against all pro-Franco turmoil in Petersburg until the end of his political career. Indeed, he succeeded in finding an important, even formal, expression for this relationship in 1884. In Skierniewice, a small Polish town, which p. 815 (#835) Bismarck's legacy. 815 Thirty years later, in what would become the scene of bloodiest battles, the three emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia met and concluded a three-year mutual neutrality treaty in the event that one of them should be attacked by a fourth. This is the germ of the so-called Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Bismarck obtained it by cleverly exploiting the Anglo-Russian tension, which had reached its peak due to the Russian advance against Afghanistan. The Balkan crisis of 1885-1886 put this complex relationship between the three empires to its first test. In Eastern Rumelia, a Bulgarian nationalist uprising against Turkey had broken out. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria (the Battenberger), elected by the Bulgarian Sobranje on April 29, yielded to the pressure of the Bulgarian nationalists and declared the unification of Eastern Rumelia (with Philippople) and Bulgaria. Serbia then declared war on Bulgaria. In a short, bloody campaign, it was defeated at Pirot and Slivnitza and forced to sign the Treaty of Bucharest (March 3, 1886), where Austria, however, ensured that it escaped without territorial losses. Eastern Rumelia was united with Bulgaria through a personal union. In Bulgaria itself, however, serious crises erupted. Tsar Alexander III (his predecessor had been assassinated in 1881) and his advisors, outraged at the outbreak of the Serbian-Bulgarian War by the increasingly strong spirit of independence in the Bulgarian state, which they viewed and treated as a Russian dependency, instigated a Russophile conspiracy in Sofia that forced Alexander to abdicate (March 21, 1886). He maintained this abdication even when a nationalist uprising brought him back to Sofia for a short time. Nevertheless, Bulgarian policy maintained its anti-Russian course. under the energetic Prime Minister Stambulov, initially supported the Russians. On July 7, 1887, in defiance of the Coburgs, Ferdinand was elected Prince. Only gradually (under the new Russian Tsar Nicholas II) did a rapprochement between the two countries develop. Russia's position in this entire crisis, which it had itself fomented, was predetermined: it tried by all means to keep the country it had "liberated" under its control. Austria suspiciously observed every step by which Russia could strengthen its position in the

eastern half of the Balkans. Therefore, it set itself up as the protector of Serbia, whose principality it regarded as under its protection. It pursued an anti-Bulgarian policy as long as it did not consider the possibility of Bulgaria truly breaking away from Russia. The position of the German Empire was difficult, however. Here, the majority of public opinion was on the side of Bulgaria and its aspirations for independence. The anti-Russian partisanship of the popular Battenberger went so far that even a Social Democratic Party meeting, following a speech by August Bebel, called on the Reich government to "counter Russia's efforts to expand its power in the Balkans with all available means." This popular sentiment found a certain amount of support in Austria, whose Foreign Minister Kalnoky spoke in November 1886 of the possibility, without Germany, of "reinforcing the arrogance of Pan-Slavism, hand in hand with England." Official German policy, however, took a different path. At that time, Bismarck saw no German interests in the Balkans, much less in Constantinople and the Middle East. Bismarck viewed the events in the Balkans only in their repercussions for our relationship with all the surrounding powers. He refused to support a state on the ideal grounds of a threat to its independence. Taking sides with Russia would have disrupted the entire elaborate system of alliances and agreements, through which he believed he had made Germany as independent as possible from all powers. In a war with Russia, Germany, in his opinion, would not have fought for German interests, but rather for English and Austro-Hungarian interests. How small, in his opinion, German interests in the Near East were can be seen from the fact that he considered a Russian establishment in Constantinople almost desirable. In his opinion, this would intensify the antagonism between England and Russia, and make the rapprochement between Russia and the Mediterranean and Oriental power, France, more difficult. In his opinion, Austria's interests in the Balkans need not be fatally damaged by a Russian closure of the Dardanelles. From this perspective, Bismarck would have rejected an Austrian question about Germany's participation on Austria's and England's side against Russia. From this perspective, he did not lift a finger for the Battenberg, of whom he personally had a poor opinion. In the entire Bulgarian conflict, he avoided strict participation, but where necessary, he gave way more to Russia than to Austria. He did not support the candidacy of the Coburg prince—just as he was generally opposed to German candidates for the throne in the Orient. But he equally rejected the initiative demanded by Russia in removing Ferdinand. Contrary to the press in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and against certain currents even within the government of the Danube Monarchy, he interpreted the German-Austrian alliance in practice in exactly

the same narrow terms as he had concluded it years earlier. The German-Austrian alliance survived this crisis. Tensions between Russia and Austria increased. The relationship between Russia and Germany initially seemed to suffer, as Germany's opponents on the Neva, following the old recipe, tried to convince the Tsar of the "Platonic" nature of German friendship. From these circles also came the forgery of those letters that had been passed on to Alexander III, which were supposed to prove that Bismarck was secretly stirring up trouble in Bulgaria against the strengthening of Russian influence. A personal conversation between Bismarck and the Tsar succeeded in clarifying this and other misunderstandings. 48/2 p. 818 (#838) 818 Bismarck's Legacy. Indeed, Bismarck even succeeded in convincing the Tsar, excluding Austria, to sign a genuine German-Russian treaty that replaced the expired Three Emperors' Alliance. This is the actual so-called Reinsurance Treaty. It was kept secret from Austria. It stated, that Germany and Russia should remain neutral towards each other if either state were attacked from anywhere. This treaty thus, on the one hand, assured Russia of Germany's neutrality in the event that England or Austria attacked Russia, and, on the other hand, assured Germany of Russia's neutrality if France attacked Germany. The treaty did not conflict with the letter of the German-Austrian Treaty. Nevertheless, it demonstrated the pro-Russian side thoughts that Bismarck had had now, as at its conclusion, so drastically that in 1897, when Bismarck published the Reinsurance Treaty in his struggle against official German policy, great excitement arose in Austria. In Germany at that time (1897), it was partly seen (Hohenlohe) as Bismarck's intention to abandon the German-Austrian alliance and exchange it for a permanent German-Russian one. This intention is unlikely, since Bismarck, on the one hand, was well aware of the strength of the anti-French party in Russia. and knew how far the Russo-French ingratiation had already progressed. On the other hand, it was precisely the good dual relationship with the two empires that offered his policy many favorable opportunities: he kept both in check to a certain extent, made himself agreeable to both, did not instigate, but also did not allow too much friendship to develop between them. However, the Reinsurance Treaty only receives full illumination through the Anglo-Russian antagonism. Russia needed backing against England. Bismarck exploited this need for Germany, albeit without getting involved with Russia to the point where Germany's relationship with England would break down. He also had France in mind when concluding the treaty. He saw the ever-closer relations between Russia and France. The Reinsurance Treaty was a means of postponing the impending alliance between the Republic and the Tsarist Empire. The anti-German element in Russian politics is old. The

strengthening of Germany in 1870, which Russia could not prevent, despite attempts at intervention, increased this element. The sovereigns of both countries, closely bound together by personal kinship and the equally strong antipathy felt by both towards Western democracy and internal upheaval, had every interest in a good understanding between the two states. Admittedly, the respective Tsar was often more brittle than his German neighbor. Russian official policy under Bismarck, with the exception of recent years, also maintained the line of mutual understanding. The mood of the educated Russian bourgeoisie, as well as a section of the Russian court nobility (including those of German descent), on the other hand, had always been consistently pro-French. Under the influence of the Pan-Slavist movement, a section of it was strongly inclined towards German hatred, which was also fueled for economic reasons in certain petty-bourgeois circles. The anti-German sentiment, which had been promoted by Gorchakoff since 1870 and especially strongly since The Russo-French Entente, which was pursued following the unsatisfactory outcome of the Berlin Congress of 1878 for Russia, had its most serious obstacle in the absolutist imperial court's dislike of the republican regime of France. In the 1880s, Russia considered France militarily not very strong and politically unreliable due to the constant stream of new ministries. As is well known, a wise and consistent French foreign policy gradually removed these obstacles. Certain anti-German and anti-Bismarckian circles at the disgruntled Danish court, which was not unimportant in foreign policy at the time, played a role in this. However, Bismarck's last years saw a striking deterioration in German-Russian relations. A first step towards a future Franco-Russian agreement was the purchase of 500,000 French Lebel rifles by Russia, under the guarantee that these guns would never be fired against France. That was the same year that Bismarck concluded the Reinsurance Treaty (1887). This was followed by the Russian policy of prohibitive tariffs directed against Germany and the Russification of the Baltic provinces. Bismarck responded by prohibiting the Lombardization of Russian assets. Russia arranged its test mobilizations on the German and Austrian borders more and more openly. At the end of 1888, the first Russian loan was raised in France. At the same time, France was feverishly in the period of nationalist excitement associated with the name Boulanger. Nevertheless, Bismarck adhered to the basic idea of his policy of going to the last with Russia for the reasons outlined above. On February 6, 1888, during the deliberations on the major defense bill, he discussed two-front warfare for the first time and also found strong words of defense, even threats, against those anti-German currents in Russia. He published (aimed at certain Russian circles, for the Tsar knew about it from

his father) the German-Austrian alliance treaty. But he resisted an open breach with all means at his disposal. STEFAN GROSSMANN: Kramarsch. I. - The trial against Karl Kramarsch was not, as is sometimes suspected in Germany, conducted in secret; the large courtroom of the Vienna Garrison Court was packed day after day during the weeks of negotiations, with politicians, civil servants, Social Democrats, and even Czechs. The Stürgkh government, half-baked and uncertain as it was in all matters except the question of its persistence, had, however, banned all printed reports on the Kramarsch trial. This did not prevent fairly accurate records of the proceedings from being compiled; one will be able to study the Kramarsch trial in very precise trial reports at the time. I have only a few I witnessed Kramarsch's wrestling match with the auditor for several days and must admit that in this short excerpt, Kramarsch operated very skillfully. Although the vast majority of the spectators were German, Kramarsch clearly enjoyed the audience's sympathy in this struggle. That is the nature of such trials. The defendant is threatened with death, for a political crime, and something of his intense excitement is involuntarily communicated to the listener. Kramarsch was characterized by a special, infectious, unemotional excitement. The small face on his broad, tall body glowed, his tightly vertical hair seemed to stand up even more erect, his nose, also directed skyward, quivered, and his small eyes darted restlessly from one corner of the court to the other. An experienced parliamentarian, a man of the world like Kramarsch, was naturally superior to his judges in terms of quick wit. The presiding judge, a judge and Upper Austrian representative in his civilian life, named Peutlschmied attested to a certain courtesy of Kramarsch. Since several ministers, governors, and statesmen, as witnesses, treated the accused Kramarsch with respect, even sympathy, the spectators were by no means under any suspicion hostile to Kramarsch. In this trial, as is also evident from the partially published reasons for the verdict, the crime of high treason was proven by circumstantial evidence. It required strenuous acumen to piece together the many mosaic pieces of these suspicions to form the correct picture. Here, after all, there was not one clear act of treason, but rather so many ambiguous features that together constituted the crime. Naturally, Kramarsch's struggle was shifted to the details, while the court worked towards the overall effect. It was equally natural that Kramarsch demonstrated all the cunning and slipperiness of the shrewd politician on such occasions. For example, he is said to have written to his wife: "I embrace you and in To you, my beloved p. 822 (#842) 822 Kramarsch. Russia." Certainly, not a harmless remark for a Czech representative in Austria! But Kramarsch could object that his wife was

Russian, he was not forbidden to marry her, nor to love her and her homeland with her. If she had happened to be Swedish, no one would have found fault with the image of embracing one's homeland along with one's beloved wife. But is it a coincidence that Mrs. Kramarsch was Russian and that Kramarsch embraced Russia in her? Another mosaic of accusation: Kramarsch is accused of having had a conversation with the Italian consul in Prague before the outbreak of the Italian War. The content of the conversation is unfortunately unknown. Kramarsch points out with a smile that the number of elegant restaurants in Prague is still very limited. In one of them, he met the Italian consul by chance; as a polite person, he greeted him and perhaps got chatting a bit. A politician with cautious Austrian leanings would probably not have found himself in this dilemma. Someone who embraces Russia shouldn't have greeted the Italian too extensively, but the treasonous content of this conversation is not verifiable. Or: Kramarsch was carrying a copy of the treasonous magazine "La nation tchèque," published in Paris, when he was arrested. Is he personally responsible for such mailings, which he cuts open or not? It is strange, however, that Czech translations of certain anti-Austrian articles from The Times were found in his desk drawer. But the leader of the nation was informed by many and wanted to be. No wonder, then, that this circumstantial treason trial lasted for weeks. The defendant interpreted the details down to the most subtle detail; the presiding judge sought to establish the parallels between the events and, with a strong hand, to define the broad contours of this mosaic picture. It goes without saying that such a smooth fish as Kramarsch was not easy to catch. Among other things, he was accused of three articles from the "Narodny Listy" (Narodny List), which dealt with the liberation of small nations, entirely in the spirit of the Entente advocates. But these articles were submitted to the censorship of the Prague Public Prosecutor's Office (p. 823, #843) Kramarsch. 823)! Can one believe in the plan of an officially censored act of high treason? But all of this will be available to read in more detail in the minutes at the time. Including the death sentence, the pardon of fifteen years, and perhaps a few more. II. Kramarsch experienced the triumph of becoming the leader of his entire people! In the years before the war, he had succeeded in shaping his people into a pyramid, with himself at the apex. It is quite symbolic that his house in Prague stands on Hradcany Hill, high up next to the old, rarely inhabited Royal Castle. The city of Prague had dedicated the grounds for this richly decorated burgher's house, and Czech artists competed in the decoration of the house, through whose gates entered all those of power, fame, and worth among the Czech people: feudal princes, rabid socialists, the nation's writers, artists, newspapermen,

peasants, and trade unionists, the governor and Czech deputies of all persuasions. The separation of Czech Social Democracy from the entire Austrian party is to be attributed to his growing influence, as is the more fanatical nationalization of the Czech nobility. Twenty years of harsh, intolerant, and then cautious work were necessary before Kramarsch completely gained control of his people. Above all, the only Czech party with political experience and historical knowledge, the Old Czechs, had to be expelled. Never has a statesmanlike party been so thoroughly eradicated and driven from all functions as in this case. In principle, the discussion of this destruction of the pro-Austrian Czechs should have been part of the Kramarsch trial, for the eradication of the politically astute, negotiating, and conciliatory Czech party was the premise of Kramarsch's life's work. However, among the radical parties, he strove to blur the differences. Originally a realist himself—that is, a disciple of Masaryk, not a Young Czech—he was never keen on his group's special brand. Under Badeni, one of his fundamental political principles blew up: the domination of the Germans in Austria by the united Poles, Czechs, and clergy. The realist, who had a Western European makeover, knew very well why he had police officers march into the chamber of the Austrian House of Representatives to protect the Badeni system. In the hour of Austrian parliamentarism's deepest humiliation, Mr. Karl Kramarsch sat high in the presidential chair and felt! This scene should not be missing from a political indictment against Kramarsch! From the moment this Polish-Czech project failed, Kramarsch felt obligated to negate Austria. Had he been filled with empty personal ambition, he would have become a minister or at least a privy councilor several times over. He avoided all honors (although this is a serious point, one cannot include it in his indictment). The older he grew, the more he shed his European-realist airs; his nose became more Czech, his German rather halting. He spoke openly against the Triple Alliance, the "overplayed luxury piano," and for a friendly relationship with Russia, which, meanwhile, systematically sent its agents across the black-yellow border. Oh, Mr. Kramarsch was not a Pan-Slavist! But he was the most astute promoter of the Neo-Slavist movement, which extended into all cultural areas and did not, like the simple Pan-Slavists, put the political dot on the i. In addition, as mentioned, he married a wealthy and distinguished Russian woman. Kramarsch regularly lived on the Russian estates he had inherited for part of the year. III. Kramarsch's uprooting is necessary. His political effectiveness is seen today at least as a long chain of ambiguities . He began his career at a time when his Czech contemporaries were embroiled in various treason trials. He is too shrewd and too skilled to hurl an open no at the Austrian

state, but I think one would search in vain for a parallel passage in his wife's letters in which she embraces his beloved Austria. His abstinence as a practical politician, his consistent refusal to act in any way responsible or politically, can also be seen p. 825 (#845) Kramarsch. 825 cannot be interpreted today merely as political chastity. No, he only wanted to watch in this state, not take action! He resisted every office and every dignity because he had no interest in the natural process of depletion through action, making himself dispensable. He steered the Czechs, interpreting his activity in the most benevolent way, into this policy of inner reserve. It is pointless to discuss whether he could have been uprooted with one move. The move was not made. It might also have been possible to send him after his friend Masaryk, and how utterly useless this errant professorial mind is today can even be read in Czech newspapers. Kramarsch was pardoned and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, and this solution seems politically the most unwise, for it means nothing less than the preservation of Kramarsch. A people as confused as the Czechs, so rich in fanatics, is best held together by a martyr! The Slavic soul, with its need for tears and suffering, daily revels in the martyrdom of its leader. To leave Kramarsch in prison is to constantly glorify him for his people! One day—one needn't even know Austria—the prison gates will open, and the next day Kramarsch will be sitting in a rose-adorned seat in the Reichsrat. Austria, after all, does not recognize the deprivation of political rights; even yesterday's traitor is eligible for re-election tomorrow. This path, unfortunately the most likely, would be the most wrong. Mr. Kramarsch in prison alongside common criminals—that fate would be Russian; the new Austria should not place a crown of thorns on the Czech leader. The best thing would be to set him free and, after public conviction of their political guilt, to permanently exclude him and other Czech politicians, who are suspected of terrible duplicity, from participation in political life through a legislative act![1] The unemployed private citizen Kramarsch will become insignificant. There was a lot of bragging in Kramarsch's political amateurism. [1] An idea against which we, for our part, have serious reservations. Editorial staff of the "Glocke". p. 826 (#846) 826 The Struggle for Coal. If he can no longer develop his activity in the Viennese corridors and ministries, he will perhaps be drawn to a permanent residence on his estates in the Crimea. There he may heartily enjoy the freshness and freedom of Russian intellectual life! LINUS SCHEIBE: THE The Struggle for Coal. The current coal shortage, combined with the excessive price increases for coal, coke, and briquettes, has once again drawn the attention of large sections of the population to the situation in the coal mining industry. The most diverse, sometimes contradictory, views are

heard regarding the causes of this calamity. Due to the coal shortage, these have been somewhat clarified. It is known that production has declined as a result of the increased conscription of miners, but that coal consumption, particularly in the armaments industry, has increased considerably, and transport has become considerably more difficult. However, major deficiencies have emerged in the organization of the coal trade. This situation has significantly exacerbated the shortage of domestic coal in town and country. No excuse from merchant circles can gloss over this. Although the coal production of the last years of peace has not yet been reached, according to the figures available so far for 1916, it was about 15-20 percent higher than in 1915. This year's harsh winter naturally brought with it a greater consumption of domestic coal. Such a calamity could not have occurred had early intervention been made. The retail coal trade was already in very bad shape in peacetime, as far as its organization was concerned. Now it has completely failed. It is not the purpose of these lines to go into this area in detail. Here, the authorities, and especially the municipalities, have to improve what can be improved through prompt action. In addition to regulating food supplies, it is their task to immediately begin regulating fuel supplies. Under the current conditions, the working people sigh and see their suffering enormously increased. The property owners are in a position to store larger coal reserves. p. 827 (#847) The Struggle for Coal. 827. They don't need to ask about the price. That's why the dealer prefers to supply these classes. Maximum prices are not set. This leaves every door open for usury, to the detriment of the poorer sections of the population, who, even here, can only buy what they need immediately. Anyone who has the opportunity to observe the mass gatherings in front of coal shops in the big cities only needs to look at the poverty huddled together there. In larger rural towns, it's not much better. If such calamities, which we have also had in peacetime, are to be avoided in the future, then a different regulation of the fuel trade must take place. Just as war has become a great teacher of organization in a wide variety of areas, so in the area in question, the current phenomena must not be ignored. Even now, much could still be changed, and the situation of the poorest could be improved. Enough tools are available. There is certainly no lack of regulations and agencies for intervention. What's missing is a fair distribution of supplies and reasonable price regulation. That's the crux of the matter. The enormous increase in fuel prices has generated a great deal of bad blood. The necessity of the price increase has been equally disputed. But the most contradictory views prevail regarding the causes. The bourgeois press, in particular, is partly responsible for this confusion, because it has mostly shrugged off the issue or

deliberately represented one-sided capitalist interests. Therefore, the broad sections of the population lack the possibility of a united and purposeful defense. The people grumble, complain, make all sorts of observations about the causes of price increases, and pay. Ultimately, everyone is happy to have received a small amount of the precious material. There is hardly any other branch of industry where there is so little knowledge about the relationship between entrepreneurs and workers as in mining. The price increase in January was justified by the increased cost price, which most people in the mining industry immediately think of as labor wages. Such opinions are readily encouraged by the mine owners and their press. During the discussion of the Hibernia bill in the Prussian House of Representatives, Representative General Hue already pointed out this grievance. The connection between the price increase and entrepreneurial profits is ignored in interested circles. Likewise, the fact that the enormous new installations are financed from the mine surpluses, meaning they are not actually paid for by the mine owners. This certainly depresses dividends. But entrepreneurs simply increase their investment capital and thus increase profits simply from existing means of production. This is only possible through high sales prices for the products extracted and, on the other hand, through low wages, with the improved mechanical aids also having to be taken into account. The nature of mining requires a certain increase in cost price. Since the beginning of the war, one can expect an average increase of 1.50 to 2.00 marks per ton. This includes wages. But how did the syndicate increase coal prices? This increase was the fourth since the beginning of the war by the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, which is authoritative for all of Germany. We cannot consider increases in trade up to the consumer, as these vary considerably, often influenced by local conditions. At the beginning of the war, the syndicate increased the price for new buyers by 2-3 marks per ton. On April 1, 1915, the general guide price was increased by 2 marks, and on September 1, 1915, it was increased again for coal and briquettes by 1 mark, coking coal by 1.25 marks, and coke by 2 marks. A further price increase took effect on April 1, 1916, for coal by 1.50 marks, briquettes by 0.50 marks, and coke by 1 mark. As of January 1 of that year, the guide prices rose a further 2 marks for coal, 3 marks for coke, and 3.25 marks for briquettes. Since the beginning of the war, there has been an increase of 6.50 marks for coal, 4.50 marks for coke, and 6.50 marks for briquettes per ton. This is an increase of around 30 to 50 percent. Through trade, this is naturally even greater for the consumer. Prussian Minister of Commerce Dr. Sydow sought a plausible reason for this price increase in his address to the German Association of Cities, saying: "If the mining industry

wants to increase production, it must be able, above all, to improve the living standards of its workforce through wage increases, to increase their willingness to work by helping to procure food, by providing welfare for miners' guild members, and by providing other voluntary services, and to retain them in the face of fierce competition from the war industry." To achieve this, the mining industry needed a reasonable increase in fuel prices." p. 829 (#849) The Struggle for Coal. 829 This gave the public the opinion that a price increase was necessary for wage improvement. This provided the right sounding board for the business press to constantly link coal price increases and increased wages. The Minister of Trade considers a wage increase urgently necessary. But the miners are still waiting in vain for wage supplements adjusted to the increased food prices. They have achieved increased earnings mostly through overtime and more intensive labor strain, less through higher wage rates. In September of last year, we pointed out in the party press that in the Rhineland-Westphalia coal mining industry, according to official figures, in the first quarter of 1916, compared to the same period in 1915, the wage increase was 17 percent, that of Food prices were 72 percent, and entrepreneurial profits, despite huge depreciation, were 65 percent. On average, each miner worked 10 overtime shifts per quarter. Once again, attempts are being made to justify the price increase with wage increases. In contrast, we must let the numbers speak for themselves to prevent the people from developing a completely false picture of the real situation. Then the causes will become clear: whether it is wages or entrepreneurial profits. According to official wage statistics, coal miners' wages in the Ruhr region in the third quarter of 1916 amounted to 8.50 marks per shift, or 37 percent more than in the last peacetime quarter. In the other German mining districts, these averaged 6-7 marks for the highest-paid category. The increase is up to 20 percent. The majority of the workforce in wage classes 2 and 3, however, earned far less, even though they were mostly breadwinners. They amounted to: - Wage class II (other underground workers) 3rd quarter 1915 3rd quarter 1916 Upper Silesia 3.95 Mk. Lower Silesia 3.79 99 4.72 Mk. 4.39 99 Ruhr area. Saar area 4.85 99 5.60 99 4.26 5.00 99 99 Wurm area . . Left Lower Rhine . . 4.50 5.29 99 5.42 6.10 99 "" Halle. Lignite .. Lower Rhine. Lignite ... 3.96 4.62 99 "" 4.90 5.25 99 "" p. 830 (#850) 830 The battle for coal. Wage class III (adult male daily workers) 3rd quarter 1915 3rd quarter 1916 Upper Silesia 3.65 Mk. 4.26 Mk. Lower Silesia Ruhr area, Saar area, Wurm area 3.43 99 3.82 99 4.73 99 5.38 4.10 4.75 99 99 4.18 99 4.76 99 4.96 5.59 99 99 4.38 Lower Rhine brown coal 99 4.54 99 5.12 99 Left Lower Rhine Halle brown coal . . . 3.84 These small wage increases are offset by the two to three-fold increase in the cost

of living before the war. Since labor costs account for about one-third of the total cost, it is readily apparent that the enormous increase in coal prices cannot be attributed to the temporary increase in wages. It probably averaged 25 percent. Now let us consider the entrepreneurial profit! At the end of 1916, the overall financial statements of 17 of the largest mining companies were available. These had: Gross profits Net profits Depreciation Dividends... 1915/16 307.2 million marks 1912/13 252.7 million marks 1914/15 159.9 million marks 137.6 99 99 55.4 99 "" 174.2 " 115.1 99.5 133 99 99 99 99 39 99 101.4 99 99 52.6 99 105.9 99 66 11.3 percent 6.17 percent 12.4 percent of the share capital 1912/13 was the best year of the economic boom. The coal production of these works was in tons: 34.2 million 26.75 million 28.09 million. From 1914/15 to 1915/16, the factory surpluses increased: gross profits by 95.1 percent, net profits by 213 percent, dividends by 101.3 percent, and depreciation by 32.6 percent. At 13 larger brown coal works, the surpluses amounted to: 1912/13 47,305,226 marks; 1914/15 49,688,829 marks; 1915/16 58,619,662 marks. This is what entrepreneurial profit looks like. How this justifies an increase in the guide prices for fuels, no economist will be able to say. And yet, during the Hibernia bill in the Prussian House of Representatives, the Minister of Trade emphasized that the price increase was justified by the increased cost price. This had his good reason! p. 831 (#851) The Battle for Coal. 831 From the just published budget of the Prussian State Mines for 1917, it is evident that the gross surplus for 1917 is estimated at 59,659,460 marks, compared to 50,326,870 marks for 1913. The total wage amount, as a percentage of operating income and expenditure, remained the same in 1917. The net surplus rose to 22,347,429 marks, compared to 14,678,161 marks in 1913. The main cause of the enormous price increases lies in the surplus economy, to which must be added the enormous depreciation and provisions for new buildings, etc. State and private mining remain the same here. For better illustration, some characteristic figures from the annual reports of West German mines are reproduced. The Mühlheim Mining Association had a surplus of 1,598,483 marks in the first nine months of 1912, but 2,181,190 marks in the same period in 1916. The Harpen Mining Company, a "pure" mining company, the largest in Westphalia, with 22 mines, had a gross profit of 25,061,380 marks in 1913/14, but 32,892,308 marks in 1915/16, and the net profit rose from 9,850,234 marks to 11,287,174 marks. Even more striking is the business management of the "mixed" Gutehoffnungshütte. With a coal production of 3,278,300 tons in 1915/16 (compared to 3,843,700 tons in 1913/14), this had a total turnover of 168,011,200 marks (137,861,400 marks) with a wage bill of 48,591,200 marks (51,270,100

marks), a gross surplus of 43,372,800 marks (20,603,600 marks), and a net profit of 23,407,800 marks (6,991,600 marks). It paid 6 million against 3 million in net profit, 20 percent against 10 percent in dividends. Thus, despite the decline in wage bill, there was a tremendous increase in operating surpluses. = What all this talk about increased cost prices is about can be seen from the following summary from the Harpen Mining Company's report. Compared to the good 1913/14 financial year, revenues per ton in 1915/16 rose from 11.85 marks to 14.86 marks for coal, from 17.18 marks to 17.99 marks for coke, and from 13.38 marks to 16.17 marks for briquettes. These cost prices for coal rose from 9.85 marks to 11.81 marks. The difference between cost prices and revenue increased from 2.05 marks to 3.05 marks. The production costs for coke rose by 0.38 marks, but the proceeds by 2.01 marks, while for briquettes the increase in cost was 0.91 marks, but the proceeds by 3.35 marks. We will leave these figures at that. They demonstrate where the causes of the current enormous price increases are to be sought. p. 832 (#852) 832 The Intellectuals. OTTO FLAKE: HOW The Intellectuals. HOW does one get into politics? Out of interest or out of passion. The interest is readily understandable. Anyone who does not live in the state as a complete individualist, who is active as a worker or employee, will automatically be led to represent the interests of their class, their association, their profession, or to have them represented. They have duties, they also want to have rights. They will learn to demand natural egoism. Its opponents are those who defend their possessions, their power, and their influence against the claims of those behind them; they are the entrepreneurs, the rulers, the leading and privileged classes. This, too, is, philosophically speaking, natural egoism, against which nothing can be said as long as no one disputes its claim to sole rule. Here as well as there, people politicize themselves out of self-interest. To this extent, then, politics is the arena in which interests clash and fight their battles; to this extent, it is an intellectual, sober, concrete activity. This is how it is practiced everywhere, and if one can speak of passion at this stage, it only means that things often get heated: the opponents are committed to it with all their might. Many leaders desire no other kind of politics, and therefore no other recruits than those from interested circles. They don't want "ideologues." And indeed, a party lacks solid ground as long as it isn't actually fighting for power and the associations and masses on which it can rely aren't its most important consideration. There's a kind of philosophical justification for this view: one must be real, because ideas are only worth as much as they can make visible; theory is not only gray, but also vague and indeterminate. Is this view viable? Let's look closely. Let's go to a meeting, let's listen to the

parties' reasons. Is it just said: We want these and these advantages? No, ideas are pitted against each other, feelings are appealed to, and there's talk of law. Or observe the parties' propaganda. It appeals to the soul via the intellect, indirectly via the intellect. Or read the party platforms. They speak of worldviews like religions. So, it's about more than mere advantage and the recognition of claims. In every European A state system before order will soon see a moment when even the lowest party in social terms has enforced minimal demands. What sustains it? Pure hunger for power? No, its idea is and remains alive. The democrat speaks of the idea of equality; the reactionary proves that, let's say, votes don't want to be counted, but weighed. Day after day, everyone draws anew their drive from immediate feeling. Passion sustains it; there is no politics without passion, without great thoughts, without ideas, without ideology. —What is ideology, then? The whole demand that sees every success as only a step. Without passion, living interest would die down or fall into the hands of a few ambitious individuals who were given full authority and exploited it. Let us not underestimate passion. It is what overcomes fatigue; it is simply faith. A party can never receive enough of those who have faith. The Socialist Party has been said not to place much value on who come from the idea. If it's true, it's a terrible mistake. The apostasy of the working community was ultimately a matter of attitude, of the idea. The others must not overlook the promotional element in this idea; ideas that signify conviction are contagious, and anyone who has suffered a loss through them must pay increased attention to them. The old party only needs to want to, and it can bring together a whole large group of people who all have the passion and the willingness to commit themselves fully—I mean the intellectuals. They are so highly qualified that they are almost disreputable. It may be their fault that they didn't show enough discipline and wanted to force their way through the wall. The party must discipline them , but it must also open the doors for them. Do people believe that Marx and Lassalle were unintellectual and that they calculated the workers' movement the way one calculates a business for sales? The solution to the problem is disciplined passion. For a long time, the intellectual was the one who refused to submit to any constraint, and this aversion was all the stronger the greater the artistic or thoughtful urge within him. He saw too deeply and he saw too far; both are essentially the same. Whoever binds himself narrows himself, and to be intellectual means to linger at all stages only until one has exhausted their content; then one moves on, for behind what is known there always still lies what is not known. Intellectuals are skeptical out of seriousness; they disregard the individual because of their feeling for the whole. What is true? Nothing that has a formula. When one

sees deeply, it very often happens that one feels reactionary and progressive at the same time. People who seek their development in this way should not be captured; one should wait until one day they desire to channel their freely wandering energy into a fixed bed. In themselves, there are no fixed paths, but they exist through choice and decision. Vagueness ultimately demands Discipline: this is the moment when the politicization of the intellectuals takes place, and we find ourselves in such a moment today. The more someone is artistically or intellectually inclined, the more they mature in the application of their precision, in the limitation, in the concentration of their impulses. Art, for example, is nothing other than a deliberate, confident, and willing commitment. In certain periods, such as the present, the intellectual meets politics, namely when the intellectuals realize that a deepening and renewal of the spirit is only possible through the acquisition of a disposition. Describing things, skirting around them, has an end; one wants their core, their intense, vital innermost being. This creates a disposition, a desire for radical construction on the first foundations. And the party that possesses the maximum of determination and humanity receives the crowds. Determination: no artist, poet, or philosopher will be liberal after the war, because it will lead to half-heartedness, wavering, indecision, etc. 835 (#855) Verses against the war. 835 Standing in the middle would be. Only conservatives and socialists come into consideration as possibilities. The conservative gives the feeling of power and of the whole, that is something, but this power is also impure because it neglects justice and exaggerates self-confidence. Greater humanity is on the side of the socialists. The conclusion is self-evident. Only it seems to me that it is no longer acceptable for the leading socialist newspapers to have a fundamentally benevolent, but also very inactive, attitude toward intellectual matters. What is needed is not occasional mentions, referred to in long pauses, but an alliance with equal rights, a joint deployment, a concerted attack, and sworn support. Of course, the rubric is less important than the recognition that the intellectual world is the most important reservoir from which the party can draw its strength. Skilled and knowledgeable minds must treat the worker as Whether he understands the daily and annual problems of the intellectual world as well as the upper middle class—who dares to say that he cannot? We, the intellectuals, are only waiting for him, tired of offering ourselves from camp to camp, eager to confess, ready to practice discipline. So that I can put it in a word: the Socialist Party must become the great cultural party. HERMANN WENDEL, M. d. R.: Verses Against War. The world of art and literature will be like that of the Indians, past in these realms—only the clash of views and the change of concepts remains. The last great wave in the 1880s brought

naturalism in literature and impressionism in painting, both of which, with their variations, still dominate the market today. But an unruly bunch of expressionists, cubists, futurists, eternists, and whatever they call themselves or are called, have for some time now rejected naturalism and impressionism as Dusty and outdated forms, 48/3* p. 836 (#856) 836 Verses against the war. And we, who at sixteen squatted together in smoky taverns, Stirner in one pocket and Murger in the other, our brains full of blisters and our blood full of urge, and who were enthusiastic about Liliencron and enraged about Conradi, today, when we are between thirty and forty, we feel almost a little old next to the wise men of the very young. But being old or young is also a matter of will. Fontane, who was elderly in years, did not want to drift in the wake of his time and therefore still had a keen ear for the Sturm und Drang movement around Hauptmann. And since we as socialists have the damned duty and obligation to be young, it is not right that we dismiss the products of the most modern as incomprehensible nonsense with a disdainful wave of the hand. If we sharpen our eyes and If we prick up our ears, we can indeed recognize Hegel's famous phrase: "Everything that is, is rational!" as true even before the most absurd nonsense, in the sense that what was born of the burning anguish of the heart somehow resonates in the great dance of suns, moons, and stars. Expressionism, to stick with this inadequate term, is not the truth, for like a dice roll of six, so the truth has countless sides, but it is, just as Impressionism was for its time, a piece of the truth. Progressively, development will accept what fits its rhythm and leave behind what is appearance, shell, or appendage. Anyone who wants to know more about the essence of Expressionism may want to pick up the book of the same name by Hermann Bahr, from which one can see not only that the aging Bahr was increasingly inclined towards mysticism. Anyone who tends to understand and analyze art socially is given a clue by the suggestion that Impressionism emphasizes the democratic, Expressionism the individualistic, for before Impressionism everything was equally worthy of loving treatment by art, the foam-born Venus as well as the pregnant cow, the flowery meadow as well as the stinking manure heap, whereas Expressionism is utterly indifferent to the objective nature of the external world and only "the fullness of the faces" within each individual is of importance. For the layman, quite simply put: the Expressionists of today strive for the same thing as the Impressionists a generation ago: new possibilities of expression in painting, sculpture, and poetry. But even those who, despite all objections, ridiculed these innovators as idle coffee-house chatterers must be shaken by the cruel fact that in the great strangulation of our time, no intellectual class paid so lavishly with its blood as the group of

writers gathered around the clever and courageous magazine "Aktion." To this day, Kurd Adler, Georg Hecht, Hans Leybold, Ernst Stadler, Hans Ehrenbaum, Walter Ferl, Alfred Lichtenstein, Hugo Hinz, and Gottfried Benn have fallen; their crosses, put together, form a small cemetery of their own. Next to the pale tragedy of their senselessly early demise, the death of Theodor Körner, for example, seems almost kitschy, so untragic does it seem: whoever goes out as a volunteer soldier and war singer only finds his destiny's highest fulfillment with the fatal bullet. But these young poets went into the field involuntarily and unhappily, for. They were all "good Europeans" and moved by a brotherly love for all creatures; their hatred of the war, purely emotional, swept them into even wilder emotional whirlwinds at the turn of July and August 1914 than the socialists with their desire for peace. The spiritual struggle and suffering, the desperate disgust of this youngest generation in the face of the collapse of Europe, is grippingly revealed in a recently published volume of verse.[1] These are verses by twenty-one poets, five of whom remained before the enemy, verses from the war against the war, very unequal in their value and ranging from the mature art of Wilhelm Klemm to unfinished stammering, but each poem is significant in its own way as a document. In these pages there is nothing of fresh, joyful victory, nothing of devotion to the fatherland, nothing of hurrah and fanfare—only the horror of war becomes spookily alive. Alfred Lichtenstein goes through all emotional nuances. Stein's enforced firmness: 1 1914-1916. The villages smoke on the horizon like squalid rags. I lie godforsaken in the rattling rifle front. An anthology. Publisher of the weekly "Die Aktion" (Franz Pfemfert). Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1916. p. 838 (#858) 838 verses against the war. Many copper enemy birds buzz around my heart and brain. I push myself steeply into the horror and defy death until Ludwig Bäumer's harshly torn, gasping evening song, in which all the horrors of trench death chatter their teeth, and Wilhelm Klemm's overwhelming vision of the hospital. The march is reflected, unlike conventional wisdom, in a poem by Oskar Kanehl, and the battle, the assault, in verses by Otto Pick: A telephone rings fearfully in a hole in the ground. Bayonets are fixed by trembling hands, and a troop of daredevils runs away like soccer players. Suddenly, one doesn't know why the corn here hasn't been cut and the potatoes are rotting, and why the brown figures stride toward us in the evening, grand and raising their hands like ecstatic worshippers. All these poets feel like strangers in the monstrous events of this time, piling up mounds of corpses: "I am a lonely foreign body, splintered off somewhere" (Klemm); they consider themselves "led toward madness," "whom a morning awakens by its hook" (Bäumer) and who "must dance toward the enemy like reluctant bears at fairs" (Keller). Bitter shame chokes

them that they must be destroyers. Hot pain stirs them that they are both victims and sacrificers in a fratricidal war. Klemm confesses: My heart is as big as Germany and France combined, pierced by all the missiles in the world. Köppen dreams "this black, velvety, singing dream": not to kill for a whole day. Fer puts the mournful cry into the mouths of the wounded: We have killed people who are calling for us: Dear brothers . . . In this roaring collapse of all things, feelings such as longing for home and filial love are awakened, which were not particularly popular among the youngest. Bäumer says: When the day fades, I smell the strong river of my homeland. And I see the blue, heavy silhouettes of the cathedral, the lights on the darkening ships, and the lonely, creaking promenades. p. 839 (#859) Glosses. 839 And I see the hands and gazes of a thousand, a thousand mothers, reaching far beyond the night to us. Piscator offers his verses to the mother of two sons who fell, and Pick sighs: We thirst for the rooms of our boyhood and the smell from the mother's clothes. Thus, these poets, whose verses in peacetime hung too much with the foul night scents of the big city, become childishly simple in the face of death, and the purity of early youth plays on very knowing brows as they await the fatal missile. Here, too, it would be foolish to say that these verses contain the truth, for truths are infinitely numerous in the life of feeling, but whatever one's position on the World War itself, one cannot ignore this poetry. These are eloquent testimonies to the effect of the years 1914 to 1916 on certain purely intellectually oriented groups of the young sex and a fully struck tone that clearly resonates amidst the discord and confusion of our times. These glosses. An enemy of the press. It is now almost twenty years since, after brief, uninformed announcements, the first small red issue of "The Torch" appeared in Vienna. The cover showed the silhouette of Vienna, from which a burning torch blazed. The editor was Karl Kraus, a very young writer. The first issue of the "Fackel" was an event whose impression will perhaps remain as unforgettable for many as it did for me: ruthlessly and masterfully, the mainstream press was attacked; Vienna shuddered at the terrible sleaze and capitalist degeneration of its major newspapers. Now the work of the "Fackel" continued: against the hollow, the familiar, the false, the hypocritical in general: against! Not only the red cover recalled the "lantern" of the fighter Henri Rochefort, the former Marquis of Lucay, later political convict in New Caledonia, London editorialist for the Parisian "Intransigeant," and finally, alas, revenge patriot. Kraus was joined by companions: Dr. Ellenbogen wrote against the Southern Railway Company, and the old Liebknecht defended his position in the "Fackel" against the Dreyfus propaganda of the liberal and social democratic press. But the main battle of the "Fackel" was still against the press itself, and

especially against the "Neue Freie Presse." The mainstream press took revenge through the old method of silence; but the "Fackel" lived on. It was said of Kraus that unfulfilled career hopes had made him an enemy of the press; once, someone he had mocked attacked him in a café, and rival papers appeared, which soon disappeared. The original friendship with the "Arbeiter-Zeitung," which had long before waged the same battle with the same weapon, lasted for a while, or was it permanent? In the fractures, the sympathy with Maximilian Harden turned into hatred, and in the mockery of Harden's style, which he called "Desperanto," Kraus first revealed himself as a protector and preserver of the German written language, of which he had an incomparable mastery. The years passed, the "Fackel" was written more and more exclusively by Kraus alone, it scrupulously avoided any courting for appendixes and sales. It transitioned—always alongside the fight against the press—to an original consideration of contemporary events that it considered important or significant, such as the relationship between the sexes. For a time, Kraus also appeared in "Simplicissimus." Books by him were published. Read them. The "Fackel" became a non-periodic publication, appearing whenever its writer saw a reason. (Oh, if only all the joke papers—with which I certainly don't want to call the "Fackel" a joke paper—would realize that one can't deliver six pages of wit by 10:35 a.m. on Tuesday, but that one day delivers more material than a quarter of a year would otherwise!) Whether the "Fackel" is still being published, I don't know: I've been searching for it in vain at the stands for many months. But recently, Karl Kraus read from his writings in Berlin. What he read proved that his hatred of the mainstream press had only grown because of the war. He offered sayings, for example, about war suppliers, about time and suffering, and a few poems, some of which are works of linguistic art for their own sake, others inspired by the times. And while many an aphorism, like the one about Kyffhäuser and the department stores, about the elemental power of presentation and so on, caused bright laughter to ring out under the illumination of many a swindle, the poems that cried out in unspeakable distress shook all the more deeply. – I believe Karl Kraus's fight against that press was not entirely in vain; but he will not conceal from himself that what he hates and what he fights against necessarily arises from the times and their conditions, is founded and resolved in them. RB p. 841 (#861) DIE GLOCKE 49th issue March 3, 1917 2nd year. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source information is permitted by Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: WER The Confidence of Reaction. Anyone who believed that the proclamation of intensified submarine warfare would end the internal war against the Chancellor will have been disabused of this notion in the last two weeks. The budget speeches in the Prussian

House of Representatives and the general assembly of the Farmers' League provided strong evidence that the highly conservative and heavy industrial circles are working toward the same goal as before February 1. These gentlemen do not believe the Chancellor is sufficiently eager for annexation; he is still strongly suspected of a certain, albeit still extremely problematic, proclivity for reform after the war—what further evidence is needed? Away with him! First of all, these activities demonstrate that the political circles in question do not see the initiation of intensified naval warfare as a victory over the Chancellor in itself. In fact, the submarine war Germany has been waging since February 1 is not the war that Reventlow and his comrades have been demanding for more than a year, and which the Reich Chancellor has rejected for just as long. That war would have led—there was never any doubt about this in informed circles—to the hopeless collapse of the Central Powers; it would almost certainly have set all European neutrals, not only America, but also all other European countries against us, among which at that time was Romania , from which we obtained, by peaceful means, approximately 12 million tons of grain for the population of the German Reich alone. Given the disastrous grain harvest of 1915, these Romanian grain masses were absolutely indispensable for us and our allies. Moreover, the number and capabilities of our submarines were, of course, considerably smaller a year ago than they are today. With this limited material, suppressing the economic power of our enemies, thus accelerating peace, would have been all the more hopeless, as these same economic powers were considerably stronger than they are today. If, in such a situation, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Romania, in addition to North and South America, had joined the ranks of our enemies, it would not be an exaggeration to describe this increase in our enemies' strength as a superiority that would destroy the prospects of the Central Powers. The submarine war, as it is now being waged, has nothing to do with the Reventlow submarine war. It offers entirely different prospects for German success than that desperate attempt that would have quickly plunged us into the abyss. The Social Democrats, who, as is well known, opposed Reventlow's plans until the last moment, have a special reason to sharply illuminate this difference between the two submarine wars. This is all the more necessary since Count Reventlow's political friends are now clever enough to see in the proclamation of the intensified submarine war not only a fulfillment of their demands, but also an admission that they have always represented the right and that only the Reich government was too "weak" to do this right immediately. Herein lies a danger for our future domestic political development; for it is clear that the greater, as we all hope, the

influence of the intensified submarine war on accelerating a good peace, the greater the influence of the conservative and agitating circles would rise if public opinion were to see in the current submarine war merely a fulfillment of old agitating demands. That these circles are now indeed sensing a new dawn is evident from the provocative speeches that the The harsh rejection of any Prussian electoral reform, in favor of the entailment bill, entwined with the lush blossoms of an annexation fantasy and murmuring with the loud fanfares of the Agrarian Federal Assembly: this is the signature that characterizes domestic political life since the proclamation of the intensified naval war. And we also include the Zabern air that noticeably blew through the proceedings of the Reichstag on Friday, February 23, in this. At the Agrarian Review, one of the main speakers was the chairman of the Central Association of German Industrialists, retired District Administrator Rötger. The "Deutsche Tageszeitung" felt it had to do the rest and commented on this process with the words: "It represents a historic moment, how agriculture and industry are joining hands here in a new, solid alliance." The "Deutsche Tageszeitung" is poorly versed in "history" when it sees a new alliance in the fraternization of agrarianism and heavy industry. On the contrary, this alliance is as old as the protective tariff movement in the German Empire. As early as the mid-1870s, representatives of the iron industry joined forces with cotton, soda, and sugar manufacturers, hat makers, leather, paper, and linen manufacturers to form the Central Association of German Industrialists. Since 1877, contact had also begun between protective-tariff industrialists and agrarians, who at that time were increasingly leaning toward protective tariffs. As early as the autumn of 1877, one year before the promulgation of the Socialist Law, major industrialists and agrarians met together under the chairmanship of Count Wilamowitz. Both sides drew up tariff proposals; however, annexation proposals had to be rejected, since peace prevailed at the time. The alliance between the two groups of agitators is therefore not new, but has existed since the beginning, even if it has been less loudly emphasized to the public in the meantime. When the political trust between "industry and agriculture" is now openly expressed before the assembled military, and the Bundist organ even calls it a historic moment, this indeed strikes us as a most remarkable sign of the times, to which the German working class in particular should pay attention. The classes that have always offered the sharpest resistance to the rise of the German working class, that have always opposed the inevitable democratization of our entire public life only from the master's standpoint, are now joining hands to jointly prevent any change in the glories of German conditions from the pre-August period. The

influence exerted by these two united pillars of reaction will be even greater after the war than it was before the war. Both agrarianism and heavy industry have experienced an enormous strengthening of their economic position as a result of the war. Enormous profits have flowed to them. The weaker and smaller among them have here and there perished, but the rest have only become richer and stronger through the concentration of capital, which asserted itself with extreme force during the war. The self-confidence of these strata has increased, and they are firmly determined not to allow even a trifle of their dominant position to be stolen from them. Here the outlines of the social groupings that will be decisive for the internal struggles in the post-war period emerge clearly. The agitators on the extreme right correspond to the agitators on the extreme left; every Westarp corresponds to a Ledebour, and both proudly profess themselves as people who have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. In between, however, stand the masses of the German people, the working classes, the broad middle- 1 1 p. 845 (#865) The Confidence of Reaction. 845, at whose expense the war is mainly being waged and under whose economic purge it has already so mercilessly wrecked. After the war, they will have to take up the struggle for the reorientation of Reich and state with united forces, since Herr Bethmann-Hollweg has proven himself incapable of drawing the basic lines of this reorientation during the war. I intentionally say: with united forces; for it is very questionable whether the economic situation of the middle class in the coming times of peace will differ significantly from that of the proletariat. The general price revolution we are experiencing, which has reduced the value of money so extraordinarily, hits the white-collar workers who depend on a fixed income most hard. The process of capital concentration, of which we just spoke, will further reduce the number of self-employed and further increase that of employees, so that one can indeed expect an economic convergence between the declining middle classes and the rising working class. This economic convergence will be followed by political convergence. Social Democracy can and must become the party of all classes suffering under capitalism. The stage of the purely industrial workers' party will end in the foreseeable future, and Social Democracy will see the hordes of employees, intellectuals, civil servants, and small and middle farmers gathered around it, although the core will naturally remain proletarian. Then, as the appointed spokesperson for the broad working masses, it will be in a position to lead the struggle for the democratization of our public life with a completely different force than before. The struggle for Prussian electoral reform, which still culminates in the new orientation, will only then be taken up in earnest, and it will be sustained by the fervor and sense of honor of a

people that has held its own in battle against the entire world and that now refuses to be chained down again by domestic gendarmes. p. 846 (#866) 846 The Confidence of Reaction. All the impertinent sayings of Beumer, Fuhrmann, and now especially of Wildgrube, etc., which we have heard in recent weeks in the State Parliament and at the League meeting, bear the stamp of those "Germans" who grinned at us from foreign caricatures even before the war, and who contributed not the least to making the German name so terribly hated throughout the world. Such types were the models according to which the English and French press, for decades, peddled a disgusting distortion of Germanness upon the world, which, admittedly, did not correspond to reality, but which nevertheless did not fail to make its impression. And if hundreds of thousands of our best men have now had to lose their lives outside because the world sees in the German people a brutal, barbaric nation whose existence threatens the security and freedom of other peoples, the exploitation of such speeches, as we have seen them, has also led to this fatal delusion. had to hear again. There was also a world politician, admittedly one who had let the wind of world politics blow around his nose and not, like Wildgrube and Beumer, merely made a noise about world politics. It was Paul Rohrbach, who had complained many years ago about the effect of these reactionary noisemakers abroad. At the time of the Turkish Revolution, he wrote: In the eyes of the Young Turks, Germany, like everywhere else in the world outside of Germany's borders, is a thoroughly reactionary state, which, in terms of its internal political and social conditions, is actually not very different from, for example, Russia. I have been asked by educated Turks in political conversations about the Prussian electoral law - albeit with the misunderstood understanding that the Prussian one is the Reichstag electoral law. This idea that Germany, alongside Russia, is the true stronghold of reaction in Europe, and that German politics, out of inner necessity, had to support the reactionary system of the old Sultan, is studiously perpetuated by the English and French press not only in Turkey, but throughout the world. We at home have no idea what an enormous obstacle to the successful advancement of our national interests this antipathy toward us, as a backward and anti-freedom power, which has long been cultivated among the peoples with art and deliberate intention. That was written nine years ago now. In the meantime, the World War has given us a "premonition" of what pests the friends of Prussian suffrage and German anti-freedom sentiment truly are. They must be made to disappear in the interest of the nation. The young and vigorous classes, who hold the future of the Reich in their hands, still stand breast to breast against the enemy. When they return one day, they will quickly know how to put an end to those old

semesters of reaction who still have the final say at home. ADOLF KOESTER: THE Bismarck's Legacy. II. Germany and Italy. The capture of Rome and the complete unification of Italy into a nation-state had taken place amid the victorious thunder of German cannons. The then French ambassador in Rome had stayed at home when Victor Emmanuel entered the Eternal City. France, especially Thiers, initially treated the newly emerged Mediterranean superpower with suspicion and coldness. Thus, quite naturally, under the conservative Minghetti ministry (1873-1876), a loose rapprochement between Italy and Germany came about. The Irredenta, the nationalist movement on the northern Italian borders for the incorporation of the Italian-speaking parts of Austria into the new kingdom, played no noticeable role in the early years of the young state. This changed when the Liberals came to power in 1876. Their "liberal" program leaned more toward France than toward Germany. They shared their freethinking and Freemasonry with the Latin Republic, which had been led by the Radicals since 1877. And while they turned a blind eye to the "unredeemed" Italians of France (in Nice and Savoy), they gave free rein to the pan-Italian agitation directed against the Danube Monarchy. Until the Congress of Berlin, Italian policy had not firmly aligned itself with either France or Germany-Austria. Crispi had, indeed, already held preparatory discussions with Bismarck in 1877, in which the latter advised Italy to occupy Albania (as compensation for Austria-Hungary's new acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Crispi declined: "We wouldn't know what to do with it." When he spoke of a new Alpine border, Bismarck dismissed the idea, for whom Italy's good relationship with Austria was, in a sense, the sine qua non of a future German-Italian alliance. England had also held similar discussions with Italy. He was all the more interested in a good relationship with the new Mediterranean power the faster France recovered from its defeat and set out to conquer North Africa. If Italy did not conclude an alliance with France, it would be dependent on England. With its long coastline and its need for coal, Italy has always made all its alliances dependent on its position with England. Even before 1878, England offered Italy an exchange of views on Albania, Egypt (which was not yet English at the time), Tripoli, and Tunis. The Italian Foreign Minister Corti rejected this as well. Thus, during the preliminary negotiations for the conference, in which England Cyprus, as well as at the congress itself, at which France was promised Tunis, came away empty-handed. Shortly before the congress, Bismarck is said to have promised Italy every assistance in acquiring Tunis. Italian policy, however, wavered. When, in 1881, France prepared to occupy Tunis (which already had more Italians than French) with 3,200 men, Italy stood by with clenched fists, but powerless. It expelled its responsible

statesmen from their offices and joined the German-Austrian alliance on May 20, 1883. p. 849 (#869) Bismarck's legacy. 849 The wording of this Italian alliance treaty, in which the monarchs of the three countries are said to have pledged themselves, if necessary, to use their entire personal influence to ensure its implementation, has never been published. But even without that, it was clear from the outset that this commitment of the third party to the Triple Alliance was quite different, much looser. had to be more important than that of the first two among themselves. Italy was a land and naval power. Germany and Austria-Hungary could only ever guarantee Italy its land possessions, never its prestige at sea and the security of its long coastline. Italy therefore needed something to complement the Triple Alliance, namely an alliance with a naval power. This could only be England or France. Italy wavered between the two for a long time. Even after the alliance was concluded, it rejected joint operations with England in Egypt (against Crispi's advice) out of consideration for France. Finally, it swung definitively to England's side, even though a formal treaty between the two states was never concluded. In the shadow of these agreements, Italy began the ten-year-long tariff war with France. In Africa, too, both states were fiercely opposed to each other, not without England's involvement. This hostile position between the two Latin states lasted until its preconditions became invalid or began to waver. These were the opposition between France and England on the one hand, the An agreement based on equality between England and Germany, on the other hand. With the decline of the Franco-English antagonism, the Franco-Italian one also had to decline. With the rise of German-English tension, the bond between Germany and Italy had to loosen. This subsequently occurred as a matter of course. The phases of German-Italian relations always coincide with the respective phases of German-English relations. The Triple Alliance was renewed for the first time under Bismarck in 1887. At that time, the Italian representative Robilant had expressly demanded the prior conclusion of an agreement, even if only a verbal one, with England in the spirit of that guarantee of Italy's position in the Mediterranean. Bismarck agreed to this agreement. "With regard to Italy, he always held the view that the kingdom could never completely do without the maritime protection of the English fleet and therefore must always show more or less consideration for England." While Italy's position in the Triple Alliance was problematic from the start (no one expected anything more in the event of war than that Italy's benevolent neutrality would tie down part of France's land and naval forces), Germany's position was nevertheless considerably secured by its accession to the German-Austrian alliance (with Russian assurances in the background). One certainly has the impression

that Bismarck, by tacitly arranging the French annexation of Tunis, partly drove Italy into the alliance. By thus binding Italy to us, he, in keeping with his favorite idea, distracted France from all too lively anti-German machinations in Central Europe through colonial pursuits. At the same time, he tied England to our and Italy's side through its threatened Mediterranean interests. WILHELM KOLB. No more hiding—act! WHAT HAD TO HAPPEN, HAPPENED. The split in the party became a historical necessity after decades of repeated, futile attempts to circumvent the internal problems of social democracy with cunning and cunning. With relentless consistency, the contradictions intensified, the conflicts multiplied, and the confusion increased. The war accelerated the development and made the crisis ripe for a decision that could no longer be avoided. 4 p. 851 (#871) No game of hide-and-seek! It would, of course, be a foolish hope to believe that the organizational split represents a solution to the problem from which it arose. For the time being, only the first preparatory step has been taken toward the internal recovery of the party. The organizational splintering of the opposition to "the politics of August 4th" must be followed by a theoretical and political reorientation of Social Democracy if the party is not to find itself, sooner or later, faced with the same situation that it believed to have overcome through the split. Nothing would be more disastrous for the future development of Social Democracy than if, as in the past, one were to close one's eyes to the theoretical and historical causes of the party crisis and content oneself with organizational measures. The problem to be solved is not an organizational one, but a theoretical-political one. Any attempt to conceal and cover up this fact will, with inherent consistency, only increase the already more than alarming confusion about the causes of the crisis. We are facing the final, decisive step in the development of Social Democracy from sect to party. Nothing has contributed more to exacerbating the contradictions and To make party discussions as fruitless as the tortured, useless attempts to avoid the actual core of the problem, which has been fought and argued over for more than a quarter of a century, in order not to endanger the organizational unity of the party. Nevertheless, there are still very influential people in Social Democracy who continue this tactic of concealment in the mistaken belief that it can take the wind out of the sails of the opposition. But if anything is likely to strengthen the position of the opposition and continually give new impetus to its claim that the principles of Social Democracy are being trampled upon, then it is the concealment of obvious facts and the attempt to outwit its logic. The experiences of the last two years have shown with all the clarity one could wish for where this tactic leads and must lead. The party is today completely internally shattered; on

both sides, a true chaos reigns. The minority is divided into three groups, and even within the majority, opinions about the future course of the party's tactics diverge widely. There is no clarity about the causes of the crisis or the consequences of the tactics of August 4. That, under such circumstances, the consolidation of the organization through the splintering of the opposition is a highly questionable one is obvious. The parliamentary and journalistic spokesmen for the majority still cling desperately to the illusion that the approval of war credits is the cause of the conflict. The Vorwärts newspaper recently wrote that the core of the party dispute lies in the two questions of whether Social Democracy has a duty to defend the fatherland and whether this duty is positively given to it in the current war. This is a gross error. The conflict over the approval of war credits is only one, albeit very significant, issue. an essential part of the overall problem from which the party conflicts arose. It makes no sense to continue this tactic of self-deception, since it brings us no closer to solving the actual problem. The party crisis does not date back to August 4, 1914; rather, its cause goes back decades. It is almost as old as the party itself. The claim that by approving the war credits, Social Democracy was only making good what its most qualified spokesmen had always assured us, namely that it would not abandon the fatherland in its hour of need, is quibbling, because until August 4, 1914, Social Democracy refused "in principle" to draw the political consequences from this assurance. But this is where the rub lies. The approval of the war credits represents a break with the previous p. 853 (#873) No game of hide-and-seek 853 - act! A policy of fundamentally denying the state. Its consequences are absolutely incompatible with the resolutions of national party congresses and international congresses, on which the policy of Social Democracy is still fundamentally based today. To this extent, the opposition fights against this policy with a semblance of justification. If one wants to take the wind out of the opposition's sails, then one must demonstrate the actual and historical contestability of its position, which was the position of the entire party until August 4, 1914. That is, one must openly and honestly admit that the Social Democratic Party's previous policy had been on a dead end. No one, neither inside nor outside the Social Democratic Party, took the Social Democratic Party's approval of war credits for granted; quite the opposite. From the standpoint of the party congress resolutions, by which the Social Democratic Party was committed to the fundamental denial of the present state, nothing was more natural than the rejection of war credits. Those who, for decades, fundamentally denied the capitalist class state the means to maintain its existence, could not, at the moment when, according to the official theory of social democracy, this state was cracking at its

seams and facing catastrophic collapse, grant it the means to secure its existence. In this respect, the opposition's argument appears plausible, and it would also have historical justification on its side if the premises on which it was based were correct. But that is not the case. For decades, a contradiction has existed between the official theory, on which the policy of social democracy was fundamentally established, and its political practice. This contradiction has grown all the greater the more the party has grown in numbers and, consequently, in political influence. As the contradiction has grown, the antagonisms have grown, the conflicts have multiplied, so that no party congress or international congress has taken place without some "party question" being discussed. All these conflicts p. 854 (#874) 854 No hide-and-seek - act! have a common root, namely the contradiction between official theory and political practice. The axis around which the party crisis revolves is not the party's principles, but its political method. This must be made clear to the masses above all else if one wants to paralyze the opposition's influence on them. The game of playing with hidden cards must stop. The "principles" on which the opposition insists, and to which all previous oppositions have also clung, have nothing whatsoever to do with the principles of democracy and socialism; they are tactical fallacies based on theories long since overcome. At the center of the dispute is the question: "How will socialism be realized?" Theoretically formulated, the problem is: "Revolution or reform." Politically formulated: "Revolutionary mass action to overthrow capitalist class rule, or the consistent, step-by-step legal conquest of political power." All conflicts fought out within the party so far are nothing more than political and tactical side effects of this central problem of international social democracy. Therefore, the crisis is not limited to German social democracy, but an international phenomenon. The party's theoretical development had reached a dead end, and as a result, social democratic policy had reached a dead end. In vain, repeated references to the hopeless contradiction between theory and practice were made. The majority of the party clung to the theory of revolution while simultaneously pursuing a political practice that was incompatible with this theory of revolution. With the debate on the general strike, it was believed that a way out had been found, but in reality the party only got deeper into the dead end. No one had the courage to consider the tactical consequences of the The party was neither able to draw conclusions from the theory of revolution, nor to derive from the party's political practice the necessity of revising its official theory. Thus, the party found itself caught between two chairs when the war broke out and forced it to openly acknowledge the consequences of its previous political practice. From then on, there was only an either/or. Either one had to

adhere to the fundamental negation of the state and draw the consequences arising from it in such a situation, or one had to abandon the official theory, on which the party's tactics had until then been fundamentally determined, and place oneself with both feet firmly on the ground of the historically established state. The party did the latter and thereby completed the historically necessary break with a theory that was bound to continually irritate its politics. The theory of revolution, like the theory of catastrophe, was a remnant of utopian socialism. It is not a component of Scientific socialism and its abandonment cannot, therefore, in any way call into question the principles of social democracy. The belief in revolutionary formulas for action can never be considered a component of democratic or socialist principles. The "principles" to which the opposition repeatedly appeals are based on hypotheses that have been dismissed as untenable by the experience of economic and historical development over the last half century. Both Marx and Engels openly acknowledged the economic-historical error they had committed in the "Communist Manifesto" with the theory of revolution proclaimed therein. It was and remains a chimera to pin the hopes of the proletariat on revolutionary adventures, just as it was and remains a chimera to expect that a democratic-socialist society could be grafted onto the ruins of a capitalist one. From the standpoint of scientific socialism, there is no catastrophic collapse of capitalist society, just as there is no establishment of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat. These were theoretical errors, from which equally erroneous conclusions for the political method of the proletariat necessarily had to follow. The Crisis p. 856 (#876) 856 act! No game of hide-and-seek by social democracy is rooted in the fact that this revolutionary Although the ideology of the "Communist Manifesto" has never been completely abandoned, until very recently it was a political dogma within Social Democracy that social contradictions were mechanically intensifying, so that a final, great decision had to be made between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This fossilized theory was once again solemnly proclaimed at the Dresden Party Congress as the guideline for Social Democratic policy, and the resolutions adopted there were internationalized at the Amsterdam Congress. With this, it was believed that a firm stop had been put in place to the political development of Social Democracy. But living development can never be encapsulated in lifeless formulas. With elemental force, the war tore down this house of cards of a yellowed theory and thereby freed Social Democracy from the shackles to which its policy of "principled" negation of the state had been chained. Today, it is crystal clear that the proletariat cannot base its world-historical task on the hopes it harbored 50 or more years ago, but that it can only

achieve its goal through the growing strength of its organizations, its economic, social, and political influence. The age of revolutions is history. The transformation of bourgeois-capitalist society into democratic-socialist society is taking place in a different way than the transformation of the feudal social order into capitalist society. The proletarian revolution is taking place methodically and legally on the basis of universal suffrage. Decisions are no longer made in the streets and on the barricades, but in parliament. Socialism is realized through the legal, gradual conquest of political power by the proletariat. It is not the product of collapse, but of construction on the seeds of the future social order developing within capitalist society. The method of the proletarian class struggle is not bound to any theory, but is determined by the course of historical development, by actual conditions. Its method is parliamentary, and from this, not from outdated theories, Social Democracy must draw its tactical conclusions. The theoretical spell must be broken, and a clear path must be created for a theory adapted to the experiences of development. The age-old fanaticism with which the opposition attacks living development is a logical consequence of the belief in dogma that had seized control of Social Democracy. We must come to terms with this. But we will overcome this fanaticism all the more quickly the more openly and honestly we admit that the party was artificially hampered in its political development by false theories. There is no turning back from the policy of August 4th to the policy of fundamental negation. Therefore, away with all the resolutions on which this policy of fundamental negation was based! The policy of Social Democracy must be placed on the firm foundation of Marx's social science. The more clearly and decisively Social Democracy acknowledges the consequences of the step it took on August 4, 1914, the more quickly it will overcome its crisis. We are facing the final, decisive step from sect to party. The political hour of Social Democracy's fate has struck. ALWIN SAENGER (Munich), currently a gunner: A dangerous path. "A simplification of the administration of justice" has been discussed and written about for some time in circles of experts and laypeople, and the submission of a draft law serving this purpose to the Reichstag can probably be expected very soon - as the Bavarian Minister of Justice pointed out recently in the Finance Committee of the Bavarian Chamber of Deputies. The reason for a reorganization of the administration of justice in the sense of simplification is seen in two necessities: firstly, the continued army demand for men, which every military force must endeavor to serve, and secondly, the duty not to tolerate "petty party squabbles" during the Great World War. If the problem as a whole, as it is now posed, already raises the most serious concerns, these are further increased when one considers more closely the

nature and method of the means to be applied, and the means that are increasingly urgently required. The greatest caution and the greatest attention are called for if a dangerous path is not to be taken, to the lasting detriment of society as a whole and of the German administration of justice. Even now, in war, indeed despite and precisely because of the war, the old state principle that the administration of justice is the foundation of the state must be maintained intact. Therefore, this foundation cannot simply be subordinated to other necessities. Even in war, the state remains a civilized state, which must solve permanent tasks equally and, above all, guarantee their secure and consistent continuation in the ever-approaching times of peace. The higher and more essential the cultural tasks, the more carefully their integrity must be preserved and protected. We therefore fear "emergency laws" in no area of public life as much as in the administration of justice itself. A fundamental "reorientation" of our entire legal system, especially criminal law, is naturally a necessity. We doubt whether the current wartime possesses the right spirit for such a fundamental transformation. The danger, however, lies in the fact that a legal change to the existing situation today will more or less always be directed by the wartime needs of the moment, and that these needs by no means necessarily coincide with the basic requirements of the administration of justice, nor do they actually coincide. For simplification of the administration of justice today means nothing else. p. 859 (#879) A dangerous path. 859 as the imprisonment of persons, particularly in the court of first instance, the abolition or at least curtailment of the jurisdiction of higher courts, especially the jury court, the shortening of the appeal process; in short: simplification of the administration of justice today means nothing more and nothing less than a restriction of legal transactions, legal prosecution, and the legal guarantees otherwise recognized as necessary. In doing so, the state is failing to fulfill one of its greatest cultural tasks, which should not be diminished even in such a tremendous era as the one we are living through. The most serious attention must be paid to further developments. Despite all assurances of the temporary nature of planned changes, there is an extraordinary danger that so-called "simplifications" in legal life—or, more accurately, deteriorations—will survive into peacetime, either completely or partially. Vestigia terrent; we have experienced too little good news in this area in our fatherland. In practice, all "improvements" will be driven by the ideas of an overly self-confident legal profession, which, after fulfilling a few heartfelt wishes, will do everything in its power to preserve its achievements in peacetime. This will achieve precious little for military preparation and readiness; for there are currently only 4,500 senior judicial officials still active

in Prussia. Eliminating those no longer eligible for military service due to age and those otherwise unfit will leave only a very small number of available personnel for the military administration. Certainly, even with the most careful observation of military needs, the advantage gained from this vanishing number, measured against the total, is disproportionate to the disadvantages of the legal restriction. Another main objection to the continued maintenance of the peacetime legal system during war is that it is the duty of the state to put aside all minor disputes during this time and not to burden or inconvenience the courts with subordinate 49/2* p. 860 (#880) 860 A dangerous path. + party disputes. That there is a kernel of truth in this idea must be admitted. The longer the war lasts, the more difficult it becomes to implement. The daily increasing law of war itself interferes with the simplest relationships of life; as the war continues, people increasingly return to dealing with previously postponed personal matters that must be dealt with and whose importance for the individual case cannot simply be categorically lumped together and left unprotected if the laws exist to regulate them; the boundary between affirming and denying legal protection is not at all determinable without committing gross injustices in every case; especially in civil legal claims, the worse treatment of lesser claims of the lower classes and the middle class as major commercial lawsuits by disguised war speculators is monstrous; and finally, this entire education in morality, intended at the expense of a secure legal system, is purely external and formal. The temporary postponement of such "trivial cases" is otherwise vigorously opposed to this expression—but it would return us to the practices of the late Reich Chamber of Justice. The results of a survey conducted by the editorial board of the most respected German legal journal, the "Deutsche Juristenzeitung," demonstrate how far the plans for such an undermining of German legal life have already progressed. Its editor addressed a survey to half a hundred of the most important and influential jurists and several other well-known personalities: by what means and ways can the courts be further relieved? The editor himself is of the opinion that fees in civil legal disputes should be increased considerably as the most effective means of "controlling the desire to litigate"; in the criminal chambers and in the senates of the higher regional courts (p. 861, #881) A dangerous path... 861, the number of judges should be reduced, the jurisdiction of single judges (!), lay judge courts, and criminal chambers should be expanded, and that of jury courts should be restricted (!!). It is striking that the Prussian Minister of Justice, Dr. Beseler, stated in his reply that the preparatory work for such legislation is being emphatically promoted and that the work is moving entirely in the direction advocated by the

"Deutsche Juristenzeitung" (German Jurists' Newspaper), and indeed, the government's proposals often coincide with the editor's proposals. One might almost speak of a well-organized struggle against jury courts when numerous jurists in the highest ranks are demanding radical restrictions on their powers, even their abolition, especially during this time of popular uprising. The Oldenburg Minister of Justice is demanding a reduction in the number of jurors; the President of the German Court of Auditors is demanding a "temporary" (!) reduction in jury courts; the President of the Higher Regional Court in Hamm is demanding that jury courts be replaced by criminal chambers of the regional courts, and at the same time, a reduction in the composition of the criminal chambers from five to three judges. Even Attorney General Plaschke in Berlin categorically declares: "The jury courts are to be abolished," while an authority such as Senate President Olshausen, who wrote the commentary on the German Criminal Code, makes the demand, unbelievable to anyone familiar with the situation, that the jury bench for all cases of the entire session must be formed in the first session! Olshausen further demands that in criminal cases, opening decisions simply be abolished, so that in the future, an accused would fundamentally be deprived of an essential opportunity to carefully prepare for his defense. Similarly, war is being declared on the other court, in which men from the people participate to a modest extent, the lay judge court. The powers of the professional judge should be expanded as far as possible, excluding lay judges, and private prosecutions should regularly be heard without lay judges. Olshausen demands, that private lawsuits for insults may no longer be filed at all (!!) - be heard. Legal protection of honor would thus be partially impossible, which would be all the more disastrous not only for the individual, but also for the state itself, if one recalls the numerous private lawsuits during this war in which public abuses were uncovered. We spoke above of an undermining of German legal life. Is it too much to claim that the highest judges are being asked to restrict legal remedies, to limit the summons of witnesses (how difficult it is today to have witnesses later recognized as necessary even by the courts, heard in the trial), and to triple court and attorney fees? The Reich leadership would certainly have done a creditable job if it had protested unreservedly against this desired suppression of the entire legal life of a free people. It could have done so all the more easily, given the prevailing and increasingly noticeable Tendencies, some of the men approached for their opinions cannot help but utter words of warning against the dangerous paths intended. Professor Wach rightly declares that one should be aware that things we are introducing today have a tendency to assert themselves in peacetime; the Saxon Minister of Justice

warns that a nation of almost 70 million like the Germans will be deprived of its legal necessities even in war, and the Austrian Minister of Justice Klein expresses his reservations about the innovations with these words: "We have already begun to implement 'relief measures' which, viewed from the previously prevailing perspectives, undoubtedly represent, in part, considerable losses of legal protection." These few warning voices show us with sufficient clarity that there is a danger, under the influence of war, of prematurely and deliberately laying the axe to the legal guarantees of a pursuit of the rights previously possible for every citizen, which in excess certainly cannot be The situation of the Reich cannot be such that it simply abandons parts of its cultural life. Any further attempt to make legal proceedings more difficult, even impossible, to simply scrap entire judicial institutions, and especially those in which the people have the most trust, must be unreservedly stopped. Thanks must be given to the "Deutsche Juristenzeitung" for so openly revealing the plans and wishes of the influential and responsible circles. Not even a fraction of these ideas of a short-sighted legal profession must be realized, and in future parliamentary negotiations, the "simplification of the administration of justice" will receive the necessary attention from our political friends and all champions of free and secure law, so that we do not experience setbacks that would harm the reputation of the Reich equally at home and abroad. SIGMUND KAFF: THE English - all too English. The surest sign of England's universally recognized world power has always been not only the shy deference of the small and large peoples it subjugated under its rule, but above all the affection of all democratic elements who saw many of their ideals exemplified in the British Empire. English freedom - many people's mouths watered after it, for they considered it genuine and a prerequisite for English world power. Therefore, it was and still is considered undemocratic to judge Great Britain unfriendly, especially in war, because one must remain "objective" towards an enemy under all circumstances. Aristocratic overlooking of British weaknesses and sins, the English all too English, is, in the eyes of the nothing-but-pacifists and Anglomaniacs, objectivity, to which war requires a double obligation. These cold-blooded objectivists fail to consider that this kind of "objectivity" toward England becomes the greatest injustice to their own people. To the extent that they do, impartiality for them consists precisely in thinking as negatively as possible about their own people, while simultaneously presenting England's dark sides to themselves and others as dazzling advantages. It is, of course, only the mindset of servile souls to convince themselves that the hippopotamus whip is the scepter of democracy and a symbol of freedom. . . . What seduces these Anglophiles is England's

greatness and power. In world politics, too, success is decisive, and England certainly has that. By what means was it achieved? That is beside the point; what matters is only that it came about at all. The "non olet" applies above all to the English sovereign, and the right to apply the Jesuit principle: "The end justifies the means" is readily granted to Great Britain. This is the demand of a democratic objectivity, which here becomes more like naiveté. Naiveté is, after all, the hallmark of petty-bourgeois democracy, which, following the ideals of 1848, believed it could embrace all peoples without choice, without considering that there might be some snakes among them, only waiting for the moment to testify to its Punic loyalty with its poisonous fang. And England's blind admirers have never seen through its Phoenician character, and even today refuse to recognize it, because they do not want to admit their error and are not accustomed to accepting people and nations as they are, for fear of being accused of national chauvinism and one-sidedness. Our democrats of yesteryear are incorruptible, clever, and wise: they understand and forgive everything, even British imperialism, if necessary. That the Central European states do not want to be reduced to vassals of England—how abhorrent! That Albion subjugates half the world—yes, peasant, that is something else entirely! It is "spiteful" to speak of England's piracy; to resist it is merely naval fanaticism. Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi: What is permitted to the shark is by no means permitted to the carp. The shark needs freedom of the sea, the carp does not; it can be content with the Danube and the Elbe. . . - What, England pirates and claims this as a historical prerogative? Ugh! But that does not give the Central Powers the right to oppose it? For even if they claim freedom of the sea for themselves, then this is likewise only disguised piracy! Continental capitalism must be overcome; but insular capitalism, well, there's nothing we can do about it! It's none of our business. Even if it takes over half the world, that's no reason to fall into its arms, and besides: democracy reigns in Old England after all! This mirage still ensnares our petty-bourgeois democrats and dulls their senses. They refuse to acknowledge that it is, in reality, a vile oligarchy. Hasn't England always and at all times supported all freedom movements in other countries? We must not forget this generosity. That it was merely the exercise of the principle of "divide and rule" means nothing further. --- - This double-entry bookkeeping in the assessment of England and other states can still be observed today. Praising foreign countries in order to advance the domestic economy is simply one of the tactical tools of politics. The demagoguery inherent in this must not be denounced, because otherwise one is suspected of being an enemy of democracy. But the World War has shown where this tactic leads. England's role in world history, under

whose hypnotic spell so many honest democrats are, is based in part on the fact that this country has long known how to mislead the entire world. It convinced them of its "disinterestedness," and with such success that today it almost believes in it itself. - First comes England, only then come the other nations. These are merely auxiliary nations, vassals of varying degrees, or, if they refuse, enemies of England who must be fought by all means. England alone has a claim to unconditional naval prestige, to the world markets, to world supremacy. The most brutal, most unscrupulous imperialism is England's. It can allow itself things that no other great power dares. And not just against colored races, but also against whites. What an outcry there would be if Germany were to lead Negroes and Gurkhas into battle against Europeans? Who would dare to mistreat a people like the Boers like that without falling into general ostracism? England was allowed to do so, and the small nations even admire it for it, for England corrupts public opinion throughout the world. But that is considered clever at best. If Germany were to advertise itself like that through the press, it would be dirty— p. 866 (#886) 866 English, all too English—and despicable. And so on! Albion's atrocities may be as great and heinous as they are, they also impress democracy! Always and everywhere, the stronger, and especially the stronger through recklessness, finds admirers. People only look at success and ignore the means by which it was achieved. But that this is so is proven by every page of English history. Its golden ruthlessness towards all who opposed it or even merely resisted it paid off magnificently and did not harm it in the slightest, because at the same time it knew how to cleverly disguise its brutality with a cultural illusion, on the only too reasonable assumption that the world does not tend to clearly distinguish between essence and illusion. This is by no means to say that England has achieved nothing for culture and democracy, but only that it accomplished these achievements primarily for itself, for its own benefit, and that it has generally directed its policy towards achieving a world monopoly for itself, in which it has indeed succeeded to a great extent. But if Germany, for its part, even merely aspires to the economic penetration of the Orient, this is, in the eyes of certain of our "democrats," a crime worthy of accursation. These people, despite their opposing worldviews, practically stand on the same standpoint as the Anglo-American imperialist Homer Lea, who sees only one salvation for the British Empire from the "German threat": the destruction of Germany, whose unification England should never have allowed. According to Lea, the disunity of the European continent alone guarantees England's security, and the Rhine and the Elbe are therefore to be regarded as its borders. Who can seriously deny that this expresses the core tenet of England's true policy? I

can already hear what doctrinaire pacifists will reply: this is the foolishness of an individual that should not be taken seriously. In truth, this madness is precisely the method by which England has acted for centuries and still acts today. England's global political role and its position can only be explained by such hypertrophied selfishness, which must be inherent in the entire English people. It is almost as if an eternal, pathological fear of the lack of food supply would have gripped the entire English nation and driven them, since the island they inhabited had actually proven to be far too small, to now seize the globe. For without the agreement, albeit unconscious, between the proletarian and capitalist classes, the success of British imperialism would be unthinkable. If one can speak of popular imperialism anywhere, it is in England. But this imperialism is, as none other than an English Social Democrat has stated, the mortal enemy of democracy.[1] CURT BIGING: Public Health After the War. It is impossible to say anything precise about the state of public health in the coming years and decades. Fortunately, examples to which one could refer are lacking in world history. Statistics remain. But without wanting to kill off the phrase "the 'filthy whore'," one must admit that statistical data (not only of this kind) from the present time are worthless. Firstly, they are not comprehensive; for the time being, something else must be done. Secondly, if they were comprehensive and already, within a certain framework, completed, they would be inaccessible. Thus, a consideration of the health consequences of the World War based solely on theoretical considerations seems more useful because it would then at least lack the often-created appearance of unconditional credibility, the dogmatic nature of scientific, numerical processing, the objection to which calls the guild spirit to arms. The lack of numbers is therefore no reason to put the matter off. Numbers can certainly change the quantity, but never the quality. Once we have numbers, we will be able to do no more than know how far we will have to go in our precautions. Where and in what way we will have to intervene, we can imagine. To wait here would mean once again covering up the much-cited well too late. The food question shows how dangerous it is to sit back and do nothing until the popular, concrete official documents appear on the table. Yet this matter, because it is limited to a few years at most, is the less serious one. However, for the physical well-being, indeed the viability of future generations, the Videant consules cannot be heard and resounded soon enough. 1 British Imperialism. JHW Dietz in Stuttgart 1914. By JB Askew. Published by p. 868 (#888) 868 Public Health After the War. We want to offer one modest consolation in advance: it will (hopefully) not be quite as bad as some think. Under the pressure of necessity, human nature has shown an adaptability that even the optimist must astonish. And if these

life-affirming forces were more than just a flash in the pan, then we can expect that the regenerative capacity of the national body will put even the frog and salamander larvae in the physiological laboratory to shame. We will overcome the loss of human life that the war inflicts on us, because we must. It is not necessary for us to take Napoleon I's cynical words after the Battle of Austerlitz as our model. Nor would it even be practical, for bringing new human material into the world in large numbers and into an uncertain future would be more than reckless, before we are in a position to protect what we already have from the inevitable damage that this time will bring in its wake. There will certainly be no shortage of voices later on advocating for the loss of life to be made good through a kind of large-scale birth industry. And let's not forget that all the childbirth and breastfeeding bonuses in the world, and all the infant care advice centers, won't bring back or even partially replace the young, healthy generation of fathers that was slaughtered out there. On both sides: it's undeniable that the best people of all warring states are rotting beneath the simple crosses of soldiers' graves. Let's ignore for a moment the health damage that awaits the next generations. Let's pretend that the lifestyle of the last two years, even for the less well-off sections of the population, has been nothing more than a short fast for health reasons. We will assume that the fertility of the returning men and the women left behind will not be diminished in any way. However, we cannot avoid the fact that those who proved themselves to be the best in terms of health by being sent out at the beginning, when the selection process was still allowed to be delicate, are eliminated as fathers once and for all. And if everyone—we can safely count those who were married—had fathered just one child, we would have had hundreds of thousands more healthy children who would have been more valuable to the race than ten times the number of less resilient ones. It is not only the dead that we will be missing, but the entire line of healthy generations that were, so to speak, invested in them. These lost generations could have offered compensation, a blood refreshment, which we will need. Now that we don't possess them, we must be all the more diligent in helping the weaker in other ways. The objection could be raised, intentionally or unintentionally misunderstanding Darwin's principles, that "selection" would leave the fittest, that the physically inferior would be eliminated in this veritable struggle for existence. Firstly, that is not true at all. The unfit were not eliminated, but rather removed from the fight. And secondly, those who seemingly overcame the impairments and thus proved themselves "fit" (?) suffered a loss that, due to the intensity of the damage, is irreparable in the purely physical and, not to be underestimated, the psychological area, if not everywhere, then in the vast majority of cases. An

example: Statistics on childhood illnesses during peacetime have shown us that children who survived certain (infectious) diseases do not become healthier simply because they survived them. Rather, high infant mortality has been proven to increase mortality in the next year, which shows that even the supposedly strong are weakened in their resilience. We have all come to terms with the fact that the generation now in power will have nothing else to do but pay the costs of war, in whatever field, in order to give our descendants the opportunity to reconstruct humanity and culture undisturbed. We will certainly have to back down and forget about ourselves. But this can only happen to the extent that it does not harm the interests of subsequent generations. Various reasons could be found for writing off the generation returning from the war as a lost cause and limiting expenditures for them to the most inadequate minimum. Not that we would relegate our invalids to the barrel organ. That would truly be unacceptable, and not just for ethical reasons. But one could reason: in the more robust natures, the damage will correct itself over time; and for those who are incapable of this recovery on their own, it is no longer worth helping. We have no time to conduct more costly experiments. That would be a fatal mistake. We cannot forbid those whose health has been damaged by the war from having children. And it would be an unforgivable ostrich policy to overlook the fact that the strains, which through their frequency and intensity have reached a previously unheard-of level, will have damaged not only the body but also the germ cells in general. It could perhaps be countered that the war had a positive effect on various illnesses, for example, metabolic diseases, which are said to have improved through the reduction of overnutrition that may have existed in some places. It could further be pointed out that, if the official assurances are correct, the health of our armies is unexpectedly good. But do we know what will happen after the artificial overexertion eases and the high pressure under which the millions of physical machines work is suddenly reduced? Do we want to wait first, correctly study and neatly systematize the material scraped together in the usual tedious way, and finally, when we are well-informed medically, racially, and economically, wisely hold conferences to discuss what measures might be considered to eliminate or at least mitigate this or that serious consequence? (By now, it has probably already grown beyond our control and is now preparing to devour us, hair and bone, documents and resolutions, for breakfast.) We know next to nothing about the inheritance of certain diseases. And regarding the inheritance of predisposition, we must rely on assumptions, albeit probable ones. Establishing a prophylactic system would be premature. We can completely disregard metabolic diseases; they represent

only a tiny percentage. Circulatory disorders and diseases of the stomach, intestines, and kidneys require greater attention. (Here, too, it will be unclear in many cases whether these are acute cases or latent ones that only became apparent under the influence of individually unbearable physical demands, and to what degree germinal damage was preparatory, present, or worsened.) Under all circumstances, however, we will have to pay close attention to the fact that the majority of those returning from the war are weakened in their general ability to resist, that almost everyone presents a complex of loci mino- p. 871 (#891) Public Health After the War. 871 ris resistentiae (places of lesser resistance). Added to this are the still sufficiently obscure economic conditions after the conclusion of peace, which will hardly allow the individual to replace lost strength and, at the same time, to store up energy reserves in order to victoriously fend off possible attacks of disease. While a weakened ability to resist can open the door to all kinds of diseases, tuberculosis is the primary concern under the living conditions of our time. It must be our primary concern. Whether we will be able to prevent a disproportionately increased morbidity compared to peacetime is more than questionable. It will be all the more necessary to do everything possible to contain its consequences. Here, the approach must be fundamentally and gradually quite different from that of previous peacetime tuberculosis care. Above all, regardless of all other enormous burdens, significantly greater resources must be allocated (which, however, will still be small enough compared to our other later expenditures) to establish a generous, all-encompassing organization that will make it possible to reliably identify every suspicious case, even in smaller towns and rural districts, using every conceivable means of diagnostic technology. Not every district town can afford an X-ray laboratory; nor is one necessary, since a government district is capable of running an X-ray railway carriage. The training of physicians in the field of early tuberculosis diagnosis leaves much to be desired . It is precisely this war—and other reasons, which were also acknowledged in the division of the "practical year"—that have aroused increased interest in surgery, especially among the younger generation of physicians, to the detriment of internal medicine. And just as social medicine has recently conquered its own place in the medical curriculum, it will become especially necessary for tuberculous diseases. This is more important than a forensic medicine course. Diagnosis alone, of course, is not enough. Sanatorium treatment on a large scale will have to be introduced, which does not, as has been the case for so long, set aside the presumably hopeless cases and leave their danger to the surroundings to the activity of a lukewarm form of welfare administered in a kind of disguised charitable style. And now comes

the sore point in the ge- [1] Precise proposals will follow in a later article. p. 872 (#892) 872 Public Health After the War. --- When fighting tuberculosis after treatment in a sanatorium, one cannot leave the rest to God, luck, and the patient, and act as if the Natura non facit saltus (Nature makes no leaps) were invalid, of all things, for tuberculosis. No layman believes that experts really believe that a disease that requires preparation over generations, at least over years, and that needs a long time to cause subjective symptoms once it has already existed, can be influenced by a relatively short-term dietary treatment (because one cannot speak of a specificity of sanatorium treatment based on experience with the various tuberculins) in such a way that in the vast majority of cases it does not relapse despite a return to the old unhealthy conditions, this decisive factor in the patient's history - that, as already mentioned, such a thing is considered possible in medical circles. Especially when, as in our case, malnutrition, tremendous hardship, and the most severe psychological depression combined to prepare the ground for it. The previous method of combating tuberculosis may well have been honestly intended, but in its effect it amounted to nothing more than a morphine injection for the public conscience. "That would be a chapter in itself," says Schweninger, "could be titled: Princess Charity; two hours of charity three times a week." Among the factors that have a profound impact on public life, the consideration of which is an indispensable condition for the successful fight against tuberculosis, the reorientation in the area of housing hygiene takes first place, even at the risk of stepping on the sensitive corns of the landowners. This is the point where public health care and domestic politics can no longer be separated. One should finally stop debating the pros and cons and engaging in lengthy discussions with opponents who are only pursuing dilatory goals to save their own sheep from being sheared. The war economy in various areas has provided us with sufficiently deterrent examples of what happens when one executes the balancing act of delicate consideration for a small, but unkind minority to the detriment of the general welfare. An appeal to social conscience is, under certain circumstances, a beneficial stylistic exercise. But the most spirited "Would you perhaps be so kind ?" decree bounces off the termite-proof walls of an Arnhem without effect. After the war, we will have to reckon with even the most basic foodstuffs being scarce for some time and having to be distributed officially. However, since shifts will occur compared to current conditions, a change in certain organizational measures will probably be unavoidable. Fortunately, one might almost say. If reorganization is necessary, it will be wise not only to employ typesetters to help new paragraphs enter the world of printer's ink, but above all to recruit people to draft these paragraphs and, no less

importantly, to implement them who understand the subject and bring more to this task than so many years of service behind some filing cabinet. Expert knowledge is needed, experience gained through lack of firsthand experience. Such "passive" experience is a better promoter of understanding than half a dozen semesters of administrative science. At present, one can accept the objection that many who would be called upon cannot be chosen because they are in the field. But hopefully, there will still be enough left after their current employment ends to replace those whose inadequacy has been sufficiently demonstrated by several million chronically rumbling stomachs. Didn't it say: Clear the way for all the capable, or something like that? ... Will all the things related to the hygiene of working life follow : industrial hygiene in the narrower sense—when will the "booths" disappear, in which the small master, along with journeymen and (attention!) apprentices, systematically prepares himself for consumption? Furthermore, transport policy, especially in large cities, with consideration for working-class neighborhoods and the factory districts or suburbs, often hours away, and the construction of sufficient bathhouses so that the need for cleanliness, this vital weapon in the fight against tuberculosis, doesn't die a blessed death through hours of waiting. The costs! people cry from all sides. We already have enough to pay! Fine, but as important as it is not to turn the repayment of our debts (nota bene, almost only to our own people) into a tapeworm of installment payments whose end lies beyond our time, it would be just as wrong to first help our wallets out only so that our great-grandchildren can one day die of consumption debt-free. - - 49/3 p. 874 (#894) 874 An English Novel. ENGELBERT PERNERSTORFER. An English Novel. One learns better about the intellectual and spiritual makeup of a people from its fine literature than from learned books. This is where life is most faithfully reflected. The poet need not have any intention whatsoever. He need only sing and speak, write as it moves within him, and then spirit and soul find their best expression, provided, of course, that he himself is a true poet. But he may also be directly guided by a critical, satirical, or pedagogical intention. It need not necessarily deface the work of art. At present, England has three writers of considerable worth, almost all of whose works have some kind of nationalist critique. These are Shaw, Chesterton, and Galsworthy. I want to speak of the third in the series. I know a novel by him ("Herrenhaus"), which depicts the life of the landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie in a truly classical manner. I know two plays that were also performed in Vienna. They have socially critical content, but at the same time bear a distinctly national character. A novel by him has now been published in German translation, which offers a sharply critical portrayal of

English social life. Since it was already published in English in 1908 in a second, improved edition, it naturally has no reference to the war at all. The translation could be better. Also missing is the necessary preface, which is important for the poet's purpose. It is also questionable whether the publisher acquired the rights to the translation. As far as I know, in Germany and here, literary agreements are still respected as legitimately existing, even though the English government has declared literary theft to be a valid right through a retroactive law. If I remember correctly, even before this law was passed, German books (Treitschke, Bernhardi, etc.) were being translated and distributed en masse in England without authorization. As the "Intern. Korr." reports, this action by the English government has not gone without opposition in the country itself, and B. Marston, in the English Booksellers' Gazette, has branded it a "miserable deed that will forever cover Great Britain with shame." French experts are also said to have spoken out sharply on the matter. The British government has thus violated the so-called Berne Convention, and it seriously raises the question of whether the governments of Germany and Austria are obligated to continue adhering to these treaties. Under no circumstances, however, is it acceptable for individuals to disregard existing treaties. That the Suschitzky publishing house received authorization to translate from Galsworthy or his publisher seems highly unlikely to me. Assuming no such authorization existed and Galsworthy filed suit against the Suschitzky publishing house here in Vienna, a conviction would have to follow under the existing laws. The judge would probably not receive official proof of the British government's offense, and even if such proof were provided, he would probably not accept it. The British government's meanness would probably be no excuse for violating a law. I am not writing these introductory remarks without a particular reason. I am, indeed, among those who are deeply embittered by the daily abominations of the English government and who have no understanding of the frequent attempts to cover all these base acts with the cloak of Christian love. Especially since those who proceed in this way are ruthlessly severe in their criticism of the German Reich government. And now to the novel itself, the reading of which is not only entertaining but also highly instructive. The author depicts the intellectual and comfortable life of those classes in England who live in carefree prosperity. In this respect, this depiction has a generally valid social-critical character. In all civilized countries, these classes present more or less the same face. From a spiritual and mental perspective, their lives have no content, except perhaps that of a strong sense of family, which, however, only has superficial features. The pinnacle of this emptiness of life is found among American billionaires, who can no longer even claim

for themselves what their ancestors achieved. 49/3 p. 876 (#896) 876 An English Novel. For the founders of the great fortunes were, even if they were unanimously immoral, men of fabulous energy. Read G. Myers' book "The Story of the Great American Fortunes" (Berlin, S. Fischer), and despite all the horror at the corruption and profound immorality revealed there, one cannot help but admire the restless energy of these businessmen. Nor should one allow one's moral assessment of these people to be deceived by the often large cultural foundations they themselves or their heirs have initiated. These mostly arose and still arise from publicity needs and have no connection to the inner lives of the donors. What Galsworthy describes here in a masterful, because entirely uncompromising, way is the result of a social order that must necessarily lead ever further away from the inner spiritual and emotional deepening of the upper, ruling classes. This is, I have said, more or less the case everywhere in the cultural world. But the "more or less" is worth emphasizing. And it already seems that the development of the Anglo - Saxon world has brought out the utmost in this regard. A "soullessness of society" to the extent that confronts us here cannot be observed among the German people. Thus, there are already differences in ethnic psychology that must be emphatically pointed out. This does not mean that one establishes insurmountable limits or unchanging differences. Anyone who does so takes the standpoint of the persistence of historical facts, which is not ours. The English national character of today is not that of yesterday and will not be that of tomorrow. But as things stand today, one is certainly entitled to draw conclusions about the condition of other classes from the condition of one class of the people. Reciprocal influences take place from top to bottom and from bottom to top. It is not the case that a powerful lower class corresponds to a spiritually and mentally impoverished upper class. In the profound decline of the upper class, which the middle and lower classes strive to emulate in all their expressions of life, lies perhaps the ultimate cause of the strange phenomenon that in England, and indeed also in North America, a powerful socialist workers' movement has not yet emerged (p. 877, #897). An English novel. 877 That Germany has such a society is perhaps already strong evidence that our upper and middle classes do not have such a horribly low level of inner life as is revealed to us in Galsworthy's novel. The novel has little plot. A young, wealthy man, whose environment has not yet been able to rob him of his natural ability to think and feel, becomes engaged to a beautiful girl whom he loves passionately. Perhaps precisely because he is a more serious person, aware that by entering into marriage he is taking a significant step toward a full life, he sees the world with new and sharper eyes. And his new eyes see new things

that had previously completely escaped him. He sees misery and sees challenges. But even more, he sees the terrible futility of life in the circles in which he is accustomed to moving. The longer it goes on, the more it becomes clear to him that he cannot continue to lead such a life, and he seeks understanding from his bride for his new views. He doesn't find it in the beautiful, but quite conventionally thinking and feeling, and somewhat prudish girl, and he breaks off the engagement. This unexciting story gains its special value from the hero's observations and reflections, some of a general, some specifically English nature. In both cases, they are sharp and apt. He goes on a hike with an acquaintance, which leaves him very exhausted due to the poor roads: "Like an inspiration, it dawned on him that for three-quarters of the entire world, life, without the possibility of any other alternative, meant only physical exhaustion every day, and that as soon as they could no longer exhaust themselves in this way for some reason beyond their control, they were reduced to beggary or condemned to death by starvation. And then we, who don't even know the meaning of the word, call them the idlers and good-for-nothings," he said aloud. He sees a policeman arresting a prostitute, and it is said of him: "The self-assured security of law and order, which on the island of England gave power to the strong and trampled on the weak, the polished baseness against which only the most select minds dare to turn, seemed to stare back at him. And the uncanny thing about it was that this man was only doing his duty." The author becomes much more satirical when he turns against particular English vices. This is where the most cutting scorn often comes to light. He has the hero, who is speaking to an officer about imperialism, say: "What I hate is the humbug with which we boast of doing benefits to the whole world through our so-called civilizing methods." The author becomes even more biting in the course of a conversation his hero has with an acquaintance about India. This entire conversation deserves to be printed here. I will content myself with a few striking passages. I note that the speaker, addressing his childhood friend, who is employed in India, does not take a moral standpoint, but only opposes hypocrisy. He says, among other things: "We take peoples who are completely different from us and suddenly arrest their natural development by replacing them with a civilization that has perhaps become useful to us."... "Would we absolutely want to continue to rule India even if the whole thing ended in a total loss? No, certainly not. Well, to talk about administering the country for the purpose of making a profit is certainly cynical, but there is usually some truth in cynicism. But to speak of the administration of a country from which we derive profit in a tone as if we were accomplishing a great and noble cause is sanctimonious hypocrisy. I am

smashing you to pieces for my own benefit, good and proper: that is the will of nature. But to then say that it is also for your benefit, that is beyond my ability."... "You smash India to pieces and say that this is a noble act of kindness. Well, let us see what now happens. Either India will never regain its original strength and die an untimely death, or it will regain that strength, and then your blow—that is, your colonial work—will be lost in the now-boiling backlash, morally worthless—it is work that you could have done better at home, since it would not have been lost here." . . . "We always consider our positions, norms, and standards to be best for the whole world. We Englishmen really capitalize on this belief. Read - - p. 879 (#899) An English Novel. 879 ... — the speeches of our statesmen. Doesn't it seem quite astonishing to you how positively they always seem to be certain they are right? It's all very well to benefit oneself and, at the same time, convince oneself that one person's portion of flesh is usually poison to another. Let's look at nature! But in England, one person never looks at nature—we don't need to. Our national standpoint has filled our pockets, and that alone matters." "The method by which we English Pharisees fatten ourselves and, at the same time, give ourselves the moral appearance of a balloon rising into the clouds is enough to embitter anyone against us." Elsewhere, it is said of the hero: "Everything appeared to him divided into classes, carefully recorded and valued. For example, a Britisher was of higher value than a human being, and wives were of higher value than women. Those things or phases of life with which these people here had no personal contact were viewed with a slight cheerfulness and a certain disapproval. Indeed, only the principles of the higher classes of England were strictly observed." ... And of the hero's bride, it is said: "Not for nothing did Antonia belong to the English nation, that most highly civilized part of the most highly civilized race on earth, whose creed is as follows: We may love and hate, we may work and never marry, but let us forget outward decorum! To do the latter is a blemish and is unforgivable. Let our lives, then, be like our faces: free from all kinds of wrinkles, even those of smiles." Only in this way can we boast of the triumph of civilization." Only a few of the most significant passages are cited here. The author is a complete Englishman, just one of the not-too-many in England capable of freeing themselves from the general national conceit. He once has his hero say: "It is so horrible to arrive at new views through one's own reflection." Galsworthy is one of these reflectors. He does not keep the results of his reflection to himself; he conveys them to his people, not to revile them, but to call them to reflection. p. 880 (#900) 880 Outlook. The fact that the intellectual and moral structure of the present character of the English people, or perhaps it would be better to say of the present ruling

classes of England, presents such a bleak picture is the result of a three-hundred-year policy of conquest, oppression, and exploitation of foreign peoples. The English have become a "master" race in the worst sense of the word. And with that, they have adopted all the vices of the "masters." They have conquered the entire world and suffered immense spiritual damage in the process. To refuse to see this is to deliberately blind oneself. To deny England's guilt in today's war is to be blind to history. What we want towards England is the same right. Far be it from us any hatred of the English people, just as we know no hatred of any people at all. Nowhere have nations made history so far; always and everywhere only the ruling classes. The history that England's ruling classes have made for the past three hundred years certainly records brilliant phenomena and uplifting facts, but alongside it such a sum of meanness, rapacity, and baseness that it is never encountered anywhere in its same form, which is not limited to England. A book like Galsworthy's confirms this claim. It is recommended for our England enthusiasts to read with zeal. MAX BARTHEL (Musketeer): Aufblick. You lonely land between the wire snares, you experience a thousand strange things day and night. Caressing winds that gently stroke the grass, flow over glowing flowers and forgotten corpses. The eyes of the sentries are chained to your blissful blossoming, those that no leap can save from fiery death. Lonely land. Life and death in your meadows, bushes and trees that reveal themselves with the passing of the hour. Lonely land. My heart blooms like a young tree in your green, torment-stormed space. Lonely land. Expanded towards us and the others! Our longing lies spread out in your flowers like a precious jewel. Brotherly land! On your grounds of peace, millions of soldiers' hands meet in spirit every hour! p. 881 (#901) DIE GLOCKE 50th issue March 10, 1917 2nd year. Reprint of all articles with full source information is permitted by Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: IN the general debate. In his lecture on Prussian history, which I attended in the mid-1990s with Hans Delbrück, he once made the occasional remark that one would be mistaken if one imagined now, 25 years after the events, that the period of 1870/71, in which the founding of the Empire took place, was perceived by the generation of that time as a particularly uplifting epoch. That was not the case at all, at least not among the broad sections of society. I was reminded of this remark when I attended the last Reichstag debates on the budget. The magnitude and impact of our time is undoubtedly far greater than the war of 1870/71, and it would be wrong and unjust to deny that the World War stirred the German people to their very core and held them in its grip in a completely different way than the Franco-Prussian War ever did. Anyone who listened to the Reichstag debates of the last week of February must have had

the impression that an awareness of the significance of the era no longer exists. Perhaps those who lived through them are incapable of fully understanding the historical significance of their time, precisely because they are participants in the action and suffering, and perhaps Carlyle is right when he says that before the legends of Emperor Charles and his Round Table could take firm shape in the popular consciousness, the last memory of Roland's last gout and the hero Trupin's hip pain had to have completely faded away. 50/1 p. 882 (#902) 882 General Debate. The present always sees only the petty and pathetic aspects of world history like a valet. The truly impressive usually passes unnoticed and reveals its significance only to future generations. The budget consultation was the first meeting of the German parliament after the proclamation of the intensified submarine war, and one might have assumed that the debates would have roughly reflected the significance of the intensified submarine war for Germany's destiny. What did we experience instead? A preliminary debate that was dangerously tinged with sappy air; a Chancellor's speech that, while undoubtedly one of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's better speeches, lacked depth; a speech by Scheidemann, not without its long stretches, but overall fresh and gripping. Count Westarp of the Conservatives wisely held back and responded to Scheidemann's fierce attack with unusual mildness. The rest was partly marked by social democratic "brotherly" strife, partly by the Adlonites. Both were embarrassing to bear. In between, a debate about the yellow organizations flared up unexpectedly, revealing the trade union movement in a completely new and forward-looking situation in the Reichstag. Is it a coincidence that, in the very same debate that declared the final separation of social democracy from the working community, a common front united the trade union associations of almost all persuasions? The Reich Chancellor addressed the reorientation for the first time, and what he said about it was certainly very beautiful and edifying. A new era with a renewed people has arrived; the mighty war has created it. The new, vibrant forces will not allow themselves to be constrained or thrown off course by any party program, neither from the right nor from the left. Wherever political rights need to be reorganized, it cannot be a matter of "rewarding" the people for what they have done. It is not about saying that it has been done, that that is an unworthy thought, but solely about finding the correct political and state expression for what this people is. That is certainly a very fortunate formulation, but alas, just a formulation. The fine words are contrasted with the deed of the entailment bill, and if the Reich Chancellor, in his capacity as Prussian Minister-President, manages to tolerate such outright reactionary types as Mr. von Loebell as Minister of the Interior and Mr. von Schorlemer as

Minister of Agriculture, then he should not be surprised if his liberalizing words are always countered by the reactionary deeds of his colleagues. Among them, one finds no trace of the "tremendous experience" of this war; some of them may be quite good ministers, but they are not ministers of state. The same applies to the Reich leadership. Here, too, the key undersecretaries and heads of departments who, at the outbreak of the war, were in the process of passing an emergency law against the trade unions to protect the interests of business, have all remained in office. Does one really believe that these gentlemen have since "reoriented" themselves and will now, with inner joy, do the opposite of what they did before the war? As long as the Reich Chancellor is not even willing or able to prepare for these personal questions, where will he find the strength to solve the much more difficult substantive issues? Of course, he may tell himself that if he had led the German Reich victoriously through the most terrible war, his position would be so strong that he could mock all attacks from his opponents; then the time would have come to implement the "reorientation"! But there are serious objections to this. The longer the war lasts, the more unashamedly reaction raises its head again and begins its reorganization. The more the Chancellor fails to do everything to satisfy the political needs of the broad masses of the people, the weaker his support from these masses becomes, and the weaker his position vis-à-vis the newly strengthened reaction. Certainly, the reorientation will come, whether with or without Mr. Bethmann, but with more determination and political power, the Chancellor could have removed many obstacles from its path, which, however, currently still lie in its path. We discussed here eight days ago how self-confident or even complacent the reaction is already raising its head. In the meantime, the heroic deeds of the Adlon Round Table have been added, which, however, in their grotesque form, could rather be classified as low comedy. They received a cheerful tribute in the Reichstag, although one should still admit that the Adlonite corona only disintegrated without success because it was discovered by chance. The activity itself continues, and Count Westarp, too, made it clear in his letter to the leader that he could not participate "at present." While until February 1, the Chancellor's agitators consistently emphasized the desire for intensified submarine warfare as the Reich's only means of salvation, this argument has now been smashed out of their grasp. Nevertheless, they continue the mine warfare, thereby only confirming that there are, in truth, other reasons that make the Chancellor hateful to them. They fear that after the war he will seek the "correct political and state expression for what belongs to the German people." The real driving forces behind their stance lie in the area of domestic politics. And that significant

shifts are indeed taking shape here, giving the reactionaries food for thought, is most clearly evident from the debates that the workers' representatives in the Reichstag conducted with and against each other. The way Ledebour and Henke still talk today is how a section of official Social Democracy talked until the outbreak of the war. The confrontation with them is therefore partly a confrontation with the party's own past, and it is only a good sign if this confrontation turns out to be somewhat crude and tangible. Indeed, Scheidemann and Keil have not minced their words here. The more forcefully they distance themselves from these representatives of a now- p. 885 (#905) The Restoration of Serbia. 885 The more they renounce the happily overcome stage of development of German Social Democracy, the more clearly they express the party's willingness and ability to face the new era as a "renewed people." The degree of this renewal depends less on their will or insight than on objective conditions. And here the budget debate already clearly showed us how, during the war, the relationship between Social Democratic workers' representatives and workers' leaders of other tendencies began to shift in the direction of a gradual rapprochement. There is no need to overestimate the facts, but one can nevertheless welcome the trend of this development as a sign that the working class is increasingly confronting its opponents as a unified body. In the struggles that will come after the war, it will sorely need this unity. HERMANN WENDEL, M. d. R.: THE Restoration of Serbia. The restoration of Serbia is passionately demanded by all members of the Ten-Alliance Party and by some All-German strongmen were just as passionately rejected in favor of the Berlin-Baghdad dream. The solution to the Serbian question can nevertheless be viewed today with a completely different dispassion than in the days when the Belgrade rulers still appeared to many as the real arsonists of the World War and quite adventurous ideas about the Serbian people in general were circulating. In themselves, these ideas were quite understandable, for just as we complain that England, even in peacetime, possessed the world news monopoly through its cables and was thus able to systematically slander Germany, a not very clean Viennese press held the Balkan news monopoly and used it day in and day out to stir up sentiment against Serbia. But just as the French petty bourgeoisie, fed by the "Matin" and "Petit Journal," Just as Boches, who chop up and destroy works of art, quickly lets go as soon as he gets to know the field grays face to face, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers have also taken a close look at the land and people in Serbia and found most things different from what they had heard, and much better than they had believed. Comparisons with East Elbia were not entirely favorable for the conditions in Pomerania and West Prussia. What the troops observed with

astonishment, the war correspondents expressed with equal astonishment: "At every step," says Hegeler, "one senses the influence of German culture." The schools are based on German principles, and the country, to its credit, has one even in the smallest village, and it is almost always the most impressive building." And Koester notes: "It's strange about this country. From the general to the train driver, everyone is surprised. This 'land of lice' is rich in livestock and fertile soil. The villages give the impression of being orderly; one finds schools of a size not always found in Western Europe. And the people are the most surprising thing. Accommodating, friendly, ready to help where one would expect it, reserved and cool where national tact dictates it." Who, back then, when our reservists and militia members wrote in chalk on the wagons of troop transport trains, along with other blessings, 'All Serbs must die!' Anyone who had publicly claimed that the reviled were not a degenerate "louse people" but a tough, clever, development-capable, and culture-hungry tribe would have been stoned; anyone who denied the same thing today would be laughed at. This is how views change when the veils of the everywhere similar hate-mongering press are torn apart and the peoples come face to face. A more just understanding of the nature of the Serbian people paves the way to a solution to the problem, which lies far removed from the Dr. Eisenbart cure of violent people, not to mention the fact that Austria-Hungary has repeatedly expressed its sincere gratitude for accelerating its transformation into a predominantly Slavic state by incorporating a large part of Serbia. Since the Berlin Congress of 1878, Serbia's entire woe and suffering can be understood from the single point that here, a country with a rich surplus of agricultural produce and a strong hunger for industrial goods, lacks direct access to the oceans and the world market. Friedrich List's words apply particularly painfully to Serbia: "A nation without shipping is a bird without wings." Anyone who has no share of the sea is excluded from the good things of the world; he is our Lord's stepchild," for in this classic small-scale farming country, where 82.20 percent of all peasant owners own less than 10 hectares, 13.87 percent 10 to 20 hectares, 2.60 percent 20 to 30 hectares, and only 1.33 percent more than 30 hectares, it was a matter of life and death for each individual when export and sales opportunities depended entirely on the goodwill or ill-will of their neighbors. Of these neighbors, Austria-Hungary was primarily considered, since Serbia had a natural urge to move westward to exchange its crops and livestock, brought there via the Danube route, for manufactured goods in the densely populated industrial regions. But the pig farmers and grain producers of Austria-Hungary viewed the The restless competition of their smaller neighbors with suspicious eyes, and since these classes in Vienna

and Budapest have even more control over legislation than in Berlin, they turned the agricultural tariff policy of the Danube Monarchy into a barricade, designed to keep Serbia's products from the Habsburg Empire, if possible, off the world market. Just as this cutting off of Serbia's fresh blood circulation explains all sorts of internal disputes and backwardness, so too lies the seed and core of all political enmity between Vienna and Belgrade in the economic conflict of interests between the Austro-Hungarian landowner and the Serbian smallholder, which is also a social, class conflict, and no less the root of Russian influence on Karadzhordschevich. Escaping economic subjugation by Austria-Hungary was something Serbia's foreign policy knew only one way. one goal: an exit to the sea, namely, in keeping with the westward drive, to the Adriatic. When the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was transformed into an annexation in 1909, Serbia flared up in bitterness and despair because it seemed to have lost sight of the old trade route from Mokra Gora via Focha to the Adriatic coast forever. In the Skupshtina at the time, Foreign Minister Milovanowitsch stated: "Serbia and the Serbian people in the Balkans, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could serve as a link between Austria and the Balkan Peninsula," but "by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, by keeping Serbia away from the Adriatic Sea, and by preventing our union with Montenegro, Austria is forcing Serbia and the Serbian people to fight for life and death in the near or distant future!" When Serbia surrendered to the When the Balkan League, which had decided to renounce Turkish rule in Europe, drew its sword only for the sake of the road to the Adriatic. With similar enthusiasm to that of Xenophon's Greeks once shouted "Thalatta! Thalatta!", the Serbian troops greeted the sea, which they reached near Alessio and Durazzo in November 1912 after an arduous march over the Albanian Alps. But the joy was short-lived. From the very beginning, the Austro-Hungarian government, supported by Germany and Italy, declared that it must "reject any Serbian territorial acquisition on the Adriatic." And since it was able to win over the London Conference of Ambassadors to its position, England gave the deciding vote, the Serbs had no choice but to reluctantly renounce what they had so eagerly sought and so hard-won. But anyone who was even remotely familiar with the inner workings of Balkan affairs could not help but have bad forebodings about the consequences of the Vienna "triumph." Not to indulge in the vanity of the prophet whose prediction came true, but for objective reasons, I should cite what I wrote at the time on this question: "To block the Serbian people's access to the Adriatic, even now, after they have seen their ranks thin on the battlefields around Kumanovo and Monastir, means piling up between the Danube and the Sava a sum of wild hatred that must one day erupt terribly. The blocking

of Serbia from the Adriatic is the world war, if not today or tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow; if not in 1912 or 1913, then in 1914!"3 Initially, however, this foolish and dangerous policy gave rise to the Second Balkan War, for since, after the establishment of the Principality of Albania, Serbia received only a third, When two-thirds of the jointly conquered territory fell to Bulgaria, the Belgrade government insisted on a review of the spoils distribution plan and, above all, demanded the Paleagonian Plain with Monastir, which had been awarded to Bulgaria. Bulgaria refused, and the arms decisively fell in favor of Serbia and Greece. Putting the restoration of Serbia on the agenda and interpreting it as the re-establishment of the state within the borders of the Treaty of Bucharest would undoubtedly mean a grave disappointment for our Bulgarian ally, without being of any particular benefit to the Serbian people, for just as the latter would see itself cheated of its national goal—the Paleagonian Plain with Monastir—the Serbian people would still be cut off from the sea. But at the beginning of the World War, Serbia was not a historically rigid concept, but still in the midst of development, having only possessed its new borders for barely a year. Therefore, one approaches the best possible solution to the question, if one disregards the now legendary 3,,Frankfurter Volksstimme". November 29, 1912, p. 890 (#910) 890 The Restoration of Serbia. Union of the Balkan Republics, as soon as one consults the Allies' first plan for the distribution of spoils from 1912 as a guide for the reorganization of relations in the Balkans, naturally only in its outline and without specifying the details. Then Bulgaria will regain—and these two states are primarily at stake!—the territory for which it fought in the Second Balkan War in 1913, and Serbia, with its finally achieved access to the Adriatic, will gain new possibilities for peaceful development. Such an arrangement only seemingly contradicts the famous principle of nationalities, for the Macedonians, through whose place of residence the new border between Serbia and Bulgaria would be drawn, are in the vast majority neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but simply Generally, Macedonian Slavs lacking a strong national consciousness; they only become Serbs or Bulgarians when Serbian or Bulgarian propaganda takes hold of them and transforms them from peasants into gang fighters, or when they rise from the darkness of illiteracy to the knowledge of literature and then, of course, choose Serbian or Bulgarian ethnicity. Concise testimonies from completely opposite camps are available for this. The famous Belgrade geographer Professor Jovan Cvijtisch recounts: "It often happened to me that in villages belonging to the Bulgarian party, I chatted with peasants who spoke to me of their sufferings just as if they belonged to the Serbian party, and who declared that it was a matter of indifference to them whether they

were annexed by Serbia or Bulgaria." And the well-known black-yellow imperialist Chlumecky emphasizes: "The Slavic elements in Macedonia had long since lost their distinctly Bulgarian or specifically Serbian character. Race and language had been subject to the influence of the centuries; a mixed people had emerged, not Serbian enough that the Bulgarians could not claim it for themselves, and yet not so Bulgarian that they could not also be considered Serbs if necessary. The various dialects sometimes sound more like Serbian, sometimes the Bulgarian roots are predominant. Nothing is easier, therefore, than to classify the Macedonian Slavs as belonging to one nationality or another at will." Thus, the mass of the Macedonian population is, to this day, nothing but malleable raw material, all the more easily molded into one form or another since their language, the Central Macedonian dialect, is capable of developing as well in the direction of Serbian as Bulgarian. Without national violence, such new borders can be drawn through a population that was still under Turkish rule five years ago and experienced only one year of Serb rule. The dream of an "independent" Albania, however, would be gone forever with this order of Balkan affairs. But no one needs to shed a tear for this figment of the imagination. The International Socialist Congress in Basel solemnly guaranteed the Arnauts their right to self-government, without realizing that they belonged to those "national detritus" to whom the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" in 1849 assigned the role of remaining "the fanatical bearers of the counter-revolution until their complete extermination or denationalization," "just as their entire existence is already a protest against a great historical revolution." When the London Conference of Powers then set about creating a state out of half- and three-quarters savage tribes, exterminating themselves through blood feuds and lacking any sense of national identity, all experts on the country predicted the dismal end of the attempt. Now that things have come to pass, as they had to, hardly any government will feel inclined to revive the stillborn child, and least of all can that of Austria-Hungary claim that the existence of an independent Albania is a matter of life and death for the monarchy, since it has never tired of repeatedly offering Albania as a piece of compensation during the negotiations with Italy. The states among which Albania is to be divided should be required, at the conclusion of peace, to give up strict guarantees that they will deliver the Shkipetars, if only to "denationalization," then at least not to "annihilation." Moreover, the unborn sons of the mountains will find it easier to join European civilization in association with peoples to whom they are partly related by blood, than within the framework of their own, eternally incapable state. Above all, however, the proposed solution to the Serbian question provides security

against future disputes more than any more violent settlement, a goal for which the statesmen of all belligerent countries claim to be committed and for which socialists throughout the world must champion themselves. While in 1912/13 Italy eagerly supported its Austro-Hungarian ally in its efforts to keep Serbia out of the Adriatic, the Viennese government completely overlooked the catch in this seemingly generous undertaking. The only reason Italy did not want to see Serbia and Greece on the Albanian coast was because it was already preparing to jump to Venice. Today, the end of the war seems likely to leave the Adriatic as an Austrian or Italian sea. The desired "freedom of the seas" would be far more in keeping with the desired "freedom of the seas" if it were neither an Austrian nor an Italian sea, but rather, through that arrangement of affairs, a free body of water on whose shores Austrians, Italians, Serbs, and Greeks could live side by side in peaceful competition. Furthermore, this solution to the Balkan question would open up valuable future prospects that are certainly not associated with the establishment of a Greater Bulgarian Empire based solely on force. Two such fundamentally different but clever minds as Bismarck and Marx had the same experience: that Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Greeks, despite Russian help in their struggles for liberation, were left behind . p. 893 (#913) The Restoration of Serbia. 893 showed no inclination "to accept the Tsar as the Sultan's successor," the latter, "that with every state on Turkish territory that managed to achieve complete or partial independence, a strong anti-Russian party immediately developed," and that "the South Slavs actually have more common interests with Western Europe than with Russia." This certainly applies to Serbia. Serbia, incapable of development, hampered in its rise, despairing of its future, could hardly be anything other than a vassal of the Tsar; Serbia, freed from its inhibitions, eager for development, confident in its future, will one day adapt its political goals to its economic aspirations. But these, as an exporting state of agricultural products on the Danube route, point to Austria-Hungary and even more to Germany: with the key to the Adriatic, Serbia unlocks the gates of the Danube. The direction in which this must affect the development of its economic relations is already demonstrated by the statistics of Serbian foreign trade before the war. In imports to Serbia, Austria-Hungary came first, Germany second, and Russia only seventh; in exports from Serbia, Austria-Hungary first, Germany second, and Russia only fifteenth! Of the 115 million dinars of Serbian imports, Germany and Austria-Hungary together accounted for 79 million, or more than two-thirds, and Russia about one thirty-eighth, a full 3%; of Serbian exports worth 117 million dinars, over 77 million went to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and a pitiful 52,000 dinars to

Russia ! The most resounding phrases about pan-Slavic joint guarantees do not help to disguise this. No matter how passionately the pages of the Serbian emigration on Corfu and elsewhere may proclaim that in future they will only import their goods from Italy, France, and England instead of Austria-Hungary and Germany, such pledges will blow away like chaff before the wind if Serbia finds its way to Western Europe on the Danube. Then, alongside Bulgaria, Serbia can also form a bridge to the Orient for Germany and Austria-Hungary, and finally, the enthusiasts for Central Europe and Berlin-Baghdad can also get their money's worth without a general smashing of pots and pans. The prerequisite for this peaceful settlement, of course, is that "Austria's renewal" after the war is characterized by a more sensible trade policy and a more just nationality policy. HEINRICH CUNOW: THE England Victory Loan. The subscription lists for the English "Victory Loan" closed on February 16. Precise details of the default are still missing, although the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Bonar Law, has twice spoken at length in the House of Commons about the result, which supposedly exceeded all expectations. Above all, the total amount of the converted assets from the second loan is still unknown. It almost seems as if the British Treasury is deliberately withholding further details—probably because disclosing them would significantly diminish the impression of the high figures that Mr. Bonar Law is flaunting. The British Treasury is adept at hiding unfavorable figures. Only twenty months after the first internal English War Loan was issued did the public learn that 148 million pounds sterling of this had been annulled, or, as the beautiful English expression goes, "cancelled," and 137.5 million pounds sterling had been converted up in the second loan, p. 895 (#915) England's Victory Loan. 895, so that the amount actually sold amounted to only 62.7 million pounds sterling; and only recently, on February 25, Mr. Bonar Law further admitted that the second English Loan of July 1915 only reached the stated amount of 616 million pounds sterling (without conversions) because the major banks took over over 200 million pounds sterling: an amount of which they had probably sold very little up to the current loan, just as the stake rate of 100 percent had been reduced to 91 percent. Such experiences make one suspicious of the Treasury's announcements. But even if one accepts the figures officially announced by Mr. Bonar Law as correct, the subscription result for the "Victory Loan," despite the nominally high total amount of 1,000,312,950 pounds sterling, cannot be considered a financial success, at least not when one considers England's current financial situation and the approximately 42 billion marks of its short-term payment liabilities. A success could only be spoken of if the sum were at least twice as high. Many English experts

shared this view at the beginning of the subscription period. Mr. Hayes Fisher, the parliamentary secretary of the Local Government Board, even believed that to be considered a true success, the large "Victory Loan" would have to raise at least 3 billion pounds sterling. The entire staging of the loan was tailored to achieving such a sum. With a large recommendation meeting in London's Guildhall, in which the Lord Mayor of London and the great statesmen Lloyd George, Bonar Law, and MacKenna appeared as business representatives, "the greatest financial operation in the world" began, and it was immediately followed by a campaign and agitation such as had never before been used for a loan in any part of the world. Mass meetings, mass processions, theater performances and concerts, churches and cinemas: all were put at the service of the great national task of making propaganda for p. 896 (#916) 896 England's Victory Loan. England's Victory Loan, "the greatest in the world." According to the English newspapers, London was particularly adept at drumming up publicity. Giant posters, decorated with flags and pennants, called on passersby in the streets and squares to contribute to England's great financial victory, and day after day the press, through advertisements, articles, notes, anecdotes, and feuilleton stories, pressured the English public to buy war bonds and destroy Germany's hopes. Wild horror stories about German war aims were served up to the faithful people, for example, that Germany intended to impose war reparations of 400 million marks on the British Empire, that it intended to deport English workers as slaves, that it wanted to annex Ireland, etc. And this type of agitation extended not only to England itself; the most desperate means were also used in the English colonies, even in India. 99 Moreover, the desire to subscribe was encouraged by the granting of all kinds of advantages. Thus, the banks were prepared to advance money to the subscribers at an interest rate of 5 percent until the end of the war, although the Bank of England maintained the discount rate of 6 percent until January 19 and even then only reduced it by 2 percent. Considering that these enormous advertising efforts lasted five weeks, that England had only issued two domestic loans during the war, that the new "Victory Loan," including the capital gain, offered an interest rate of 5 pounds 84 shillings per 100 pounds sterling, and that the exchange of the assets from the second war loan and the 5 and 6 percent treasury notes was permitted, then a total result of 1,000,312,950 pounds sterling, approximately 21 billion marks, is by no means a brilliant result, especially when one examines more closely the items that comprise this sum. According to Bonar Law's figures, the amount subscribed at the bank amounted to 819.6 million pounds sterling, the amount of converted treasury notes amounted to 130.7 million pounds, and

the total subscriptions at post offices amounted to 30.7 million pounds. of war savings certificates to 19.3 million pounds. How far these subscriptions will be realized—that is, to what extent the subscribed sums will actually be paid in later and not just remain on paper—will be revealed only by the future. The experience of the first and second English war loans suggests that sales of the subscribed securities will be seriously sluggish. But even if one assumes that the 1,000 million pounds sterling are fully disposed of, the purpose pursued by the English government in issuing the loan will not be achieved. On the one hand, the third loan was intended to convert a considerable portion of the short-term payment obligations, primarily the enormously swollen mass of treasury bills and notes, into a fixed, secured debt; on the other hand, it was intended to provide new funds, "new money," to cover the steadily growing costs of the war. After the failure of the first two English war bonds, the arrogant financial policy of Lloyd George and MacKenna preferred to forgo the further issue of sound securities and instead continually threw new series of short-term treasury notes and bills onto the market. According to a report by the London Economist, from August 1, 1914, to January 27, 1917, English war expenditures rose to a total of 3,787 million pounds sterling. Of this, only approximately 883 million pounds sterling was raised through war taxes and special levies; 2,904 million pounds sterling had to be borrowed. The first two domestic loans, however, only yielded approximately 680 million pounds sterling, to which 220 million pounds sterling came from foreign loans. The shortfall, apart from the issue of so-called currency notes, was primarily made up by the mass issue of domestic treasury notes, of which 505 million pounds sterling were in circulation in mid-January of this year, and of treasury bills, the total of which, according to official figures, already amounted to 1,100 million pounds sterling. The majority of these sums of internal floating debt are due within the current year, and some of the external payment obligations also have quite short maturity periods. Of the fourth loan, concluded with the Morgan syndicate in America just last January, for example, $100 million is due on February 1, 1918, and the remaining $150 million on February 1, 1919. Therefore, the aim was to convert as large a portion as possible of this short-term debt, consisting of Treasury notes and bills, into a secured bond. At the same time, as Bonar Law himself recently admitted, an attempt should be made to reduce the high interest rate of 6 percent that England was forced to grant for its last Treasury note issues and the aforementioned loan on the New York money market. Although the interest rate on this loan is only 52 percent in the United States, since the one-year notes were issued at 99.52 percent and the two-year notes at 99.07 percent, the American

buyer receives almost 6 percent interest in this case as well. Both of these objectives, however, have only been partially achieved by the Victory Loan. The new loan has certainly reduced the enormous outstanding debt, but not by a third. According to Bonar Law, of the 1,000 million pounds sterling, 130.7 million pounds sterling came from Treasury note conversions and 19.3 million pounds sterling from War Savings Certificates. To what extent the subscriptions at the Bank of England reported include exchanges of Treasury bills is not yet known. However, even if one assumes that 300 to 400 million pounds sterling of this amount could be paid in Treasury bills, there still remains a floating short-term debt of England amounting to approximately 1,400 to 1,500 million pounds sterling. Even less is the purpose of providing England with large new funds for its war expenditures achieved. If we assume the amount of subscriptions at the banks and post offices, according to Bonar Law's announcements, to be 850 million pounds sterling and calculate that 300 million pounds sterling will be paid in circulating Treasury bills and 200 million pounds sterling through the conversion of the second internal war loan, only about 350 million pounds sterling will remain as new funds; an amount that will probably just suffice to cover the money requirement until April 1 of this year, at least according to the calculation recently made by the English financial journal "Statist" (number of January 20), for according to this calculation, the financial year from April 1, 1916, to March 31, 1917, will close with a deficit of 311 million pounds sterling. The paper drew up the following balance sheet: Probable receipts up to March 17, 1917, according to the budget estimate. Probable expenditure up to then. Accordingly, deficit. Of this, covered by loans up to January 13, 1917. . . From this, the following must be deducted: - 502,275,000 pounds sterling 2,174,060,000 99 1,671,785,000 pounds sterling 99 This leaves a deficit of 1,300,561,000 371,224,000 pounds sterling 99 99 Proceeds from the Treasury Bond in Japan 10,000,000 .. 50,000,000 60,000,000 99 Last American Bond... This leaves a deficit of 311,224,000 pounds sterling as of March 31, 1917. While the "Victory Loan," staged with huge advertising, does at least mean a certain relief from the financial squeeze in which England found itself at the beginning of this year, it cannot be called a real success, but rather a failure. There is therefore little doubt that new bond projects will appear in the English press in a short time, perhaps within a few weeks. If the Yankee Republic joins the Entente as a new fighter for the "freedom of Europe," perhaps Uncle Sam will be willing to dig a little deeper into his pockets than before and finally grant England the long-awaited large foreign "liberty loan." Of course, on the other hand, this would only serve to further increase the importance of the New York money market compared to the

London one. ARNO FRANKE: WE Principle and Tactics. WHEN spirits are in turmoil over any matter in German Social Democracy, one would always bet with luck that a "principle" or "tenet" is in danger of being "abandoned." In each of these cases, people rush to the scene, "upholding" the "principle" or "tenet" that has just suffered the misfortune of being abandoned, with a great effort of lung power. In such an action, there is always a great deal of talk, and usually very loudly, but anyone who rushed to the scene of the rescue operation hoping to learn something more about the principle or tenet, about its nature and character, always returns home disappointed. And today, when we in the German social democracy have witnessed such a rescue operation, carried out for over two years, we are no different. After all, the two-year struggle has not passed us by without results. We know that the pillars of principle and the guardians of principle in the party today, as ever, employ the old method of appearing on the battlefield in disagreements with alleged principles that are, in fact, only alleged principles. It's the old argument about whether we're dealing with fundamental or tactical values when it comes to the issues dominating the struggle. At our party conventions, a question almost always arose that sparked a dispute about whether it had fundamental or tactical significance. Our struggle for principle was fought on a broad basis, especially in the debates over budget approvals in the state legislatures. If we follow these debates today, we find in the minutes an enormous amount of facts and political viewpoints, but we learn very little about the damned thing itself, about the principle, about the tenet and its inner nature, about the nature of tactics, and about how principles and tactics relate to one another. That's natural. These debates always deal with political situations that did not lead to the root of this question. One declared the question of budget approval a tactical one based on his convictions; the other treated it from a "fundamental perspective," so for him it was a matter of principle. They adopted a resolution and dispersed, and everyone acted with the calm that comes with a clear conscience, "according to their convictions." They knew: these things would come up again at the next party conference, and they would have to give their speech on principles or tactics again. But they accepted the matter as something given, something from which they could not escape. The bomb of the World War fell into this more or less comfortable hustle and bustle. This confronted the German Reichstag faction, which had previously been little affected by these struggles in practice, with the question of approving or rejecting funds intended to maintain the existing state. This was not the budget of some southern German state or region; these were demands for billions for the war. And to the extent of this difference, the dispute flared up again, far

more passionately and threatening the existence and unity of the party. The banner, the banner of the guardians of principles, rose in a flash. Party betrayal had been committed, the principles had been denied and shattered, and once again the dispute over principles raged. What didn't turn out to be a "principle," a "principle"! There were no more tactical questions. Everything was a principle! We experienced it again with a shudder: all the "reasons" struck our ears, which the attentive reader could easily have looked up chapter and page by chapter in the Party Congress minutes. Among the opponents of the approval of war credits, the tone was and is tuned to Kautsky's omission at the Nuremberg Party Congress: "There are questions of principle that are not tactical questions, but there are no tactical questions that are completely detached from principle. Tactics means nothing other than the interpretation of principle." Comrade Zetkin echoed the same sentiment at the time, merely summing up the prevailing view of the so-called radical wing of the party in a simpler and clearer formula. She said: "Whether one says it is a tactical or a question of principle is quite the same. Our tactics must be principled." The radical wing of the party adopted these views of the two academic leaders as its own, and we encounter the same arguments in its resistance to the tactics of the party majority. Indeed, the opposition's arguments are still based on these reasons today. However, the World War and the evidence surrounding it have shown us that, for Social Democracy, tactics and principle are different things, and that it is a vital question for the party to precisely determine the scope of these two political factors and to unambiguously determine their meaning. The principle of a political party is the basis of its will. The political principle arises when the real phenomena within the scope of a group of politically like-minded individuals are grasped in their essence, examined, and then spiritually transformed in accordance with ideally given possibilities. The new picture of things gained through this process provides both the starting point and the end point of the party's efforts. A party strives to shape real political events similarly and equally to this picture. It seeks to make every possible means of achieving this purpose entirely available to it. It must examine all the forces at work in the real world to determine whether and how they can be utilized to realize the vision. The assessment of the given possibilities, the selection of the available forces, the utilization of the available facts, and the manner of directing the available forces to realize the vision is the process we call tactics. It is natural that the viability, reputation, and prospects of a party's efforts depend on the state of its principle . A party stands all the more securely the less its principle is affected by occasional tactical difficulties. It is a danger for a party if its principle is not so clearly and

impeccably established that it is constantly related to, or considered in relation to, occasional tactical fluctuations. Social Democracy is currently in such a danger. This danger, however, does not lie in the fact that principle and tactics are inseparable, but rather in the fact that large sections of the party do not recognize, or do not want to recognize, the existing, easily recognizable separation between questions of principle and tactics, which is rooted in the party's overall situation. How about this? Our principle is the transformation of the whole of society. We want to transform the social order in which we live. Everything that concerns this goal, everything that in any way affects the existence of this goal, is of a fundamental nature. If I say that society cannot be transformed, then I am touching on our principle. If I say that there are tendencies and forces in human nature that make people unsuitable for life in the society we strive for, then this undermines our principle. If I say that the forces that maintain our present society are insurmountable, or something similar, then these are things that affect the principle. None of this has happened in the party! What happened? German Social Democracy approved funds because it saw the integrity of the country in which it lives and works threatened, and because it believed that it could not allow this integrity to be compromised. Is this a violation of principle? It would certainly be one if the state or states that threatened the existence of the German class state through war were entities that had implemented the socialist principle, so that German Social Democracy marched into the socialist state after a lost war. But Russia is at war with us—a state that, of all countries in the world, with the exception of nations that are not relevant for comparison, is furthest removed from implementing our principle! The question of approving war credits is therefore a tactical, not a fundamental question. What else happened that violated our principle? Budgets were approved, and party members discussed the question of whether budgets should or should not be approved in certain situations. Here, in keeping with my topic, I am not discussing whether the approval, or the demand for approval, was right or wrong. I am examining whether the question of such an approval was a matter of principle, as it was made into one at the party congresses. These questions, too, were tactical in nature. The budget serves to provide the state with the means necessary for its maintenance. We live in the state; a portion of the approved funds is used for our benefit. Whether we should approve the use of these funds was a tactical question. If a question of principle had been involved, the rejection of the funds would have simultaneously made it possible for the rejecting party not to give their funds to the state, but to keep them and thus fulfill, or strive to fulfill, the purposes that the state thereby fulfills in its own sense. What kind of

principle is it that compels me to reject funds for certain purposes, but subsequently to claim all the results that this purpose has produced? What relationship does the approval of these budgets have to our principle? We want a different state than the one that demands the budget from us. Now, if the state were to abdicate the moment we reject the budget and demand that we organize the state according to our principle (p. 905 (#925) Basaroff and Solomin. 905), then the approval of the budget would be a serious violation of principle. But the state does not do that. Even if we had the majority and we were to deny the state the means of its existence, so that, from the standpoint of the parliamentary system, it would not have a penny at its disposal, it would still exist if it still had the strength to exist. Thus, in the situation presented to our political gaze by the contemporary state, the questions of rejecting or approving state loans, war credits, or budgets are by no means questions of principle, but rather tactical ones. FRANZ DIEDERICH: VON Basaroff and Solomin. A vital chapter on Turgenev. It can be said of Turgenev that for our present time he has become a mountain in the twilight distance. We always see him clearly, know in which direction he can be reached, can mark a path that leads from his summit to our proximity, and yet always feel that his time zone is noticeably graying away behind us. Anyone influenced by the literature of the 1880s will have also received a more vivid impression of Turgenev, who died in 1883 in his adopted homeland of France and whose major works were written at the end of the 1840s and then from the beginning of the 1860s onward. A late work like the "Poems in Prose," written since 1878, may even have remained a close companion to him, whose healthy life, between optimism and pessimism, proves to be friendly. But between Turgenev and the present, the strong, multi-peaked mountain ridges of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and Gorky draw. Today, they attract the gazes and footsteps that strive for the soul of Russia, the Sphinx, as Turgenev once called this country. Nevertheless, it has happened that since the First World War, German workers' newspapers have served their readers one of Turgenev's great contemporary novels, "Fathers and Sons," - p. 906 (#926) 906 Basaroff and Solomin. Already in the first work, "Memoirs of a Hunter," these sketches, which contain a wealth of novella material, it becomes clear that Turgenev's gift for observing the external reality of Russian life was capable of a sensitive understanding of human nature. The figures he discovered in villages, forests, and steppes are not only fascinating because of their Russian nationality. They are even more compelling because of their purely humanly understandable nature, and this became the sharpness of Turgenev's poetry. In constant, intimate contact with Western European intellectual culture, it developed and achieved

European recognition, a result that was achieved not only by its sophisticated, action-packed form, but also by its content, which reached forward from the narrow confines of individual existence into the wider realm of social movements. In Germany, his contemporary novels became known during the Spielhagen era. He was a valuable helper, protected by the Russian sense of reality from romantic and weak fantasy , and held in high esteem at the very time when the Slavophile and revolutionary movements in Russia were casting him on the scrap heap; when Dostoyevsky saw in him the most accomplished of all Russian writers, when Katkov, with silent contempt, called him a pseudo-literate, and the Young Russian generation, as he himself recounts, bitterly burned his photograph. Turgenev conceived this Russian experience as a process of historical development, and he knew that this always uniquely conditions its people's actions. He regarded the period, which its laws had imposed on him, as over, without resentment toward the rising youth; he once called himself a transitional writer, one that could only be enjoyed by transitional people. Here he was influenced by the discipline of the 19th century, which shortens the phases of cultural development to rapid pulses and allows longer, extended human lives to witness several phases. This transformation has shattered the cohesion of the older age groups and thus diminished their social importance; but the youth class, which, in the urgency of its will to develop, feels all pressure more acutely and already senses everything new in its germinating announcements and, thirsting for freedom, seeks to advance quickly, gains the opportunity to venture forward and... p. 907 (#927) Basaroff and Solomin. 907 — - tend to make. Its strength lies in striking, but its tragedy lies in overestimating and misinterpreting the signs of a new development. The pitfalls of this tragedy are all the more broadly and insidiously laid out the more powerful and violent the resistance of the old, the inherited. Turgenev's youth had experienced this, for it fell into the terrible night of the despotism of the first Nicholas, and it is no wonder that she—a letter points to the year 1840—stormily devotedly lists her friendship with Bakunin as her great experience. His friendship with Alexander Herzen marks Turgenev's mature years. While the collapse of the Nicolaitan era was evident in the emerging struggle against Old Russian corruption and the push to abolish serfdom, Turgenev had already been a strong comrade in the field since his "Memoirs of a Hunter." He perceived this movement as the wave of a new, rising generation. Turgenev's view of contemporary history is well illustrated by a lecture on "Hamlet and Don Quixote," which he delivered in Petersburg in 1860. The certainty in assessing and considering the future, in recognizing what was necessary, which emerged a generation later from the influence of

the new economic doctrines of socialism, was not yet at work in Turgenev. German contemporaries rightly called him a realist of idealism. An idealist of Hegelian descent, he was driven by the instincts of his passion for truth, education, and freedom. He believed that good and evil were not distributed arbitrarily, even according to merit: he suspected lawful rule in this distribution, unknown but logical laws. This idealistic thinking, which sought to search for worldly-beneficial deeds, saw in Don Quixote a symbolism that overshadowed Hamlet. "Anyone who wanted to carefully consider and calculate all the consequences of his actions, the probability of whether they would actually be beneficial, before sacrificing himself would hardly be capable of sacrificing himself. Hamlet, however, could never encounter anything similar. How could he, with his penetrating, subtle, skeptical mind, be capable of such a gross error! He will never fight windmills, p. 908 (#928) 908 Basaroff and Solomin. He does not believe in giants . . . but he would not have attacked them either if they had really existed." Turgenev saw the Hamlet characters in the mood of an age that was about to burst open the door. He drew them several times, struck by their fate of already being separated from the conventional, the dull, the afflicted, and yet finding no ground that would give them a spade to use. For this, too, was Hamletian to him, and his Russia allowed him to experience examples of this kind at every turn. The lecture then expanded on this theme to a consideration of the crowd's relationship to Hamlet and his comic counterpart. "People like Hamlet, it was said, are indeed of no use to the crowd. They cannot lead them to any goal, since they themselves have no goal to pursue. Indeed, how can one lead someone when one does not know whether one has real ground beneath one's feet?" The reason for Sancho's attachment to his master, Turgenev believes, lies deeper than the hope of personal gain; in his view, it lies "in the crowd's best quality, its happy, honest blindness (alas, it knows other forms of blindness!), in its ability to inspire itself disinterestedly, to despise immediate personal gain, which for the poor is almost tantamount to renouncing one's daily bread." Turgenev exclaims: "A great world-historical quality! The masses always end up following, in unreserved faith, those whom they themselves mocked, cursed, and persecuted, but who, without fear of their curses and their persecutions, without fear even of their mockery, go forward without hesitation, their gaze fixed on the goal visible only to them, who seek, fall, rise again, and finally find, and rightly so: for only he finds whom the heart guides." Addressed to a circle of Russian literary intelligentsia, these inspiring words convey the mood of someone who believes he is close to the goal for which many suffered. Hopes for a great victory, which would soon be sorely dashed by the content of the

Serfdom Edict, burst forth strongly. As for the judgment on the psyche of the masses, however, it is clear that no modern mass reality influenced the speaker's thoughts. The time was still on the eve of the widespread penetration of economic and political organizational efforts into the proletarian millions of the masses, and Turgenev judged in accordance with the liberal revolutionary ideal, which viewed the masses as an element to be moved toward a momentary political goal and therefore most surely seized by stirring up emotions and moral outrage. Turgenev still knew nothing of the revolutionizing of the masses in a long-established organization aimed at a great social goal, and even for the Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s, for Chernishevsky himself, this goal meant nothing. But he soon became acquainted with the reversal and collapse of the movement to which Turgenev had sent his voice and pen to aid. The Polish Uprising of 1863 provided a favorable opportunity to take reactionary action against the surge of liberal and democratic idealism, powerfully promoted by Russian Westerners, and to do so nationally, under Slavophile banners. Resistance also spilled over into Turgenev. At the same time, however, he was also attacked by politically radical youth, who, in their passionate efforts to embrace revolutionary action, felt exiled and damaged by the novel "Fathers and Sons." The Slavophiles had stoked the fire here as well: Katkov, in his demagogic incitement, seized on the word that Turgenev, to capitalize on a historical fact, had coined to describe the Young Russian movement; the term "nihilist" was used as a moral stigmatization. The poet then accepted his literary fate with brave insight. "New times have come, and new people are needed." he wrote at the end of the 1860s in a reply to his fierce opponents, and that he otherwise remained true to the ideals of his generation, the generation of the 1840s, was still magnificently attested to at the end of his life. For it was he who, in the years of the greatest intensification of revolutionary action (1878 to 1881), wrote hymns of praise full of holy seriousness to the deadly, sacrificial courage of the fighters: the prose poems "The Workers and the Man with the White Hands" and "The Threshold." He was not one of those enthusiasts who stood up for the people who did not understand their actions and their sacrifice, and he stood aloof from the men of the Narodnaya Volya, who bloodily executed Tsar Alexander in the streets of Petersburg; but his deepest thoughts and feelings belonged to the human, moral greatness of their work of liberation. Turgenev's behavior toward his opponents from young Russia cannot be called a retreat to a deadlock; it emerged characteristically from the man's outlook on life and history. For him, the struggle for truth was the core of all world struggles, and he conceived the concept of truth in a Hegelian way: The whole truth

remains eternally worth striving for, and what individual ages discover is only relative truth, but precisely for that reason of lasting value. He believed in the lasting value of great achievements in the struggle for truth, did not allow himself to be deceived by illusions about the value of what had already been achieved, and kept his gaze, which sought to understand life, directed toward individual processes. For here, in the individual human being, there was something solid to be gained for his keenly observant senses. "I am most interested in the living." "Truth of human physiognomy," he once said, and thus one should see the historical values of his poetry emphasized in the psychological. But if he experienced the people of a transitional period, in which old and new clashed and separated, then in him, who unabashedly acknowledged and emphasized the rights and significance of the new generation, one has the prospect of insights into the nature of people who resolutely separate themselves from what has previously dominated, as if it were already settled. Herein lies, indeed, a significance of Turgenev's contemporary novels, for which a lasting relevance can be asserted. The whole and the half, the independent and the dependent, the strong and the weak, the honest and the deceitful, the stormy and the hesitant, all are given in the movement that is characteristic of times of collapse. In the famous figure of Bazarov, about whom there was fierce debate in the 1860s, the traits of the new type, which Turgenev first recognized in Russian reality in personal encounters, into almost programmatically sharp expression p. 911 (#931) Basaroff and Solomin. 911 collected. The man of action, who perceives and develops himself solely as a destructive force, stands in this Basaroff, a man of reason in purest flesh, who is concerned with tangible knowledge of reality, for whom all romanticism, art, philosophy, love are a vain figment of the imagination, who rejects all principles as fetters of nature, for whom only he is a real man who does not care what the world thinks of him, whom one must obey or detest; he believes there is not a single institution of our social, state, and family life that does not deserve to be completely and mercilessly abolished, he measures himself against the universe and eternity, feels his insignificance in boredom and Hate, but has an unwavering self-confidence and demands that men be wild. To his friend, who admiringly submitted to him and finally leaves him, he says: "You have acted wisely: our rough, dreary vagabond life is not suited to you. You lack boldness and malice; you are certainly endowed with youthful boldness and youthful fire, but that is not enough for the work to which we devote ourselves... You are not on our level; you admire yourself complacently, giving yourself the pleasant pleasure of blaming yourself; but all this bores us; we have something entirely different to do than admire or blame

ourselves; we must have men who can strike." This Basaroff seems like a crater in which the rebellion of nature lies ready to erupt; one knows only one thing about his power: that it will be devastating. His presence is subduing, and yet one seeks it nonetheless; It is as powerful as the fate that must necessarily strike in order to relieve the existing, heavy pressure. Such natures become understandable in the proximity of catastrophes, are bred by them. They are conscious of belonging solely to the living moment, and in the instinct of this significance, they erase everything that inhibits the human cultural character. The question of the future, which reaches beyond the moment of their action, the cultural question: What then?, does not concern them; they are merely resistance, revenge, and annihilation, which frees them from obstacles; they are haters of culture, Russian Rousseautism, for whom barbaric means are acceptable in order to make a healthy human existence possible; and stripped of p. 912 (#932) 912 Basaroff and Solomin. Stripped of temporality, Basaroff can be considered a generic type of his kind, in whom individuals from other times rediscover their traits. For Turgenev, however, this question, "What then?" existed alongside "What is to be done?" In the novel "Neuland," which, a decade and a half after the novel "Fathers and Sons," portrayed the people of the putsch: their urge for sacrifice, their fanaticism, their fate in the clash of illusion and reality, the figure of Solomin emerges. This mechanic of humble origins who runs a factory for a Moscow merchant, a man who, through his skill, actions, and demeanor, wins the trust of everyone, including that of the Petersburg revolutionaries with whom he is in contact, without, however, sharing their belief that a revolution will soon break out in Russia. The poet does not push him forward, allowing him to assume significance more as a side issue, but he is very concerned with this figure: he presents him as a living critique of the revolutionaries who, with holy will, go among the people, to the peasants and workers, only to discover at the moment of their action that the people they thought were ready lie in a deaf sleep. What they learned as they perished, Solomin had long known, and his view is that the people, without whom nothing can be done, must be prepared for a long time, but in a completely different way, notes Turgenev, and for a completely different purpose than they did. Solomin has the same goal as the revolutionaries pushing for insurrection, but his path is different; he, too, wants to work from the bottom up, but not headlong, not as a "quick-ready healer of our social wounds" who, as a hoped-for someone, will "rip out all our ailments like a rotten tooth." At the end of the novel, we hear that Solomin has acquired his own factory in the Russian East, brought the best people who had previously been under his command there, and introduced the "principle of association"

into his work. By presenting this as the only rational means of social transformation against the coup-like practices of other, failed revolutionaries, Turgenev portrays Solomin as a representative of Western European utopian socialism. He rejected Chernyshevsky, who, as a critic of capitalism, also came from the background of the great utopians, but at the same time advocated the political action resulting from Russia's economic development, rooted in the view that social revolution could be achieved through a sudden upheaval. Chernyshevsky languished in Siberia as a martyr of Russia's social revolution, and Turgenev's ideal appeared outdated and inadequate. But again: in one respect, he was and still appears today in this figure of Solomin, vital: in his portrayal of humanity and the demand associated with this man for a popular, natural development of the new Russian social territory. Turgenev is certainly right when he strongly emphasizes the importance of character. And then he says: people like Solomin are actually the right people. "You don't understand them at first, but they are the right people, and the future belongs to them. They are not heroes; not even those 'heroes of labor' about whom some American or English joker wrote a book for the edification of us poor devils; they are coarse, gray, people who have emerged from the people. Such, and only such, are what we need now! Look at this Solomin: his face is clear as day, and he is as healthy as a fish... Isn't that wonderful? For what has been the rule here in Russia until now? If you are a living being, endowed with feeling and a conscience, you are infallibly sick! Solomin, of course, is just as sick at heart as we are; he hates everything we hate, but his nerves leave him alone, and his whole body obeys as it should. In a word, a splendid fellow! Say what you will, he is a man who has an ideal, without using platitudes, educated yet descended from the people; simple yet clever and skillful... what more could you want?" - - Emerging from within and finding and bringing together the best forces—with this popular ideal, Turgenev remains someone who has important things to say to new times, even in critical hours. If the Basaroffs are not to have sacrificed in vain, the Solomins must be ready to succeed, and we can recognize their nature more clearly today than was possible for Turgenev four decades ago. What to do? and: What then? Both must be the watchword at the same time. Acting with foresight—that alone is good politics. 50/3 p. 914 (#934) 914 The Cow. OTTO FLAKE: The Cow. From the train station, which lies in the north of the big city, a stone shaft leads to the slaughterhouse far in the south. When one looks into it, one is reminded of the mathematicians' definition: a straight line is the shortest connection between two points. It is so straight that a cannonball fired in front of the station would always hit the middle. the street and would not touch any of

the houses that seem to have been flung sideways to make room for a fanatically forward-looking will. Every day, animals are unloaded at the train station and killed in the slaughterhouse. What could be more natural than to drive them through the stone shaft—the shortest way to connect two businesses is to make a living? But the stone shaft is filled with cars and wagons. The slaughtered animals take a detour. They turn at a right angle at the station, trot in a strangely nodding gallop along an elegant promenade that runs parallel to the stone shaft, and then descend again at a right angle to the slaughterhouse. They gain half an hour of their lives and a last impression of tree-lined avenues and idlers, which perhaps makes their death easier; one cannot know. I encounter them every day when I go to the office. They leave behind a smell of land and stables that mingles with the specific smell of civilization, that of gasoline. I encounter them so often that I allow them a part of my thoughts. You calves, oxen, and cows, I think, how orderly everything is in a modern city! I go to the office, you to the slaughterhouse: we cross paths, animal and human, and when it's time to go to the restaurant, a piece of you is placed before me. I devour you, and without a doubt this is the divinely ordained harmony of existence; one thing affects the other—what if it were the other way around, or one day will be the other way around, and what is now me trudges to the slaughterhouse, and what you are follows my path? It's frightening to think like that, but it won't let me go; it's necessary to think like that. When there's a cycle, the moment comes for everyone when they no longer eat, but are eaten. p. 915 (#935) The Cow. 915 And at night I dreamed of a planet on which humans take on the role of animals. hold, a mighty race of giant creatures takes the place of the masters. There were butcher shops like ours; human bodies hung in cleanly gutted halves, the ribs pink, the fat white and firm; breasts were soft and appetizing, feet scalded, calves smoked and fleshy and round. A gentleman (from the giant race) stood there with a lady (of the same size) and said: "Actually, it's disgusting to eat these creatures, who are also alive and certainly have a kind of intelligence like us, but what can you do?" A dog sniffed at the pieces, the lady gently reprimanded him. As for the dogs, it was like here: dogs happened to be among the creatures that weren't eaten, so they had it quite good. It's not the stupidest thing to be an animal that isn't considered edible. If you're one of the edible, then all love ceases. There is something cruel in some people's love for animals. I know a lady who is so enamored with chicks that she raises them on her veranda, in a cardboard box with an electric wire ending in the cotton wool: the chicks are wonderfully warm, and the lady kisses and cuddles them. After six weeks, she preserves them in jars. Yes, that's how love works. Today I met the cows

again, under the trees on the promenade. It had frozen, and the ground was covered with black ice. One of the cows slipped; now she's lying there, or rather, sitting there, on her four tucked-in legs; with her horns, she resembles a large snail. Is she exhausted, or does she feel quite well? In any case, she doesn't think about getting up. Her companions trot on, running; the blows they receive on their rear ends fade away; Her bleating, farewell, and lamentation vanish, only she, the one cow, remains behind, indifferent to what happens to her. What can happen to her? Nothing. Right, make it difficult for those who want to slaughter you. And I see with irony that she is causing a traffic disruption, for she is lying on the tram track. A circle gathers, two-legged creatures stare at the four-legged one—does it make much difference how many legs someone has?—50/3* p. 916 (#936) 916 The cow. The drover hits her, my dear, a stick is a lot, but it isn't everything, she doesn't move. A soldier comes out of a barracks bringing sacks. Brilliant idea, one thinks admiringly. He puts a sack under each of the cow's feet, now she can stand up without slipping. But she doesn't think about it. The soldier pulls one horn, the driver the other. They pull so hard you'd expect them to rip out the horns. The horns hold, but the cow just gets a long neck. The trams are backed up and ring their bells angrily. The task is to push the animal away. This is achieved by one person grabbing its fur on the back, the other helping with its head; it is dragged half a meter, and you realize that in its fear it has soiled itself. So something is going on inside it after all. The trams drive cautiously by. People are sitting behind the windows. They all turn their heads to see the cow. A moment of metaphysics, a scene from outer space, a snapshot of the existence of the whole: vague, dark feelings in the people who, in gliding yellow carriages without any visible propulsion, pass by an animal sacrificed to their higher purposes—the higher purposes of their busyness, the rendezvous they are hurrying to, the shopping they are doing, all this bustle of a city at five o'clock in the afternoon. A girl on the platform sees that the animal's black eyes are beautiful and feels pity, but without doubt, here too, on the platform, there is a master who would know how to calm it. It would also be a way to establish contact. The trams have passed, the cow cannot remain lying there forever. The soldier is inexhaustible with ideas; he brings a cup of cold water and pours it into her ear. He thinks it will frighten her, but he says it will refresh her spirits. The cow is indeed frightened, then shakes out her ears and lies down. Instead of a cup, someone fetches a bucket of ice water, pours it into both ears, and she doesn't get up. Now the cattle driver tries out an idea. It's a farmer's trick: he twists her tail for five minutes like the handle of a barrel organ; animals have sensitive nerves. The cow doesn't want to be sensitive, she

stays. And if she hasn't gotten up in the meantime, she's still lying there today. One could also say, as in the fairy tale: she's still alive today. For you can't really drive a stake into her brain on the open road. HEINRICH LERSCH: Miners' Exit. Darkness draws in from the cities, from the farthest distances comes the first sparkle of sunlight, swelling around roofs and towers. Around the rigid masses of walls the first dawn glows, into the fading clouds, smoke billows from chimney to chimney. A dark chorus of sounds roars from the creative powers; tired, striding figures emerge from the black gate. Deep-diggers, old, young, still bent from their tunnel journey; breathing, their lungs expand, still oppressed by dust and smoke. Stretching, they raise their heads, lifting their faces, humans, sentient creatures, they pray from night to the light. Those who atone for the light with darkness, which surrounded them with horror. And with wobbly, tired feet they greet the new day. p. 918 (#938) 918 Glosses. Glosses. Bring on a juvenile justice law! - Due to the endless duration of the war, juvenile delinquency has increased alarmingly in our country, as in all other belligerent states. The reasons for this sad phenomenon are readily apparent: the father, older brothers, and other adult relatives are usually in the field, while the mother works during the day. It's no wonder that education is neglected, and immature individuals easily fall victim to bad company, bad books, etc. Often, this is compounded by the fact that young people, who still lack any moral support, all too easily end up in positions of trust (outposts, warehousemen, etc.). As daily experience shows, property crimes committed by young people in such positions occupy a prominent place on the agenda of our juvenile courts. The lack of a law governing juvenile justice is becoming more noticeable every day. The following points are crying out for a remedy: 1. Far too many punishments are meted out. For quite minor offenses and transgressions, at least at present, one would have to avoid the gigantic apparatus that the judicial processing of criminal cases will always require. From a higher moral perspective, however, it is undoubtedly a crime to make young people pay for every minor misstep and to brand them as "criminal" for life, especially since neglected education, one of the most unfortunate and irreversible consequences of war, bears the primary blame. An emergency law must therefore immediately eliminate the public prosecutor's obligation to prosecute offenses and transgressions committed by young people, even if they possess the insight necessary to recognize the criminality of their actions. 2. The punishments are far too harsh. We are thinking here less of the sentencing, which ultimately must be decided by the freedom of judicial discretion, but rather of the unfortunate side effect of the penalties incurred: that these are invariably entered into the youth's criminal record. While such

an entry may be appropriate in special cases, the subsequent effect of the punishment, which stamps the young person as a criminal from the outset, should be decided by the discretion of the sentencing court. Therefore, the second provision of the Emergency Act should stipulate that, in the case of convictions of young people, the entry of punishments in the criminal register may only be made on the basis of judicial orders issued in the judgment (against which an appeal would be permissible). p. 919 (#939) Glosses. 919 3. The punishment is wrong. In particularly minor cases, the court should limit itself to a reprimand, while moderate cases should generally be punished with a short prison sentence, which can be remitted by the state justice administration upon good behavior. Experienced practitioners know, however, that a reprimand will later hit the juvenile harder than a "remitted" prison sentence; because, according to the "recidivism" provision of the Criminal Code, a reprimand is always considered the first prior conviction, while the "remitted" prison sentence remains unconsidered. Since, according to the provisions of the Criminal Code, sentences to reprimands are already particularly minor cases, this would be a third fundamental provision of the Emergency Law—reprimands should never be viewed as a punishment that justifies a "relapse." 4. The Emergency Law should be given retroactive effect to August 1, 1914. Such a necessary reform law would be greeted in the trenches and at home with the same feelings of gratitude and joy as if it were an amnesty. Indeed, the harshest social and economic consequences of the war would be averted for thousands of families. Based on previous practice during the war, the Federal Council would undoubtedly be authorized to remedy this situation by means of an ordinance. And the current situation truly demands remedy. Hygiene as a state monopoly. The idea of nationalizing or urbanizing individual branches of hygiene is not new; it is represented in the literature and, as far as it is concerned, for example, has been discussed in the German version. B. pharmacies, has already been put into practice in some places. In his recently published pamphlet[1], Landvogt does not content himself with partial reforms, but has outlined a complete system of nationalization of all hygiene; he advocates a state monopoly in this area. That such a state monopoly has and must have a fundamentally different character than, for example, a state mining or electricity monopoly is obvious; the difference between the two types of monopoly is roughly the same as that between municipal institutions that serve public health (hospitals, baths, etc.) and municipal utilities that are run independently by the municipalities and not just for the supply of the 1 Robert Landvogt. Hygiene as a State Monopoly. A Critique and a System as a Basis for the Nationalization of the Medical, Veterinary,

Dental, Pharmacist, and Food Chemist Professions. Munich 1910. Commission Publishing House at H. Birk u. Co. G. mb H. 1.20 Mk. p. 920 (#940) 920 Glosses. should not only serve the population with gas, electricity, water, etc., but should also generate surpluses to relieve the taxpayers. While in the latter case, certain commercial principles must not be ignored, in the former, the sole consideration must be the best possible representation of the interests of the community, without regard to the financial result. This principle would also have to be followed in the event of a nationalization of hygiene. If this idea, which we are in principle sympathetic to, is to be realized, then everything must be eliminated from the outset that does not serve the national nutrition, population policy, the protection of mothers and infants, the reduction of the mortality rate, the improvement of sexual intercourse, the care of the disabled, and other hygienic purposes. This also seems to be the view of the governor. If he also expects permanent revenues for the state that the If the total sum of 100 million marks far exceeds the estimate, we should be pleased if this calculation, which we are unable to verify, proves to be correct. For then considerable sums would be available to improve hygiene, and the enormous health damage of the World War could at least be partially offset without a new burden on the people. Certainly, the branches of industry affected by nationalization will protest against the governor's plan; but they, too, will realize that the majority of them will not be materially harmed by it, but rather, apart from doctors, pharmacists, and related professions with unusually high incomes, will benefit from it. The experiences gained with the introduction and every expansion of health insurance will be repeated. But even if this were not the case, the interest of the community as a whole would have to be higher than that of individual professions. What serves the interest of the community as a whole must and will also be counterbalanced against prevail, no matter how fierce the resistance. If one approaches the examination of Landvogt's proposals from this perspective , then one will not underestimate their significance, then one will not simply reject them as fantastic, but will wish for their fundamental idea to be vigorously promoted. The author will probably also be open to discussion about this or that detail. In any case, the text stimulates reflection, and no time is more suitable for the public discussion of the plan developed therein than the present, when the World War has thrown everything into disarray and when it is necessary to rebuild from the ground up. PH p. 921 (#941) DIE GLOCKE 51. Issue 17 March 1917 2nd Year. Reprinting of all articles with detailed source references is permitted. Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M. d. R.: Well, well! The debates that took place in the Prussian three-class house during the deliberations on the agricultural

budget have finally put the bells around the Prussian cat's neck and clearly showed the German people how enormous the danger is that threatens them if the current system of one-sided agrarian producer policy continues. The Bavarian peasant leader Dr. Heim declared in a very noteworthy article about these debates that it was high time to finally make the facts, which had long been known to him and a small circle of insiders, clear to the public. It was better to ruthlessly tell the people the truth than to continue working with a system that had collapsed under grave guilt. Indeed, that's it: collapsed under grave guilt! It is by no means a question of the Prussian administration, primarily the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, being unable to overcome the undoubtedly existing difficulties in food supplies. What Mr. von Schorlemer is accused of is rather that he deliberately and deliberately did much to undermine the intentions of the War Food Office, that he was the father of all obstacles, because of whom all of Mr. von Batocki's good intentions to make it easier for the German people to hold out, repeatedly failed, and that he was ensuring that the farmers would exploit the German food shortage, which would put the Reich in the greatest danger. 51/1 p. 922 (#942) 922 Now, well, well! Mr. von Schorlemer objected to these massive accusations, which were raised in the press and especially in the petition of all trade union groups on February 21, in a manner that unintentionally raised the entire question beyond the level of a mere departmental issue and presented it as what it is: the core problem of Germany's internal future. In the Prussian Agrarian House, it was easy to secure a vote of confidence for the loyal spokesman for agrarian interests, but the entire situation turned this vote of confidence in the Prussian minister into a vote of no confidence in the Representatives of the Reich authorities, not so much against Batocki as directly against the Reich Chancellor and especially his deputy, Mr. Helfferich. This was expressed in the House by the Agrarian Center speaker Stull, and outside the House by the small conservative press, which sneeringly reminded Mr. Helfferich that "just shortly before the war"—in fact, it was in 1900—he had declared a war of starvation like the one we are experiencing today to be impossible, and linked this affectionate remembrance with the remark: "But this error before the war does not give him the right to add further mistakes during the war; thus, it also does not give him the right to play the role of indifferent spectator in the hustle and bustle perpetrated against agriculture and its ministers for party-political reasons." The Junkers are thus perfectly clear about what is at stake: Prussia versus the Reich, that is to say, large-scale agrarian particularism versus national solidarity. Of course , not in the sense that it had no interest in the victory of the German people, or that it was unwilling to continue making

blood sacrifices for a German victory. Such contradictions cannot be understood in this way at all. The great defeats of the Prussian army in 1806 and 1807 were not brought about by the Junkers' cowardice on the battlefields. There can be no question of that, and no less a figure than Scharnhorst spoke out against such absurdity. And yet, during the years of reform, a spokesman for the same Prussian Junkers managed to coin the highly treasonous phrase about Stein's legislation: "Better to lose the Battle of Jena again than endure such laws!" And he could be sure that with his words he had very well expressed the heartfelt opinion of his fellow Junkers, the same Junkers who, in the coming battles of the Wars of Liberation, fulfilled their duty no less than the other strata of the Prussian people. No, if the Junkers of today fight against the War Food Laws with the same tenacity as the Junkers of yesteryear fought against Stein's reform laws, although both sets of laws represented, and still represent, an absolute necessity and an indispensable prerequisite for defeating the enemy, they do so both times in the firm conviction that they are thereby best protecting the interests of the state and people, since the state and the Junkers in Prussia are identical, and everything that is dangerous to the Junkers is therefore, in the truest sense of the word, also dangerous to the state. - - The attitude that Prussia has so far adopted on the food issue, which was crucial for the war, is highly characteristic of the power of the Prussian Junkers and—what is essentially the same—of the Prussian state administration. All other large German states have created central state authorities for food. Bavaria had made significant progress under the new Minister Brettreich, and Württemberg had also successfully endeavored to protect its population from the worst. Prussia, on the other hand, did nothing, although a state food office would have been particularly necessary for the largest German federal state, given the country's peculiar economic and geographical character, in which the surplus provinces lie in the east and the needy provinces in the west. But nothing happened. Mr. von Batocki was left in the vacuum of the War Food Office, where he served in 51/1* p. 924 (#944) 924 Well, well! In reality, he had no office but only an "opinion," and thus taught him, quite con amore, that he had "nothing to seg" in the land of Prussia. After all, the Reich has no executive branch and, as far as the implementation of its decrees is concerned, is dependent on the Prussian administrative apparatus. The more the Prussian executive branch failed, the more Batocki sought to help out with new decrees, and so we increasingly found ourselves in an unfortunate dilemma where the more the Reich decreed, the less was carried out in the state, until Mr. von Batocki, the former "food dictator," had been fortunately turned into an almost comical figure, whom his good Prussian friends could

now accuse, with some justification, of being unable to find their way out of his abundance of decrees. Thus, the "danger" that the Reich might perhaps conquer some executive branch in the individual states had been gloriously repulsed. Through obstruction of the population, they had thoroughly disgusted Batocki's "war socialism," and were just about to celebrate this triumph as a great victory. But here, the beautiful story of the well-known farmer who wanted to wean his horse from its boring eating habits and had actually succeeded in putting it on ever-smaller rations was repeated. One day, however, when the farmer believed that the animal had finally forgotten how to eat, he found it, to his greatest surprise, lying starving in the stable. Of course, they could not and did not want to let it go quite that far in this case, and so they were finally forced to appoint a Prussian Commissioner for Food. Due to the logic of the facts, Mr. Michaelis had become an opponent of the Prussian Minister of Agriculture, and the objective antagonism between the two men was expressed with all the greater sharpness in the debates in the Three-Class House, the more both of them, and especially Mr. Michaelis, emphasized that no Contradiction separates them. The constraints of the circumstances under which the Junkers stood were in fact so extraordinary and the danger so enormous that no new farce could be performed, and that one saw oneself forced to fill the newly created position of Prussian Food Commissioner with a personality as capable as he was determined and proven. With his candid description of our extremely serious situation in the area of national nutrition, Mr. Michaelis has earned a merit for which we highly value him. The firm will he expressed to take correspondingly serious measures in the face of this serious situation will soon bring him into open conflict with Mr. von Schorlemer, who has expressly declared that he will not deviate from his previous practice in the future. Then it will become clear whether the Minister or the Commissioner is the iron pot that will earthly collides. The conflict that has erupted here is based on the antagonism between the individual state and the Reich, between the three-class system and the system of universal suffrage, and it was no coincidence that Herr von Schorlemer heaped cheap scorn on the German people's representatives. In this respect, the conflict is already a struggle for reorientation, in which we are already in the midst, despite the Burgfrieden (Civil Peace) and Bethmann's soothing speeches. How strongly this antagonism is felt by the Junkers, and how little they are willing to show any concessions, was shown by the session of the House of Lords, which became a wild outburst of hatred against everything that is not strongly Prussian in the worst sense of the word, and which the Prussian Minister of Agriculture attended as the sole minister, without uttering a single word against the reactionary paroxysm.

Here we all heard again the impudent scornful words against those elected to universal suffrage, who must strive for popularity, which were so often hurled at us in the pre-war period, and which will now sound especially sweet to the ears of the field-grey soldiers out there. To the trade union leader, p. 926 (#946) 926 Well, well! The noble Count Yorck made it a crime to Legien that he had exchanged telegrams with the American trade union leader Gompers, in which war and peace were spoken of. That was a scandalous encroachment on the rights of His Majesty the Emperor. Hey, there it is again, in the flesh, before us, the blue-blooded worldview according to which workers are merely objects of legislation, according to which they need not concern themselves with the well-being of the Reich and the people, but merely accept orders from above in silent obedience. The Prussian people will be commanded to be patriotic at the right time, so that they can wag their tails and fetch; until then, they must remain silent and wait to see what is decided about their fate. — The last few weeks have witnessed an almost dramatic growth of reactionary forces. The leading strata of the Junker class are firmly determined not to surrender a single iota of their privileges. We have, of course, never doubted this, and from the very first months of the war, when national enthusiasm was still running high, we have repeatedly warned against expecting any concessions from this class except after difficult and tough fighting. What we certainly didn't think possible was that these classes would choose the very moment when the World War was at its height and the entire nation, like a panting titan, was working on the sole task of defeating the enemy, as the most appropriate moment to proclaim, with complete peace of mind, as their program of action, the words: everything stays with the old man! We do not envy those whose blood is not filled with bile at this point. But the Reich Chancellor sits like a bucolic shepherd boy sub tegmine fagi and blows the soothing flute: Be patient, be patient, for in just an hour your chamber will be full of sun. p. 927 (#947) Bismarck's Legacy. 927 These most illustrious gentlemen may be mistaken! World history has its profound meaning, and neither today's tremendous world revolution nor the gigantic German development of the last one and a half generations that preceded it exist purely for the pleasure of a high nobility. Ah, dear gentlemen, as Thomas Münzer once said in his great speech at Allstätt, how nicely the gentleman will throw an iron rod under the old braids . If I say that, I may be considered seditious. Well, very well! ADOLF KOESTER: Bismarck's Legacy. III. Germany and England. England has never had a lasting special interest, either sympathetic or antipathetic, in any single great power on the continent. Since William III, its insular interest has lain in preventing the dominance of a single continental state over the

others, in preventing the emergence of continental solidarity, and finally in establishing and promoting a certain tense balance between the continental power groups. In addition, it has so far destroyed every continental fleet that threatened its maritime trade monopoly. Based on this fundamental principle of British interest politics, the Germany of the Bismarckian era was not dangerous to the English, although at times inconvenient. The island empire viewed the gradual emergence of a German nation-state with a leery eye, but did not seriously attempt to prevent it. It counted on this state as a future battering ram against Russia, as flanking pressure against France. France's hegemony was all the more threatening at the end of the 1860s because Napoleon III had strong interests in French naval power. p. 928 (#948) 928 Bismarck's legacy. In the 1870s, Germany's relationship with England played a minor external role. The occupation of the Fiji Islands (1874) led to unsuccessful negotiations due to alleged violations of German trade rights. In 1875, England readily participated in Russian pressure against alleged German intentions to attack France (Queen Victoria's warning letter to Wilhelm I, Lord Derby's offer of alliance to Count Andrassy, the inflammatory "Times" article by her Paris correspondent Oppert). The great Oriental Crisis at the end of the 1870s saw Germany sometimes on the side of Russia (against England), sometimes on that of Austria. The Orient (Constantinople) was at that time the scene of fierce diplomatic struggles between England and Russia. In order to prevent the Tsarist Empire's influence on the Christian Balkan peoples from becoming too great, England refused to join the anti-Turkish Berlin Memorandum of 1876. Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) followed an old English tradition when he supported Turkey in order to keep Russia away from Constantinople. He was able to do this all the more since the then threatening War also gave him a free hand in Egypt in the event of a Russian victory, which had been his main interest since the British government acquired the majority of the Suez Canal shares (1875). The British government was not aloof from the Young Turk Revolution, which overthrew the pro-Russian Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876. While Gladstone's anti-Turkish pamphlet sold like hot cakes in England, his supporters in Parliament ensured that Turkey was not seriously threatened. England was unable to prevent the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. However, it sent its fleet into the Dardanelles when Russia advanced dangerously close to Constantinople. When the harsh conditions of the Treaty of San Stefano became known, England assembled a quarter of a million troops and alarmed Europe with a war speech by Disraeli. Russia gave in and initially acquiesced to a Preliminary discussion with England (Londoner p. 929 (#949) Bismarck's Legacy. 929 Memorandum). In this, England secured its entire position in the

Near East and also captured Cyprus. At the Congress of Berlin, this curtailment of Russian conquests finally received its European sanction. Bismarck's position on English policy, whose intransigence sometimes endangered the entire Congress, was determined solely by his relationship with Russia and Austria. English influences were striving to push German policy away from the Three Emperors' Alliance at that time. Bismarck held fast to it. He did not advise against a peaceful solution to the Anglo-Russian conflict. He sided with England only insofar as England's anti-Russian interests coincided with those of Austria. But even these Austrian interests he only championed to the extent that our good relationship with Russia was not jeopardized. The major opponents at the Congress of Berlin were England and Russia. However, a cunning Russian press campaign succeeded, to England's delight, in shifting Russia's understandable displeasure at its diplomatic defeat from England to Germany and its broker. England naturally viewed the Triple Alliance primarily from an anti-Russian perspective. As uncomfortable as the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty must have been for it, it had little reason to be suspicious of the Triple Alliance. The German-Austrian alliance, with its purely anti-Russian defensive policy, was always viewed favorably on the Thames, as long as the possibility of a Russian-English understanding remained remote. But even when Italy joined this alliance, this position remained the same. In our previous article, we referred to the Anglo-Italian Entente as a precondition for Italy's entry into the Triple Alliance. This Entente, to which Italy owes the acquisition of Massawa on the Red Sea, focused particularly on the various Suez Canal Conferences. For German policy, there was no reason to disturb this Anglo-Italian intimacy as long as no serious conflicts of interest arose between Germany and England --- p. 930 (#950) 930 Bismarck's Legacy. SO long as England was willing, in its own interest, to play the role of the "complementary Triple Alliance naval power." Russian backing ensured that Germany could not be abused by England as an agitator against Russian desires for the Bosporus. Initially, Germany had no direct points of friction with England. The relationship between the two states was officially friendly. In 1880, Bismarck is said to have attempted to reach a closer understanding with England. The attempt did not fail because of him. Germany's colonial policy, which began in the 1880s, gave rise to certain difficulties between the two states. Bismarck overcame all these difficulties to Germany's advantage because, through his German-Austrian-Russian alliance system, he had secured a strong continental power position that did not exclude Italy and maintained or cultivated the colonial antagonism between France and Russia and England. In the 1870s, Bismarck had to reject an offer from the Transvaal Boers to

place themselves under German protection. In 1883/84, thanks to his position in Europe, he was able to venture to seize possession of South West Africa despite protests and obstruction from the English Cape Colony. The opposition to this seizure, which also encountered in England itself (Lord Granville), was based on the fear that Germany would seek to establish contact with the Boer states from the West. This "danger" was all the more imminent as Germany soon began planning seizures of the southeast African coast (Lucia Bay), which clashed with simultaneous Boer attempts to reach the sea there. Germany achieved recognition of its southwest colony, but rejected a commitment not to expand into the Boer states. England soon cut off this possibility by annexing Bechuanaland. p. 931 (#951) Bismarck's Legacy. 931 The seizure of Togo and Cameroon also took place under fierce competition with England. The conflict over Cameroon was only prevented by the English gunboat arriving off Victoria five days late. Here, as in German South West Africa, friction arose after the seizure with English merchants and consuls, who were more or less supported by their government. These frictions led to lengthy negotiations. between the two governments (and later in the Reichstag). Bismarck everywhere imposed his will against England's "dependent" policy. The Franco-English conflict in the Mediterranean, especially in Egypt, played a major role in Bismarck's policy towards England for years. France had strong interests in Egypt. But since Disraeli had secured a majority for England in the Suez Canal Joint Stock Company, his influence in the Khedive's state, which nominally still belonged to Turkey, dwindled. On the upper Nile, Gordon established a massive English protectorate, the southern part of which was administered by the German Eduard Schnitzer as governor. In Egypt itself, an uprising broke out in 1882, which led to the Anglo-French bombardment of Alexandria and the subsequent landing of Anglo-Indian troops. Since France could not bring itself to participate vigorously in Egypt, England provisionally occupied the country alone, from which it never left. France had thus lost its share of the condominium. Bismarck's Egyptian policy was still purely continental in orientation. Without any global political interests of its own (for under Bismarck the German colonies were viewed primarily as purely commercial protectorates), German policy in the 1880s skillfully threw its weight into the Egyptian question, sometimes in the English, sometimes in the French scales, always concerned with nothing more than securing its European alliance system by all means. As early as 1876, Bismarck had encouraged the English to annex the Nile region. In the following years of the ministerial office of the colonially reluctant Gladstone, he continued this method. England found itself in ever greater difficulties due to the fighting on the

upper Nile. And French resentment against the island empire grew ever deeper. This did not prevent Bismarck from changing his mind in the following years and, together with Russia, supporting France at the international conference of Egyptian creditor powers. In 1866, England wished to issue a new loan for Egypt. France refused without compensation. Bismarck sided with France. He advised England to give in, to reach an understanding with France, and to seek the consent of the Three Emperors. England then agreed to repeatedly declare neutrality regarding the Suez Canal. It had to give in, frightened by the possibility of a Franco-German understanding. Two years earlier, England had attempted to exclude the newly founded Congo Company from the Atlantic Ocean through an understanding with Portugal. To implement this plan, Bismarck, in agreement with France, convened the Congo Conference in Berlin, which guaranteed the Congo state, now recognized as independent, free access to the sea and all European states freedom of trade in the new giant empire. With the same power constellation of Germany and France, Bismarck had already established the sovereignty of the Sharif Empire in 1880 at the First International Moroccan Conference in Madrid, in contrast to English protectorate intentions in Morocco. Thus, German policy sometimes used France, sometimes Russia, against England. In the shadow of his alliance system, Bismarck exploited all English difficulties to strengthen his alliances, gain advantages in Africa and the South Seas, avoid falling out with England, sometimes even go a long way towards meeting her halfway, but at the same time anxiously avoid the danger of German vassalage to England that came with the lack of a German fleet. Only in light of the great difficulties p. 933 (#953) Bismarck's Legacy. 933 England's influence in Upper Egypt as well as in South Africa (Boer uprisings after the annexation of 1877) makes the acquisition of our colonies quite clear. "England is certainly inaccessible to us by land. Meanwhile, general policy offers enough leverage to induce England to leave us unmolested in foreign parts of the world." Bismarck always played against England only indirectly. This sovereign method with which Bismarck, supported by his continental alliance system, conducted German policy toward England, caused the greatest discomfort in London. England's Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, publicly declared that Germany had reached an agreement with England about Egypt behind France's back. Bismarck then brusquely refused to respond to official English inquiries in the future, until Lord Granville finally apologized in the House of Lords for his "misunderstanding." He then stated that Germany's policy had forced England to abdicate all liberty of action in colonial matters. The sheer speed with which England expanded its imperialism, especially under Bismarck's

chancellorship, shows how wrong this was. In 1874, it acquired the Fiji Islands and united British North America with Canada; in 1875, it subjugated the Ashantis and acquired the Suez Canal shares; in 1877, it brought the Transvaal into its own hands; in 1878, it promised itself Cyprus; in 1880/81, it assumed its decisive position in Afghanistan; in 1882, it entrenched itself in Egypt, where it had conquered a vast empire in Sudan since the 1870s; it took possession of New Guinea in 1883, Burma in 1886, and Rhodesia in 1889. Compared to this, the unconnected scraps that German imperialism seized in Africa meant nothing. Even under Bismarck, the conviction that England was unwilling to make even the slightest concession to any further German expansion took root in large circles in Germany. p. 934 (#954) 934 Bismarck's legacy. If one surveys Bismarck's policy toward England as a whole, it displays the same virtuoso maneuvering toward the island state as it did toward Russia and Austria. Bismarck rejects a fundamental anti-English bias in favor of France. We can never win the degree of goodwill in France that could compensate us for the (inevitably resulting) resentment in England." He also hovered between Russia and England: "We could very easily transform our contact with England into an intimate one if we were to sacrifice our Russian friendship to the English one, which is not our intention. England always has more to fear than to hope from Russia, but in conjunction with Austria and Italy, we could offer her strong cover if Russia were to withdraw its friendship." He saw through the repeated English attempts (e.g., during the visit of the future King Edward VII in May 1884) to tear Germany away from Russia. Just as he himself avoided everything to create a situation in which Germany would become England's battering ram against Russia, he also repeatedly warned Austria against allowing England to push her forward against Russia in the Orient. He flatly rejected the English offer (1885) to act as arbitrator when Anglo-Russian tensions over Afghanistan threatened to escalate into war. Thus, he maneuvered back and forth, sometimes making himself useful to England, sometimes dangerous. We have seen above how, by stoking the antagonism between Italy and France, he drove the former into the Triple Alliance, and by the antagonism between England and France and England and Russia, he drove the latter to the side of the Triple Alliance. It was, in a certain sense, the height of his political achievement, a masterpiece of free, realistic mastery of the living forces that fill state and history." 99 The German-Russian tension at the end of the 1880s brought England and Germany closer together once again. But the last years of Bismarck's chancellorship show the beginnings of a German-Anglo tension that was difficult to resolve with the means of the previous alliance system, for the global political development of the Reich, which led to that tension,

simultaneously undermined the reinsurance system that had previously been a firm pillar of German policy. German colonial policy had outgrown its purely commercial and mercantile beginnings. In German East Africa, the first real state colony, at the end of the 1880s, young German imperialism wrestled with English imperialism for the first time over Zanzibar, Uganda, Witu, and the Somali coast. The end of this struggle came through a treaty that Bismarck himself never signed. But at the same time, German policy had already begun to feel in a different direction and spun threads that were still inconspicuously thin and loose at the time, but in later developments of the utmost global political importance. After a German military mission had already been sent to Turkey, on October 4, 1888, the Deutsche Bank received the concession to build a railway from Constantinople (Haidar Pasha) to Angora. Thus, young German imperialism penetrated a territory sacred to every Pan-Slavist. France saw its ancient supremacy in Asia Minor threatened. And far-sighted England, which had just believed its Egyptian bridge from India to South West Africa was complete, could not fail to notice the consequences for its own global political position that a vigorously pursued German Oriental policy would have. It is pointless to ask whether, under Bismarck's leadership, German Oriental policy would later pursued the paths it had taken—and how it would have overcome the actual difficulties with England and the impending difficulties with Russia, whether the rapprochement between France and Russia that automatically followed the termination of the Reinsurance Treaty could have been avoided or paralyzed by a fundamental understanding with England. The fact is only that at the end of Bismarck's political career, German foreign policy suddenly faced difficult global political questions, but no less so that Bismarck managed to masterfully thwart the increasingly strong English opposition until the very end. This is demonstrated not least by the role that English influences at the court of the young German Emperor played in his downfall. The relationship between Bismarck's policy towards England, in addition to the factual, also exhibits a personal element, without which the Bismarckian period cannot be properly assessed. What characterized the leader of Germany's foreign policy towards Russia The force of the monarchical-conservative tradition made him brittle towards England. Although personally an admirer of England's nationally united popular will, he never shed his mistrust and a certain aversion to England's parliamentarism. (Alliances with a state whose government depended on shifting majorities seemed inappropriate to him.) This personal sentiment was not without influence on his foreign policy, even if he himself gave it less space than Wilhelm I. With a certain bitterness, he recalled various occasions on which England had once placed obstacles in

the way of the great power politics of his Prussian state. In addition, from the beginning to the end of his political career, what he called the "English disease" made his life miserable. In the form of that Gotha liberalism that believed that Prussia only needed to turn away from Russia to be elevated by England to a great European power. Or in the form of those Anglo-European influences that sought to prevent the bombardment of Paris in 1870 on humanitarian grounds. Or finally (most seriously) through the persons of the old Empress and the young English princess, both of whom were Bismarck's most ardent opponents in both major and minor political issues. All of this resulted in the leader of Germany's foreign policy developing an increasingly antipathetic relationship with England and English culture. This antipathy, through him, had a long-lasting effect on broad sections of the German people. p. 937 (#957) When does the Chancellor intend...? 937 Dr. WILLY ALTSCHUL: When does the Chancellor intend...? Some time ago, we read a ruling by the Reich Court in one of the most respected legal journals, the "Juristische Wochenschrift" published by the German Bar Association, which the author captioned: "It is inadmissible to deny a certain segment of the population a normal sense of morality." For sociological reasons, we were extremely curious about the content of this ruling, and the following emerged: A woman had filed for divorce. Her husband had been sentenced by a jury on October 8, 1910, for a highway robbery, taking into account several previous convictions, to a total prison term of six years and to the loss of his civil rights for a period of eight years. The regional court had divorced the plaintiff due to her husband's fault. The higher regional court—the Colmar Higher Regional Court—then overturned the ruling. Only the following reasons are of interest here: The Higher Regional Court recognized that the crime of highway robbery committed by the man constituted dishonorable and immoral behavior; however, it assumed, contrary to the Regional Court, that this had not destroyed the plaintiff's marital spirit. This assumption was based on the fact that the parties belonged to a social class whose education, sense of honor, and morality were so profound that even serious offenses, especially property offenses, were not considered particularly dishonorable and immoral. The defendant, as an ordinary farmhand and shepherd, belonged to this social class. The Reich Court disapproved of this reasoning succinctly: "Such a general judgment, that in a socially lower class the sense of honor and morality is so poorly developed that even the serious crime of highway robbery is not perceived as a dishonorable or immoral act that could disrupt a marriage, does not correspond to experience and not to the law. The sense of morality is not dependent on property or education. . . . .' 66 The horrific judgment of the

Colmar Higher Regional Court was handed down in the first months of 1916; that is, in the middle of the war, but apparently the gentlemen in Colmar had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. This, despite the fact that, in the heart of Alsace, they are, or should be, particularly directly and deeply shaken by the great experience of the war; this despite the fact that they work in a country already so fissured and shaken by national antagonisms that the feelings of the broad masses of the population should be spared, not deeply hurt and provoked by the authorities. It will, of course, be objected that in a country of 70 million, many things can happen, and that even strange judgments can be pronounced by the highest courts. Surely there are unworldly judges who truly believe that proletarian ethics approves of or encourages the crime of highway robbery, that the modern proletariat is filled with the moral views that the ancient Roman jurists attributed to fugitive slaves. ww One cannot be satisfied with such consolations, because the fault lies not, or at least not solely, in people's minds, but rather in the system, which seems to have survived the war with a rare freshness and untouchedness. In all German states, from the Obotrite state to the model state of Baden, socialists are excluded from the office of judge, not because of a draconian law, but because of constant violations of the constitution and administrative abuses. In addition to the tests required by law, life demands another, unknown to the law: non-membership in the socialist movement. Anyone who belongs to the socialist party, or who otherwise publicly acts as a socialist, is not admitted to the office of judge. This is by law. It may seem strange that in Posemuckel or Katzenellenbogen the sacred dignity of district judge may not be held by a socialist judge, at a time when the principle of socialist purity has been violated in the highest offices of the Reich. It may even seem provocative that the socialists, who shed their blood in streams for the independence of their homeland, are considered incapable and unworthy of holding the office of judge on the grounds of a blatant abuse of the law, which even age and tradition can barely conceal. Some may find this grotesque, others tragic; we must not content ourselves with mockery and sighs; we must overthrow the old, change the face of the state. The admission of socialists to the judiciary would not only mean a restoration of the long- and persistently violated law, it would also bring about a rejuvenation and renewal of the law and jurisprudence in general. A Colmar ruling is unthinkable as soon as socialists are also allowed to become judges, and the jurisprudence is no longer forcibly purified by the idea of socialism. Admittedly, a single German federal state will not soon decide on this reform and defend it against powerful opposition. "With that sudden force that abuse has, Should I enter into wrestling for life and death?" the ministers of

the individual federal states will despondently ask themselves, like Lassalle's Emperor Charles V. They will fear their own courage and change nothing. It would be the task of the Chancellor, who is, or at least should be, more than the Prussian Prime Minister , to break the ban and appoint some outstanding socialist lawyers as judges at the Imperial Court. Once the socialists are admitted to the Imperial Court, their fundamental distancing from the lower and intermediate courts would no longer be maintainable and enforceable. The struggle for justice in the individual federal states would be considerably facilitated and promoted by the Chancellor's courageous act. There has been so much talk of reorientation, of there being no more parties, and of the path being clear to all capable people; now the moment has finally arrived to turn words into action. When does the Mr. Reich Chancellor . . . . . ? 5.5 p. 940 (#960) 940 Justice of Opportunity. GUSTAV STENGELE: In the Prussian House of Representatives, our party comrade Haenisch spoke on the justice budget on February 26. He recommended that, in order to relieve the courts, the obligation for public prosecutors to file charges be lifted and that the principle of opportunity be applied.[1] The dispute over whether the so-called principle of legality or the principle of opportunity should be applied is old and has been much discussed. I do not intend to discuss this question here; I leave that to more qualified pens. I would just like to mention that the argument in favor of the principle of legality (and thus against the principle of expediency) is that compulsory prosecution guarantees equality of justice regardless of person, in that it compels the public prosecutor to intervene even when he would otherwise not do so due to the social, societal, or personal status of the person seeking justice. The counterargument is that the principle of legality brings a multitude of petty cases to court, foolish pranks, and the like, in whose punishment the public has not the slightest interest, while a conviction, no matter how lenient, severely damages the person affected for life. But, as I said, I do not wish to address this topic, leave the public prosecutor's office entirely out of consideration, and speak solely of expediency justice, that is, the administration of justice that is determined not only by the letter and spirit of the law, but also by considerations of individuals and circumstances. Yes, does such a thing exist? Our judges are independent and decide solely on the basis of objective considerations, without any considerations that lie outside the law. 1 This is not correct in this general sense. Comrade Haenisch, while recognizing the advantages of the principle of opportunity, has himself emphatically emphasized the serious reservations that, given the current nature of our public prosecutor's office, militate against the introduction of this principle. He has demanded adequate safeguards against any abuse of this principle,

he has urgently requested that the settlement of the entire question be postponed until after the war, when the time for calmer discussions has come, and finally, he has repeatedly declared that he does not wish in any way to anticipate the decisions of the Social Democratic Reichstag faction. Editorial staff of the "Glocke." p. 941 (#961) Opportunity Justice. 941 - sentence stands out for its leniency or its severity, then, apart from isolated errors, this is not because the judge was influenced by the person or class of the defendant, but because outsiders do not see the case correctly: they neither know the details as well as the judge, nor do they understand the "spirit of the law" as distilled in countless commentaries, preliminary decisions, etc., as he does. Above all, we do not have class justice, which would be the worst form of expedient justice. Isn't that true? It has always been said, and anyone who spoke of class justice in an individual case was usually promptly convicted of insulting a judge, which once again proved the incontestability of the German legal system. However, cases are probably extremely rare in which purely personal class hatred or a purely personal interest in "deterring," for example, strikes, has led a judge to deliberately act harshly. If this were the case, the individual's struggle would have to be taken into account. But in general, the situation was such that judges unconsciously practiced class justice; as members of the ruling class, they emotionally took sides, and the impartiality they would undoubtedly have maintained in a murder trial was lost when they had to judge a matter related to social struggles. Sometimes the influence of one's own class affiliation became so strong that it led to pure expediency, with sentences deliberately handed down that were too harsh, sometimes with the openly stated intention of preventing social struggles through deterrence. Such jurisprudence, its practitioners probably believed, was indeed a higher form of justice. Human, all too human! But the victims of such expediency and their class comrades were filled with bitterness. - So there has been expedient justice, and indeed on a considerable scale. This can be said without offending the personal honor of those involved, who, with isolated exceptions, have always believed they were serving justice, and without insulting the entire judiciary. We are simply searching for the deeper reason for expedient justice. - This is all the more appropriate because the complaint is now being raised that the administration of justice is failing in the fight against an evil that seriously threatens and harms the entire people, in the fight against war usury in its various forms. In his speech mentioned at the beginning, Comrade Haenisch also pointed out the extraordinary leniency of some courts towards usurers and speculators. Here we have the opposite of expedient justice! Superficially, the very criticism leveled at the leniency of

the judiciary seems to imply a desire for expedient justice. Because usury has now become a danger to the public, because it has provoked intense bitterness and resentment, it should be treated exceptionally, and sentences should be made deterrent and thus preventative. But that would no longer be objective administration of justice, but rather expedient justice. This is claimed not only by the usurers and their followers, but also by lawyers proud of their objectivity; the judiciary must not allow itself to be influenced by currents, however legitimate, or by momentary needs, but must continue its practice unswervingly. In truth, however, this is not a desire for expedient justice at all, but rather the abandonment of lines of thought that have previously distracted from a truly unbiased perspective. But these lines of thought are not arbitrary; they arise from the very nature of the capitalist class state, from its legal institutions for promoting and securing profit at the expense of others. The entrepreneur derives his profit from the labor of his employees; the merchant derives it as the surplus of the selling price over the purchase price; the moneylender, i.e., the "capitalist" in the limited sense of the word, receives it in the form of dividends and interest. The usury laws, which impose certain restrictions on the interest-taker, are actually a foreign body in our "law," contradicting the entire rest of the system and were vigorously opposed by the Manchester people at the time, and quite logically. Equally logical is that in normal times, convictions are even more rare in the relatively rare usury trials. The boundary between permissible and illicit profit is fluid, difficult to determine, and where does the "exploitation of necessity" begin and end? While a decision is already difficult in the case of usury with money, although some norms have developed quite habitually, there are no characteristics of criminality for usury with goods, and therefore no criminality in the legal sense either. The price fixing customary in the Middle Ages, the drastic measures against usury on bread and meat, contradict the nature of the capitalist state. Let us not forget that the French Revolution not only abolished feudal economic forms, but that at its turning point it led to the storm against the "maximum"—the petty-bourgeois-revolutionary fixing of maximum grain prices—and that with its fall, the capitalist organism was firmly constituted. The war, with its hardships, has now necessitated a restriction of the capitalist profit-making process. Individual items are gradually subjected to communal control, maximum prices are set for others, and general measures have been taken against usury, such as the prohibition of "chain trading." The judiciary is now supposed to enforce compliance with these emergency laws by imposing the threatened penalties, which are set at considerable heights in the paragraphs: fines, imprisonment, loss of civil rights. But the judiciary fails

almost entirely, as the general complaint goes. Acquittals or, in relation to the usurious profits achieved, ridiculously small fines are the rule, it is said; the "penalties" are sometimes even an encouragement to continue usury. We have plenty of such complaints in parliaments and in the press. Those who raise them are probably mostly unaware that they are criticizing the capitalist system and are essentially criticizing the courts for continuing the opportunistic justice system unconsciously practiced in normal times, because they have not "relearned." Let's take chain retailing as an example. Its essence is that, through the insertion of more or less numerous intermediaries, each of which adds its profit to the resale price of the goods, the goods become monstrously expensive on the way from producer to consumer. The judge should try to control the evil, which now appears particularly serious and dangerous to the public, through deterrent sentences. But he has his law studies and perhaps many years of practice as a civil, not a criminal, judge behind him, both of which have taught him that it is a perfectly legitimate business to resell goods at any price markup. Only the economic situation and competition set limits on profits, not the "law." Furthermore, practice has taught him that trade is essentially chain retailing; The manufacturer p. 944 (#964) 944 Opportunity Justice. The manufacturer or importer sells to the wholesaler, who in turn sells to other merchants, from whom the actual retailers receive the goods; in between, there are brokers and similar entities, profit-snatching, fattening themselves up. What is now branded as chain trading is nothing other than legitimate business, carried on somewhat more vigorously than usual. Now the courts are supposed to intervene, whereas in the past they often had to safeguard these transactions, i.e., the profits from intermediate trade, through their judgments. They usually cannot get their bearings, and when they do convict, the punishments are mild, barely noticeable. One must give the judges credit for trying to remain cool and objective; and so they simply cannot make the leap to impose a few months in prison in criminal proceedings today for the same transaction that they recognized as entirely legal and lawful through their decisions in civil proceedings a few years ago. This also explains the otherwise striking phenomenon that in wartime usury trials, the lay judges, where the lay element can make the difference, rendered verdicts that were far more in line with the general mood than the criminal chambers, which, moreover, often overturned the verdicts of the lay judges. The apparent contradictions are easily resolved upon calm reflection: the World War, with its tremendous impact on all areas, has, on the one hand, awakened and strengthened the sense of community among broad sections of the population, while, on the other, offering new opportunities for

selfishness. Collectivism and individualism are emerging more sharply, much more sharply than at other times, and are in opposition. And so, what seemed self-evident and justified in peacetime is being recognized by ever-larger circles as harmful and dangerous to society. The perception of the damage of the capitalist system has sharpened, and even the eyes of those who were previously blind have been opened. The need of the times and also the insight into the injustice of the previous "sacred order" have led to drastic interventions in the previously legally protected capitalist profit system. Now, however, it is becoming apparent that the justice of opportunity, calculated to protect and preserve this system, continues to operate automatically and renders attempts to suppress individualistic selfishness in the public interest futile efforts , p. 945 (#965) Wilson's Failures. 945 This should be a warning not only to intervene legislatively against the so-called "excesses" of the capitalist order, but above all to strive to ensure that those called upon to uphold the law in the future are familiar with and imbued with the spirit of the law, instead of educating them through theory and practice to exercise a justice of opportunity, which has evolved to protect an order that has proven itself rotten under the hammer of world-historical events. But that would also mean depriving capitalism of an important weapon of defense. Thus, every individual question, examined more closely, points again and again to the overcoming of the class state. HG SCHEFFAUER: IN Wilson's Failures. (From a letter from an American.) To the eyes of the American, who observes the war from a truly international perspective and is familiar with both Germany's situation and the web of distortion spun around the world by the Entente, Woodrow Wilson's latest policy appears not only devoid of any logical foundation, but also characterized by an almost incomprehensible lack of sense of responsibility. It contains something so senseless and monstrous that it almost paralyzes the imagination. This feeling is by no means mitigated by the fact that the President's hostile attitude toward Germany was clearly evident from the beginning and that his latest policy is only the long-heralded execution of a threat contained in his last submarine note of early last summer. The realization of this threat is due not only to his personal pride , but also to his moral conviction, and it is characteristic of the man's entire temperament and hopelessly prejudiced standpoint. That Woodrow Wilson is sincere cannot be doubted; he is as sincere as Torquemada or Don Quixote. His assumption that Germany represents a moral danger to the world, and especially to democratic institutions, is not only deeply rooted in his nature, but it also blossomed luxuriantly under the influence of English propaganda. Wilson is p. 946 (#966) 946 Wilson's Failures. Learned, but not intelligent; he has

never shown any signs of bold and independent thought. His principles and his humanitarian pronouncements are familiar platitudes and sentimentalities, such as the shallow-minded American masses love. His political ideals are shadowy utopian projects that have no touch with reality. His explanation of history is purely academic. His conception of English history and politics is false, and his knowledge of modern Germany is not only infinitely small, but is also drawn from inferior English and even more worthless Anglo-American sources. His own historical works, while outwardly correct, are without any trace of originality and even less of genius. They consist of compiled materials and are written in a dull, pompous English, after the manner of other orthodox historians. The poverty of thought, the false logic, and the incorrect premises of his diplomatic notes are obvious to all who have read and analyzed these most strange and disturbing documents. There was a moment when Woodrow Wilson had a glimpse of hope and saw the true role that history and humanity prescribed for the United States in this war. There was a moment when he grasped his real and brilliant opportunity and a glimmer of noble inspiration seemed to come over him. That was when he wrote his Declaration of Neutrality, a document that no American can now read without a blush of shame. Soon, however, America began to be flooded with great waves of darkness and slander, and its constitutional leader, saturated with the Anglo-Saxon conception of history and its admirer by blood, education, and personal taste, saw his idealistic declaration of neutrality melt away like a fantastic mirage. He was one of the first to condemn them to destruction, for from that day onward his prejudices and favoritism became so obvious that even any pretense of concealing them became completely useless. His first great defeat was his failure to stem the ever-widening rift among the people of the United States. His surrender to the pro-Allied element and to the slanderous New York press was complete; indeed, it was carried out by him himself. p. 947 (#967) Wilson's Failures. 947, ever since he sneered and slanderously hurled the phrase "hyphenated Americans" at those of his fellow citizens who thought and felt differently from him. His second great failure was his inability or unwillingness to see that the true essence of neutrality for a country like the United States could only lie in refraining from all active participation in promoting war, especially all unilateral participation. Plutocratic interests and intellectual prejudices, however, have trampled on this beautiful humanitarian ideal with elephantine feet. Although the President's right to prohibit the export of war supplies is undeniable and has been applied by him himself with regard to Mexico, formal legal reasons, to which the American usually resorts when breaking a higher law, have been so

exaggerated that their subtleties seemed almost like truth. It was the true American philosophy of expediency and opportunism when Wilson declared: "It would be unneutral from America, to impose a ban on the export of war supplies." And this was completed by the mocking and cruel declaration that the United States was just as willing to sell to the Central Powers as to the Alliance Powers, provided the Central Powers would provide the transportation. The American conscience was assuaged; morality and self-interest seemed to coincide. The petition of 15 million citizens to stop the bloody trade was simply ignored by the President. The country was transformed into a monstrous munitions factory, and a stream of gold flowed through the rugged stone canyons of Wall Street. The ambition of every American President is to ensure "prosperity" (business prosperity) during his term in office. After the initial period of business decline that had set in at the outbreak of war, the new opportunities could not be resisted. The government and politicians of England immediately recognized with whom they were dealing, and with their well-known shrewdness, they seized the opportunity offered them by Woodrow Wilson. His third great failure lay in his sacrifice of indisputable American and neutral rights, and in his unwillingness to defend these rights against the Union Powers, using the same harsh methods, the same authoritative language, and the open threats that he used against Germany. Is it possible that, while speaking in his last message of legitimate trade and the right of American citizens, he forgot how quickly he had sacrificed the chartered rights not only of the United States, but also of all neutrals, to conduct legitimate trade with the Central Powers, even though he himself had declared the British blockade to be illegal? His indulgence in England's brazen interference in our shipping; his calm tolerance of England's starvation tactics against Germany; his hopeless inability to protect America's supposedly sacred mail; his tacit approval of England's recruitment drives in the United States; his neglect of taking effective reprisals against England's criminal blacklists, as well as a number of other circumstances, mark the complete collapse of American principles. The man of rigid and narrow principles sacrificed them all in practice, although he clung to them in a doctrinal and feeble manner. However pacifist Woodrow Wilson may be at heart, there can be no doubt that, in his unshakable personal opinion, it is in America's interest that England not suffer defeat. He fears a German victory. The superiority of German culture over Anglo-Saxon civilization has become apparent to the whole world in this war; its significance for the future prosperity and reorganization of the world should be clear to all who know how to correctly interpret such phenomena. Nevertheless, the rigid doctrinalism of the present occupant of the White

House has neither softened nor purified, despite the two and a half years in which he has had ample time to acquire a clearer understanding of the German character, or at least of European conditions. His appalling inability to comprehend the situation, the motives, the needs, and the nature of the European states was once again clearly revealed when he naively believed that his appeal alone would induce the neutrals to join him in morally condemning German fighting methods. Neither the honor, security, nor interests of the United States are affected by the European struggle. A truly gifted American statesman would have understood this and also seen that it is not Germany from which a truly neutral America would have anything to fear. If he knows his people, he must have known that his measure harbors a serious danger, inflaming the passions of the simple, sentimental, and easily excitable masses; equally, he could not fail to notice the unspeakable injustice and mental anguish it must cause among the millions of his fellow citizens of German origin who, although always loyal to their new homeland, would be less than human if they had not raised an objection to the shameless partisanship of official circles. The danger of shaking the Republic to its very foundations may perhaps be the price that will have to be paid for his personal stubbornness and partisan attitude. A deplorable ignorance, coupled with immense sources of power and wealth, and a boundless national conceit, deliberately cultivated by people like Woodrow Wilson, have become the causes of fateful errors and injustices. Wilson knew how easily the naive masses of the United States could be swept into the most unreasonable war—and yet he did not shy away from this terrible danger. The cry of "Remember the Maine!" and the hysterical outbursts of the yellow press made the Spanish-American War. The cry, echoing from England: "Remember the Lusitania!" whipped up American passions in 1915. The loss of a few American lives in the restricted area, suffered in the struggle for life by a people always friendly to the Americans, would easily constitute a casus belli under present conditions. The sophistry of the phrase "My country, right or wrong" is so deeply ingrained in the mind of the average American, and the lack of moral courage or intellectual independence in the face of the masses is so unfortunate, that they cause him to remain silent, even when his conscience or reason is unsatisfied. An example of this intellectual inconsistency is the apostle of peace, Henry Ford, who, it is reported, was the first to throw his principles entirely to the wind and to demonstrate his patriotism by offering to place his factories at the government's disposal for war purposes. The lack of strong characters, clear thinkers, and an honest press is one of the tragedies of the great republic. The inability, the blind unwillingness, to even consider Germany's situation or motives, or the great

problems of this war, is one of the saddest symptoms of war fever. This fever develops in a political organ- p. 950 (#970) 950 Heretical. ganism that has been contaminated for years by the lies and hypocrisies of the Entente. It is fostered by a childish fear of Germany. Every Anglo-American feels humiliated by Germany's superiority over England. He is incapable of understanding the servile nature of her attitude toward England, or the secret contempt she thereby engenders in the Englishman's heart. Added to this are the peculiarly invigorating effects of the idea of war, the adventurous lust for laurels, the incitements of the sensationalist and profit-hungry press, and the belief that America has nothing to lose. The United States currently appears to be a clumsy giant with the mind of a child. At its head stands an imperious schoolmaster who, relying on his renewed power and immunity, feels called upon to assist threatened civilization by placing the sympathy and armed force of the great mixed republic, the child of Europe, on the side of England. If reason prevails, his rash action will meet with resistance as soon as the surprise at Wilson's arbitrary action has passed; the people will express their desire for peace. The war fever will cool even further by the unhesitating rejection of Wilson's policy by the truly neutral nations. Wilson's fourth great failure has already been recorded in the history of recent weeks. Nevertheless, he has succeeded in opening a gaping chasm into which the American nation can be abruptly plunged by his hand or by those of his backers. GEORG BEYER: Heretical. MAY FEAST 1909 in Marten, a large mining village near Dortmund. Dark processes moved through soggy streets around which young greenery sprouted timidly. Gendarmes on horseback escorted the men to the festival site, where they disarmed in the face of a fairly peaceful commotion. In three large assemblies, the living idea of the May Day spirit was celebrated, and in one of them, the then editor of the Dortmund "Arbeiterzeitung" and current editor of the "Glocken" spoke. In the gloomy hall, the miners listened closely; " p. 951 (#971) Heretical. 951 But it seemed as if the speaker's political-economic flights of thought, his references to the blatant injustice of the Prussian electoral law, to internationalism, to the eight-hour day, to the entire economic burden of everyday working life, which socialism was supposed to flatter, hadn't quite caught on. Then the speaker turned to a topic that lay outside the political and economic spheres: He spoke of the love of homeland, which glows as an unfulfilled longing in the soul of the worker. With rhetorical flourish, he recalled the mountains and valleys of magnificent German realms, the splendor with which nature bestows them; he spoke of Thuringia, the Rhineland, and the Alps, which, for most workers on their narrowly confined land, must forever remain a distant, never-seen world. The enjoyment of

nature, the freedom in the joy of one's homeland—the speaker portrayed this with ever-new turns of phrase that inspired his own experience. In the weary faces of his listeners, a glow appeared that seemed to flow from their hearts. A colorful butterfly fluttered in the dim hall, burning eyes following its curling and fluttering. I had long forgotten this modest experience, which made a strong impression on me at the time, until it resurfaced during this war. The declaration of patriotism, which had swept me so powerfully for a few minutes, had become the consciousness of the working people. Karl Bröger wrote his song: "We have always known a love for you . . . " Konrad Haenisch, the speaker at that May meeting of 1909, wrote his book of declarations, in which the individual's sense of patriotism stood before us as political insight. Millions crossed the border shuddering and gazed in amazement out the windows of the trains that brought them home for vacation: this is the homeland, the German homeland, from which we come! It may be that after two and a half years of war, after disappointments and deprivations, this flame no longer burns with the same vigor. But all this taught us one thing: how enormously we had underestimated the emotionality of the working-class soul in all our previous educational work; how highly we had always placed the dry understanding of economic interrelationships, the purely political penetration of the masses, above the bubbling springs of universal human emotional life; how rarely had we understood how to make the worker's soul resonate! While taking inventory of all sorts of papers from peacetime, I recently found a number of lecture notes. One read: "Historical Materialism," and a quote caught my eye: "All cultural forces, all ideal phenomena can only be understood as the result of a specific social economy." Good heavens, we have indeed attempted to explain the ideal phenomena, yet we have carelessly passed them by, and we were still surprised that our own enlightenment so rarely spread to our listeners who were by no means economically or historically oriented from the outset! Our professional politics with its insights had the tendency to transfer our ideas with its thinking machinery seamlessly to the emotional life of the workers and to see in them essentially also political beings who had to feel the pressure of their class position and nothing but this pressure at every moment, and so we often, all too often, talked past them; We viewed, partly with incomprehension, partly with sadness, the joy in the "frills," despairing over alienation from pure doctrine, over the blurring of strict class insights in singing and sports clubs. Everyone knows the many who always gave us their vote in elections, but were inactive in the organizations; they saw themselves oppressed by the sobriety of the nothing-but-political-organizational requirements, their minds were directed

toward a glimmer of personal happiness, toward the satisfaction of the emotional, which they did not find with us. It should be a good war lesson for us not to overestimate the political in the breast of the worker. I do not believe in the so generally hoped-for politicization through the trenches. When those from outside return, great hopes cling to it, yes, then... then the long period of suffering will quickly be transformed into political energy: whoever has endured outside in hardship and death will no longer want to be a political helot. He will, like He had given his best to the protection of his homeland, and now he would gladly give it to its domestic political liberation, to the achievement of the right to vote, and much more; for an infinite wealth of new political insights had been planted in their hearts. But p. 953 (#973) Heretical. 954 Human souls do not always follow logical laws, and I fear that the fulfillment of this hope will by no means beckon us so quickly. One could also say: precisely because they deprived and suffered so long outside, because they were so deeply shaken and torn apart, that is why, in later times of peace, they will no longer want to give their utmost for the sake of a domestic political goal. May I mention a few symptoms? Many of the comrades who have been outside for a long time wrote us enthusiastic letters in the early days, which resonated with great hope for the future and a vow to actively participate in the future, new German development. Such letters have become rarer and rarer. Not because those Comrades were gripped by the conflict over direction and had joined the other, "more decisive" side: they seemed to have become alienated from our world of thought over many months. Our previous work and the future work suddenly seemed so weak and insignificant to them in the face of the personal influences the war had brought them. Friends who had previously devoted themselves to detailed work lost all interest in them; their small family circle had them again. And instead of an ironclad commitment to working in the service of socialism, which was supposed to bring world peace to the world, many found an escape from the cruel reality into a world of quieter emotional satisfaction. I know of quite a number of capable comrades who returned from the field wounded by war and are working again as before. I believed they would come back to us with a burning desire for action and, as former field-grey soldiers whose word is obeyed, take over leadership in the organizations. Instead, they retreat into confines and escape politics and organization; the love of modest solitude and quiet security gave rise to a longing for the possession of some small piece of land where they could enjoy personal seclusion. Undoubtedly, this longing also contains a touch of patriotism. On a snow excursion with a prehistoric society visiting a prehistoric cave in the Eifel, I recently met, to my great surprise, a comrade

returning from the field among predominantly middle-class people. He had formerly been diligently active in the organization but was now considered almost lost. He told me about scientific lectures he had attended, and his deep interest in the subject matter that had previously been completely foreign to him shone through every word; a new world seemed to have opened up to him. I know of another who formerly held a responsible position of trust, but who, after being quite seriously wounded, is now going to his wife's remote home village to cultivate a new island of happiness. I believe that we can expect such feelings to be very strong after the end of the war. It will take some time before the forces of political energy will unfold again in those who have returned home. Only among those who have returned home? It is not only those who are repelled by party strife who stand aside; the singing club, the "Naturfreunde," enjoys greater love than ever before, despite all the hardships of war. Of course, the idyllic inclinations in the working-class soul also have their petty and depressing side. Anyone who has ever overestimated the political nature of man could be converted by two and a half years of editorial experience in wartime. Certainly, editorials with carefully inserted statistics were not read before. But it was precisely through the enormity of the war that one could increasingly appreciate how little the human inner life is, in the long run, grasped at its core by any kind of general consciousness, by solidarity-based interests. The surge of the first war experiences is a strange, almost unreal memory for us today, revealing the human race not in its reality, but in its ecstasy. What does the editorial mail bring us today: women's complaints about the smallest and most pressing everyday issues, field post complaints about food, inquiries about leave. Not only has worry killed the momentum, but human nature has rather found itself again, for among broad sections of the population it is bound to the narrowest personal interests. And as the war progressed, one encountered ever less the elements of active power that could later gather and form a whole. I don't want to preach resignation; The biblical verse, "Vanity of all vanities, all is vanity," would be a poor guide to socialist insight and political activity. But in our future work, we should pay much more attention to the vibrations of the soul, which we have so neglected in favor of purely intellectual matters. The longing for the bright joy of nature's gifts and for the small idyll of happiness amidst all the social hustle and bustle is stronger than we would like to admit; emotion dominates all intellectual insight more than we realize. And I would like these aspects of human nature to be transformed for us one day into powerful energies of socialism. In devotion to the homeland, this seems possible; under its roof, both can flourish: the will of the community and the emotional world of the individual.

When we ask how these spiritual forces, which so willingly remain silent and hide, could be harnessed into political power, we encounter the term that has always seemed to our most persistent minds the epitome of anti-economic-historical vagueness: socialism, social democracy as a cultural movement, a cultural party! We were often proud of having overcome sectarianism, and we were right to do so; but what characterizes the sect, the complete grasp of the entire inner world of the individual, we lost by weaving only the economic and political content of the class struggle into organizational life, without providing a full substitute in our parallel educational work. A mere reform of assembly life would not have been enough either; We need more of the "Holy Spirit," which embraces humanity in love and, alongside the iron severity of the objective, sharpens our vision for all the luminous phenomena of nature, the special nature of the homeland, which we can only approach if we devote our energies to the work of solidarity and liberation. Whoever recognizes those spiritual forces and never ceases to say that they will only become active when socialism redeems the capitalist homelessness of the worker, perhaps serves our struggle better than the vulgar Marxist church light, which ignites no souls; better than the political sober-minded person, from whom human hearts slip away. A distrustful person is not always a bad fellow; if good nature is exploited and betrayed too much, distrust matures and matures into a permanent character trait. H. Sonntag. 51/3 p. 956 (#976) 956 Worker as Narrator. LUDWIG LESSEN: Worker as Narrator. Germany's industrial development in the last quarter of 2000 has brought about tremendous upheavals, which were also evident in purely intellectual areas. Entire provinces were abruptly torn from rural conditions. Land speculation began. Factories sprang up where previously only tiny businesses operating in traditional handicrafts had met the sparse demand. Modern transport routes often crossed lands that had previously been dreamed of in remote isolation. For thousands, their land was fragmented, torn away, and alienated. The elderly, who nevertheless remained at home, gradually died away. The young, however, migrated to the factory towns, where more regular and abundant income could be expected. A new world opened up there for those coming from the countryside. They looked and compared. But what they saw, they saw with different, more untouched eyes than the urban proletarians, who were already in their second or even third generation serving the whirring machines. While these, stimulated by books, newspapers, and lectures, had already absorbed and grasped the massive organization of modern cultural work for decades, recognizing and valuing their own significance within this gigantic creative community, the mostly unskilled

people coming from the countryside had to first find their way. For them, this meant first feeling their way into the new surroundings that were storming towards them, adapting their feelings and needs to the living conditions into which the economic upheavals of the time had planted them. His peasant mistrust was awake and remained awake. Thus, he did not accept what assaulted him suddenly and anew without criticism. His senses were, in a certain sense, sharper and less worn out than those of his newly acquired, older, urban comrades. This was expressed not least in a more sensitive capacity for perception. It is therefore no coincidence that these very people strove to capture and shape what was so extraordinarily new and powerfully forcing itself upon them at every turn. Anyone who has worked editorially on workers' newspapers for decades will have gained many insights into this side of popular life today: Time and again, it was precisely those submissions that came from newly flourishing industrial districts that captivated them. Sometimes it was southern Alsace (or northern Switzerland), whose textile factories continually drew fresh energy from the still industrially underutilized peasant land; sometimes it was the Hamburg metropolitan area that swallowed up the dwarf peasant farms in the immediate vicinity; sometimes it was the smoking giant Chemnitz that lured rural youth from the valleys of the Ore Mountains; sometimes it was the Dresden cigarette industry that became new employment territory for so many. Similar observations apply to other regions, of which Rhineland-Westphalia, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt am Main were particularly notable. The new life soon gripped everyone who ventured into its realm. The descriptions of this new life, which encompassed the narrators, who usually also provided some information about their personalities in the accompanying letters, came in the form of stories, occasionally also as broadly spun novels. The new experience was expressed in every line. It was as if the authors were walking through a world of wonders. They saw with entirely different eyes, described with entirely new, albeit mostly clumsy, words. They drew attention to countless things that one had to admit had previously received little attention, if not been completely overlooked. Yet not only the relationship of man to things took on an incomparably peculiar, untouched form in these descriptions, but also the relationship of man to man. For perhaps the first time in their lives, political and professional questions entered the lives of these newcomers to the city; old moral prejudices were overturned; religious misgivings caused more or less severe spiritual struggles. The ground on which they had previously stood and worked had begun to falter; innate or acquired egoism had little effect in the new circumstances, where the primary concern was to fit in and fit into the framework of a great community. All of this lived and trembled in

the writings of those who felt called to such recordings. Those who missed these submissions and read them with the interest of an expert in contemporary cultural documents could learn a great deal from them, and ultimately, here and there, correct preconceived judgments. Of course, one had to read with love and a constant striving for understanding. For, apart from poetic talent, form, and structure of the written text, only a few of the contributors managed to avoid making mistakes in their expression and actually say what they wanted to say. The same picture emerged that one frequently observes at small gatherings and working-class pay evenings: the less trained speakers frequently make mistakes in their expression, unable to find the right words in the moment, unable to make what they intend to say clearly understood. Lack of practice, inadequate schooling, and the occasional oratorical shyness of the novice are the reasons for these sad phenomena. The same applies, of course, to the novice writer. However, one must apologetically overlook all this if one does not want to deprive oneself of a great and pure joy. For all these tentative attempts by an aspiring section of the population are part of the picture of our contemporary culture. They reflect a good deal of the development of our time. What these working-class narrators have to say, one senses as one reads, must be spoken from the heart; they are, in a sense, under a compulsion. Their literary gifts are in no way stereotyped, tailored to any effect, or preconceived according to any intended viewpoint (utopian tendencies only arise in people who are already intellectually trained). The conscious, sharply defined working-class standpoint only becomes apparent in those writings that originate from proletarians who have been organized for years. It is a peculiar pleasure to follow the career and development of these people, who are intellectually wrestling with themselves and their past, and who offer you their shy and naive trust. Only gradually does a personal sense of value break through. And where at first only love of humanity and compassion are the sole driving forces behind the respective descriptions, there finally, absorbing all ideals, the socialist idea flares up, encouraging unity in all areas of life. The stories and novels of this kind are distinguished, provided, of course, that they satisfy the external, printable form, above all by their strong agitational value. Often they are merely memoirs, more or less poetically embellished, which, through the interlaced facts, provide everything a narrative effective for working-class circles should offer. What we already have printed in this style is virtually free of all the defects mentioned above: the form is smooth, the structure exciting, the description captivating. Not only our press has endeavored to publish such stories and novels by workers, but also our party publishing houses and, here and there,

bourgeois publishers, who want to offer more than just literature, have already produced a considerable number of such popular entertainment books that characterize the era and are readily available. At the same time, these books, as agitational publications, have done effective advertising for the spread of our ideas, especially in circles to whom our political writings are difficult to access. Unfortunately, the war has also brought about a noticeable standstill in this area; the time of peace, which is hopefully not too far off, will demand even greater work from us in this regard. Glosses. Another prophet. "The claim that England is also planning to send an expeditionary force to the Continent to support France against Germany has almost died down. The suspicion that some secret agreement with such an obligation exists has been destroyed by Sir Grey and Asquith through certain statements before Parliament. The Russian rulers do not want war, as the Chancellor declared. If it is true that Russia is not actually participating in any such aggressive combination, then one cannot make us believe that we are in danger of attack from Russia. Now, should the Russian government dare to provoke a war, we can be sure that internal revolution will be the result of such a war." Hugo Haase in the Reichstag session of April 7, 1913. Belgium's neutrality. "Two events have characterized the politics of our country recently. First, the elections, and second, the takeover of the Congo. Belgium annexed the Congo, not because Belgium wanted it, but because the great powers, namely England and the United States, wanted it. Belgium, therefore, did not annex the Congo. It is the Congo that is annexing Belgium. Thus, Belgium has been driven into the Anglo-German conflict, and our very fortunate neutrality has been severely damaged as a result." Huysmans, the Belgian socialist leader and secretary of the International Bureau, at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1908. A vulgar Marxist's record book. (From Faust, Part I, Walpurgis Night.) Proctophantasmist: Cursed people! What do you dare do? Has it been a long time since anyone has shown you that a spirit never stands on proper feet? Now you dance like the rest of us! The Beautiful One (dancing): What does he want at our ball? Faust (dancing): Ah! He's just everywhere. What others dance, he has to appreciate. If he can't talk his way through every step, then the step is as good as never taken. What annoys him most is when we move forward. If you wanted to spin around in circles like he does in his old mill, he would at best approve; especially if you were to greet him for it. Proctophantasmist: You're still here! No, that's outrageous. Get lost! We've enlightened you! That pack of devils doesn't care about any rules. We're so clever, and yet Tegel is haunted. How long have I not swept out the madness, And it will never be clean; that is unheard of! The Beautiful One: Then stop boring us here! p. 961 (#981) DIE

GLOCKE 52nd issue March 24, 1917 2nd year Reprint of all articles permitted with detailed source references PARVUS: The Victory of the Russian Revolution. THE political victory of the Russian Revolution was decided the moment the military victory of the Russian army was thwarted. Recognizing this fact, I wrote here on October 1, 1915: "The blows of the German army have shaken the Tsar's throne. Soon it will be reduced to rubble. The defeats of the Russian armies have robbed the Tsarist government of its authority and power. Russia's ruling classes, from the staunchly reactionary Junkers and priests to the liberalizing industrialists and the democratically flamboyant intellectuals who unscrupulously fomented nationalism and Pan-Slavism before the war and thus caused this war, saw themselves compelled to take a stand against the government, frightened by the prospects of the empire's destruction that they had conjured up and to divert the people's hatred from themselves. The Russian workers, who, despite the flight of some of the socialist leaders, with Plekhanov at their head, to the nationalist camp and the cowardly indecision of many others, had maintained their revolutionary, proletarian class standpoint from the beginning, are pressing forward again despite the terrible sacrifices that revolutionary action demands. Today or tomorrow, after new defeats or with the demobilization of the army and the return of the prisoners, the days of Russian Tsarism are numbered. The regime will fall, the 52/1 p. 962 (#982) 962 The victory of the Russian Revolution. The entire Romanov clan will be driven from the country, if not eradicated root and branch, and the dynasty, whose power outshone the entire world, will remain in memory only as the greatest stain on human history." The tsarist regime would have been overthrown long ago if the bourgeois parties of Russia had joined the revolutionary storms of the Russian workers. But they did not want that and instead sought to hold the workers back. They did not want a revolution during the war. Because they wanted war. After the first major shock caused by the retreat of the Russian army, the Russian bourgeoisie believed it could still save the military situation with a new offensive. Therefore, it opposed the revolution and tried to paralyze the actions of the working class. The Russian bourgeoisie did much to make the army ready for action. It created an armaments industry that was very important by Russian standards. It used all its forces and organizations, including the mobilized the entire intelligentsia for military service and whipped up patriotic sentiments. It weakened or thwarted the revolutionary actions of the proletariat by isolating the working class. Even if the new Russian offensive failed, it would be wrong to simply blame Russian corruption and court cliques. Rather, corruption and court cliques spread with renewed and increased force because the efforts of the bourgeoisie, along

with the patriotism of society, could not lead to the desired military success. The deeper reasons for the failure lie in the two major miscalculations made in Russia and elsewhere since the beginning of the war. The first miscalculation was the overestimation of Russia. Russia was not yet sufficiently industrially developed to be able to wage the world war victoriously. After all, one could not have built even this gigantic empire with its railways during the war. p. 963 (#983) The Victory of the Russian Revolution. 963 which it still largely lacked. And with that, the barriers to industry and agriculture were also in place. The second mistake was the underestimation of Germany and the Central Powers. They imagined a fight against the Spiked Helmet and the Junkers, but ran into German industry and German Social Democracy. The unsatisfactory outcome of the new Russian offensive, for which the leaders of the Russian bourgeoisie bear full responsibility, shook confidence in their leaders in bourgeois circles. The bourgeoisie appeared dissatisfied, war-weary, sullen, and despairing. Daredevils like Miliukoff and Guchkoff no longer resonated as they had before. To understand what follows, we must briefly review the development of bourgeois politics in Russia. The propertied classes in Russia supported the counterrevolution in 1905. The bourgeoisie in the broader sense sought to join the government. They did not believe in a decisive victory of the revolution and did not want it. They did not believe in it primarily because they did not want it. The bourgeoisie, through its leaders, proposed an alliance with the monarchical power. They wanted to cede their most important prerogatives to the monarchical power. They wanted to protect it and only demanded that purely business matters be left to them. They recognized the Tsar as master, but imposed themselves on him as administrator and demanded extensive powers. The Tsardom was initially suspicious, but then the pact with bourgeois parliamentarism seemed to them to be of little use. First, it was a misalliance: the Romanovs could not bring themselves to consider the masters of the stock and the pen as equals. Second, the protection that bourgeois parliamentarism could provide them did not seem secure enough; they preferred to rely on the army and therefore retain absolute control of government. 52/1* p. 964 (#984) 964 The Victory of the Russian Revolution. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie itself had to confront the revolutionary working masses and sought to discourage them by arguing, with quasi-scientific arguments, the impossibility of a victorious revolution in present-day Russia. This evidently could only strengthen the tsarist regime in its determination to assert its position by force. The bourgeoisie was more or less aware of this contradiction and strove to assert itself not merely as a defense against the proletarian revolution, but as a

general support of the state, as the true foundation of state power. However, the revolution of 1905, although it formally ended in defeat, steered the entire political life of the empire in new directions. Only from then on did the Russian bourgeoisie appear on the political arena and unite in political parties. It also immediately mingled, quite unlike the Social Democracy, in all state affairs. Economically, not in the least stimulated by the political rise of the bourgeoisie, initiated a vigorous industrial activity which, supported by agrarian legislation, decomposed the country capitalistically, allowed the bourgeoisie to grow rapidly, enormously increased and concentrated its financial power, and widely spread its intellectual influence. At the same time, the leaders of the Duma sought ties with the parliaments in France and England. Germany was overlooked, partly because it was under the sign of Prussianism, and partly because it was the land of Social Democracy. Moreover, the existing alliance drew attention to France. The strong financial ties that already existed were interwoven into the new political connections, and an intimate connection of banks, political groups, and press cliques was formed between Paris, Petrograd, and London—an international conspiracy that worked to place Russia in to be dragged into the maelstrom of Western European imperialism. Only now did the Russian bourgeoisie gain common ground with the monarchical power. On the question of the expansion of the empire, they were of one heart and one soul. The bourgeoisie discovered its nationalism, its Slavism, and only too gladly allowed itself to be carried away by its leaders into a policy of adventure. It flaunted its patriotism like an upstart with his top hat and white gloves. It blustered all the more as the maturing European crisis gave it wind in its sails. France and England, with all means of secret politics and publicity, supported and encouraged the murderously patriotic behavior of Miliukoff and his gang of scribblers. But strong revolutionary stirrings again appeared among the masses. This may have tipped the scales for the tsarist government to risk war. Not, therefore, to to unleash, or rather to escape it, they went to war. Nationalism was to be used to overcome revolutionism, imperialism to overcome socialism. The Russian bourgeoisie wanted to test its power to preserve the state. It wanted to unite government and people, increase the power of the state, surround the throne with a new splendor, and consolidate its position of power internally through external victory. The apotheosis was to be that bourgeois constitutionalism in which parliament protects the government against the people and, in turn, relies on government power against the revolutionary masses. This, then, was what the Russian bourgeoisie wanted, and not the victory of the streets, not a violent and sudden cleanup and the overthrow of officials, which would initially destroy the authority of state power throughout

the empire, not the convening of a constituent assembly in the midst of the war, which would bring the entire confusion of internal struggles and the anarchic conditions of 1905 back onto the agenda. This must be held, since the bourgeois politicians now, for understandable reasons, have every interest in lying and turning their position into the opposite. They are supported in this by the combined press power of the Entente, which raises all the greater cries of jubilation the more it has to conceal its inner anxiety. The military defeats have destroyed the political dream of the Russian bourgeoisie. Had things turned out differently, had the Entente triumphed, ha, what glorious prospects would have opened up! Russia in possession of Constantinople, Germany overthrown and its bank coffers emptied, a powerful pump also being pumped into the allies, the rain of billions driving industry, the capital magnates controlling the state, industry controlling minds, Russia controlling Europe, expanding in the Mediterranean, making the Scandinavian states its vassals, and who knows what else! But the retreat of the Russian armies put an end to all these dreams. Now the leaders of the bourgeois parties changed their tactics. They chose the Tsar as a sacrifice, hoping to thereby also clear themselves. It was no longer possible to gain power with the government, so it had to be done against the government. But how could this be accomplished without unleashing a revolution? That was the big problem. Since the beginning of the war, the bourgeois parties had established extensive relationships with the army command. These relationships became even more intimate with the founding and development of the War Industrial Committees. The ferment in the army, caused by the military setbacks, found expression in opposition to the government. The Tsar saw himself beset on all sides and therefore seems not to have been averse to making peace, but feared that the waves of revolution would then crash down upon him. His indecision gave him the greatest perseverance, and his innate stupidity triumphed over all rational considerations. This was a welcome situation for the adventurers, monks, and spiritualists who surrounded him. The Tsar's uncertain attitude, however, had promoted the alliance between the army command and the leading parliamentarians and gave them the powerful support of the Entente. p. 967 (#987) The Victory of the Russian Revolution. 967 Under these circumstances, the bourgeois parties had long since had the power to overthrow the Tsarist government. But it was precisely the certainty of being able to effect a change of government whenever they wanted that made them timid. There was no rush for this; it could happen after the war, too; on the contrary, they feared that overthrowing the government would unleash revolution. But the situation was becoming increasingly critical. The working

masses were in full revolt. The revolutionary organizations spread throughout the country and were ineradicable. The Social Democrats took the lead. And even in bourgeois circles, revolutionary ferment was spreading violently. Added to this was the state of emergency in the big cities. The peasants were also on the move. This is evident from the statement made by Deputy Kerensky (now Minister of Justice) in the Duma: "Look how the red of the fires is spreading in stripes here and there across the sky of the Russian Empire." Now there was danger. The Tsar had to be overthrown to forestall the revolution. But this clever tactic failed. For it was already too late. When the history of the overthrow of the Tsar is written, we will hear of a conspiracy involving the High Command and representatives of foreign powers, of the Tsar's imprisonment at headquarters, etc. This, however, does not change the fact that the revolution had triumphed in Petersburg even before the Tsar abdicated. We will soon be informed of the details of the events. But even now, it can be stated that the representatives of the bourgeois parties did everything they could at the last moment to nip the revolution in the bud. Events were already in full swing when Mr. Miliukoff published a letter urging the revolutionary workers to return to work. Indeed, the bourgeois leaders even succeeded in persuading two tame members of the workers' group of the War Industrial Committee (the others were behind bars) to make a similar appeal. It read: "Comrades! We consider it our duty to appeal to you with the urgent suggestion that you return to work immediately. The working class, aware of the importance of the political moment, must not weaken its strength by prolonging the strike. The interests of the working class call you back to the workshops." Novoye Vremya characterized the position of the State Duma during the revolutionary events as follows (I quote from Rech, which accepts this characterization with satisfaction): "The State Duma plays the role of the center, curbing the Stychian forces on the right and left ; accordingly, it fulfills a high mission that should be appreciated. But the position of the State Duma is very difficult, as it runs the risk of separating itself from the very nervous social circles." The Social Democrat Cheidze exposed the political instability of the bourgeois parties in the last sessions of the State Duma. "The war," he said, "has brought many surprises, and one of these surprises is that, despite the truce, class antagonisms are growing and questions are emerging in Russia, some of which you have already filed away. You would not voluntarily stir up these problems, for who among you would want to solve the agrarian question on the basis of expropriation, or the coalition question, the question of the eight-hour day, etc.? Of course, no one. Just as little would any of you currently take decisive steps towards the realization of political freedoms and the democratization of the country. But a

moment has come when there is almost no free choice of tactics left. This government is not suitable for solving the problems facing Russia. That is one circumstance that limits your choice of tactics. The other is that the government is fatally heading for a fall into the abyss, and it therefore seems advisable to separate from it in time to avoid falling into the p. 969 (#989) The Victory of the Russian Revolution. 969 abyss. Therefore, first answer the question of whether you want to renounce your imperialist hopes or continue on the path you have taken so far! But for our part, we declare that, whatever path you choose, Russia is now pursuing paths that will lead it with honor out of the situation in which we now find ourselves." Although the bourgeois parties were certain of the army command's approval of the change of government, they were by no means clear about the eventual course of revolutionary struggles in the empire. They feared the people's victory in the streets and, in turn, feared that if the people were crushed in the streets, their own action might be thwarted . Hence the warning against strikes and demonstrations. But neither the people nor the government could be held back. The government still hoped to gain control of the situation through a bloodbath. Hence the dissolution of the Duma. That is why they also prohibited the publication of the above-quoted appeal of the workers' delegates. Street fighting broke out, and the Russian Revolution triumphed, like every revolution: through the army's defection to the side of the people. It was necessary to uncover these connections because they determine the character of subsequent developments. This is not a coup, but a mass movement. The revolution came from below. It is the culmination of the great development that began in 1905. It presents itself as such from the outset. Although Guchkoff and Miliukoff received the most important positions in the new ministry, its actions showed that it was under pressure from the masses: the complete political amnesty, the proclaimed freedoms, and above all, the convening of a constituent assembly. These are demands of 1905. The State Duma, as it has been until now, as the representative of the propertied classes, is thereby simply thrown out of existence. The constituent assembly will be composed of peasants and workers. It will concern itself primarily with the internal transformation of the empire. It needs peace and quiet. Tsarist Russia has ceased; Russia is becoming a democratic country. The focus of attention now is the convening of the Constituent Assembly. If this is thwarted, it will mean a setback for reaction and imperialism. Democratic Germany must extend its hand to democratic Russia in the name of peace and harmonious cooperation in the field of social and cultural progress. The press Cossacks and political jugglers, the bandits and informers of the French and English bourgeoisie, are now indulging in exuberant phrases in praise of

the Russian Revolution, which swell to gigantic proportions because they are internally hollow. The German proletariat has the right to say to the Russian proletariat: "Your struggle against tsarism has given us arms to protect our fatherland, and with it all of Europe, including Russia, from tsarism, which, in alliance with capitalism, sought to subjugate the world. The soil on which the freedom you fought for grew is now fertilized with our blood. Your victory is our victory. Let us now unite to secure peace and progress for the world." Dr. PAUL LENSCH, M.d.R.: JE The Ides of March. The longer the war lasts, the more clearly its revolutionary effects become apparent, and gradually even the most arid revolutionary philistine, who is always crying out for revolution behind the stove, understands that for the past two and a half years we have been in the midst of a world-historical upheaval. The third year of the war, however, now seems to be bringing to fruition the effects that had been prepared in the two previous years. Not least because in it, need, the impetuous pressurizer, in all countries, is ever nearer its climax, and the outdated can offer ever less resistance to its terrible pressure. The Ides of March 1917 have bestowed upon us two facts, two facts which, placed nakedly side by side, may perhaps appear strange, yet belong together like two complementary colors. We are referring to the speech of the German Chancellor in the Three-Class House and the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Certainly, in their contrast—here a speech and there a deed—both events could give rise to melancholy reflections, and we have no doubt that the aforementioned revolutionary philistines will not fail to set the Russian deed in melodramatic contrast to the Prussian word and to present the events in Russia as a shining example to the German people. But only philistines, who never leave their grumbling corner and whose eyes for reality have long since died, could act and think like that. For anyone else, the contradiction between the two facts would only make the contradiction of the conditions underlying them all the more clear. Especially in the last few issues of the "Glocke" we have had repeated occasion to express our grave misgivings about the passive behavior of the German Chancellor in questions of reorientation and the increasing impudence of reaction. What Herr von Schorlemer did in the Three-Class House and now Count Yorck von Wartenburg in the House of Lords must have seemed like a deliberate challenge to the German people, who are currently waging the most terrible of all wars with almost superhuman strength and endurance. They are truly not waging it for the sake of those big landowners who see Herr von Schorlemer sees their protector, much less for the sake of that Junker class, whose noble outburst we were allowed to enjoy the pretensions of the Kassubian offspring from the House of Lords. It was not for their sake, but in

spite of them, that the German people in general, and the German working class in particular, went to this war, and the words that Representative Leinert read from a letter of a field-grey soldier in the House of Representatives: "First the English, then the Junkers!" should be thoroughly taken to heart by gentlemen like Yorck. Against these classes, who in fact represent the greatest danger to Germany's future, the Reich Chancellor has so far gone to war with far too little determination. His speech of March 14 has now made up for much in this regard. It represents a powerful commitment to a democratized Germany. The entire people, at all levels, must lend a hand in solving the enormous tasks that lie ahead after the war, the Chancellor declared, adding that this will only be the case if the political rights of the entire people, at all levels, including the broad masses, enable fully justified and joyful participation in the work of the state. Our future demands this, not for the sake of theoretical problems, but so that we can live. The key sentence, however, was this: Before the war, the interests of the working class were often placed in a supposedly irreconcilable conflict with the interests of the state and the employers. I hope this war will finally cure us of this madness. For, if he did not do so, we would not be determined to draw all the conclusions arising from the experience of this war in all questions of political life, in the regulation of workers' rights, in the regulation of Prussian electoral law, in the order of the state parliament as a whole—the gentlemen are speaking of the House of Lords; I do not want to go into details if we are not determined to draw these conclusions without reservation, and I will do so for myself with the trust that has grown in me during this war in all the sons of the people. If we do not do so, then we are heading for inner upheavals whose consequences no one can overlook. I will not burden myself with this guilt. - - - - p. 973 (#993) The Ides of March. 973 Here we have the brief outline of a program of reorientation and the pledge that the German Chancellor will conquer or fall with this program. Here one cannot say: we know the method, we know the text. The tone struck here by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is entirely new in Prussia; it truly emanates the breath of a new era and a new Germany, in which we believe and for which we work, and it makes the fanatical hatred with which men of the style of the great Yorck and Junius von der Alter honor the Chancellor all too understandable. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg wants reforms on a grand scale. Whether they are entirely in line with those the Social Democrats consider necessary, we doubt. But if he wants them, why wait until after the war? He has spoken out on this, too. The Prussian government is convinced that the reforms it plans, especially the reform of the Prussian electoral law, will lead to serious internal struggles, and that we cannot endure internal

struggles at a time when we are still being attacked by the enemy from outside. That certainly sounds plausible, but it is not quite right. We have long seen that internal struggles have not ceased, despite Prussia's failure to present its reform plans. They rage with the utmost fierceness, only they are being conducted secretly, underground, with poisoned weapons, in secret conventions, through anonymous diatribes for which no one wants to take responsibility, yet whose arguments are nevertheless effective. In a short time, we will witness a new edition of Yorck's initiative in the House of Lords during the deliberation of Hoensbroech's interpellation on the submarine war, the justification for which has been entrusted to a fanatical opponent of the Prussian Minister-President. The gentlemen gathered in the House of Lords don't care about the Burgfrieden (Burgfrieden), they don't care that we are being attacked by the enemy from outside." They defend their class and clique interests without the slightest consideration of whether national unity remains unified or not. Thus, in this respect, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg does not evade the internal struggles through the strange tactic of announcing reform plans but postponing their implementation. On the other hand, however, the trust of the masses in the leading statesman diminishes when they only ever hear the bells ringing but can never find out where they actually hang. What a tremendous revival of the national forces it would be if the Prussian Prime Minister could decide, even during the war, to implement the Prussian electoral reform. He has the "right" to do so. As is well known, the three-class system has never existed " legitimately" for a single day; it owes its existence solely to a coup that occurred during the most miserable period of Prussian history and that could not have been carried out without the firm confidence of the Prussian reaction in possible Russian assistance. This three-class system is a true child of Prussian-Tsarist friendship and, for that reason alone, should disappear from the face of the earth as quickly as possible. On the same day that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg warned of the "inner upheavals" we face if Prussia fails to understand the signs of the times, and whose terrible consequences no one can overlook, these inner upheavals actually broke out in the neighboring and once so intimately friendly Tsarist land. Indeed, the Prussian Prime Minister could not have wished for a more vivid commentary on his words than the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Here we have the two methods of revolution before us. The German statesman also wants a revolution, namely a revolution of minds; for he knows that if the revolution of minds fails to materialize, the revolution of fists will take effect. These are the two methods that Lassalle already characterized with immortal words: "The revolution will either begin in full legality and with all the blessings of peace, if one has the wisdom to

decide on its introduction in good time and from above—or it will break out within some period of time among all Convulsions of violence, with wildly flowing curly hair, bronze sandals on their soles. 1 p. 975 (#995) The Ides of March. 975 In one way or another, it will come, in any case, and when I, shutting myself off from the daytime noise, immerse myself in history, I hear its footsteps." Now it is here, in a double form. The German Chancellor wants revolution for his country with all the blessings of domestic peace, having the wisdom to decide on its introduction, in good time and from above. But revolution has now broken out over Russia, amid all the convulsions of violence. The reports available about the events in Russia are still too unclear and contradictory to allow any clear insight. The news almost all goes through England and is accordingly colored in English interests. Only this much seems certain: Tsar Nicholas renounced the crown for himself and his son and transferred it to his younger brother. However, the latter, Michael Alexandrovich, accepted the crown under conditions tantamount to a refusal. He demands a plebiscite, expressed by a constituent assembly, which will convene on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage and determine the form of government and the new constitution of the Russian state. Until this Russian constituent assembly convenes, the Grand Duke enjoins all Russian "fellow citizens" to submit to the Duma government. We can imagine no surer means of allowing the Russian Revolution to degenerate into hopeless chaos than this proclamation by the worthy Michael. For his proposal means nothing less than that, at best, for several months, Holy Russia will no longer be ruled by the Tsar, who unites the highest state and ecclesiastical dignities, but by a few professors and merchants who were previously members of the despised and powerless Duma. And this at a time when Russia's millions of troops are under arms, and when every opportunity therefore beckons a determined and fortunate soldier, but when, at the same time, the population of city and country is collapsing under the agonies of hunger, when traffic conditions are hopelessly deteriorating, and the enemy is still far inland. At the same time, the provisional government has issued a proclamation setting out the basic principles of its policy. They are understandably moving toward unrestricted democracy, eliminating on paper a whole host of autocratic regulations that have so far hampered Russia's political life, abolishing the police, proclaiming universal suffrage for local elections and for the future National Assembly, granting the right of association and assembly, freedom of the press, and the right to strike to everyone, including military personnel, within the limits permitted by military and technical conditions. And the provisional government intends to introduce all these wonderful things immediately,

without using the state of war as a pretext for delaying the reforms. Had the Russian Revolution broken out at a time when we were not at war with this neighboring state, the collapse of the old, accursed system would have aroused only a feeling of satisfaction. Now we view this tremendous upheaval with considerably less emotion and skepticism. We know that the sections currently in control are fanatical warmongers and anti-Germans, whose dissatisfaction with the old system stemmed not ultimately from the fact that Tsarism was not waging war vigorously enough. This is where foreign influences also came into play, especially the English, which undoubtedly played a role in the outbreak of this revolution. The longer London remained, the less secure it felt in its Russian ally. The trip of the English minister, Lord Milner, was, as the Manchester Guardian openly stated, closely connected with the internal situation in Russia. Milner was supposed to bring about a reconciliation between the Duma and the Tsar and suggested to the Tsar that he appoint a cabinet that would be responsible to the "parliament," namely the Duma. This was even more than the Duma wanted. When this proposal was rejected, Milner recommended appointing the reliable Englishman Sazonov as Prime Minister, with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The English minister consulted continuously with the Duma leaders, continually encountering harsh rejection from the Tsar, until finally, Milner's wishes were fulfilled by another means. The outbreak of the revolution was greeted with greater jubilation by no quarter than by the English press. They felt it was their doing and, quite generally, described it as the most severe blow to Germany's wartime morale. This demonstrates a remarkable shortsightedness that only demonstrates the depth of anxiety with which England viewed the development of Russian affairs. One could practically hear him breathe a sigh of relief, the excellent Bonar Law, when he welcomed in the House of Commons it as "a real relief" for England that the movement was not aimed at achieving peace, but, on the contrary, at a determined continuation of the war. But already, all signs point to the fact that once the avalanche had begun to slide, it would not allow itself to be dictated to by London. After all, it was not the unsatisfied ministerial needs of the Miliukoffs and their comrades, and even less their longing for Constantinople and the Dardanelles, that set the Russian Revolution in motion. The driving force is the hunger of the masses and their desire for peace. The fate of the Miliukoffs will depend primarily on their ability to create bread. If they cannot do so, and they cannot, then the reins of the tremendous movement will slip from the hands of these dwarfs, and the revolution will overtake them and their English backers. The men of the old system can almost wait for the They must calculate the hour when, although

not their former omnipotence, power will fall into their hands, and it will depend entirely on their political insight and energy what use they will make of their power to help the counter-revolution to victory. This revolution will naturally mean the end of the old Tsarism, and in its course the Russian bourgeoisie will achieve the freedoms it needs for the economic development of the country. But it is another matter whether they will be able to direct the fate of the war according to their wishes. And here we say: no! The outbreak of the Russian Revolution is so little a joyful event for the Entente that it rather destroys their last hopes and provides the decisive impetus for the collapse of the Quadruple Alliance. Russia is only at the beginning of its internal upheaval, and as people in England seem to imagine, nothing will be as easy in this monstrous empire of illiterates and Foreign peoples, the tsardom is not replaced by a clique of liberal merchants and landowners. The more fanatically the provisional government advocates for the continuation of the war, the more it plays into the hands of the counter-revolution. Its weak authority could only be shored up by concluding a victorious and swift peace. It will not be able to achieve the first, and will not want the second. Inescapable contradictions are already rising within itself. The more nationalistic the revolutionary movement becomes, the more it will free itself from foreign influence, that is, from England, and obey its own laws. ADOLF KOESTER: Bismarck's Legacy. IV. Germany and France. - France after the Peace of Frankfurt was initially a hybrid of monarchy and republic, with a National Assembly with an anti-republican majority under President Marshal MacMahon. German policy promoted the republic wherever possible. Bismarck saw a coming clerical monarchy as a threat of war . p. 979 (#999) Bismarck's Legacy. 979 and the possibility of an understanding between Austria and France at Germany's expense. In his conflict with Harry Arnim, temporary German ambassador in Paris, the latter's legitimist intrigues with Wilhelm I in favor of a French monarchy played a major role. Before this semi-monarchical interim state ended in 1877 with the definitive transition to a republic with a republican majority, there was a warlike tension between France and Germany, the roots of which are not entirely clear. On the German side, the Prussian General Staff (in connection with the adopted French Army Cadre Law), and on the French side, a monarchist clique led by Foreign Minister Decazes, appear to have seriously considered war. Added to this were misleading and clumsy diplomatic rhetoric on both sides. Bismarck was against this preventive war. But the threat of war alarmed England and Russia, both of which opposed the supposed Disturbers of the peace in Berlin brought out the heavy artillery. Bismarck regarded the war articles, which he did not dislike, in the German press merely as a

warning "cold water jet" addressed to France and was very angry when Gorchakoff subsequently presented himself at the courts as a European peacemaker. The crisis marked the first signs of rapprochement between Russia and France. "The interests of our countries are common," the Tsar declared to the French ambassador in Petersburg. That was a year before the German-Austrian alliance negotiations in Gastein. In the following years, relations between Germany and France improved. For a time, Bismarck's Kulturkampf even brought about certain internal relations with the anti-clerical young republic, which had to struggle heavily with the monarchical-clerical opposition. Gambetta visited Germany twice, but attempts at verbal understanding with Bismarck were abandoned by both sides as premature . Occasional outbursts 52/2 p. 980 (#1000) # 980 Bismarck's legacy. National fervor in Paris could not prevent France's zealous colonial policy from bringing the two countries closer together. This French colonial policy, whose soul was Jules Ferry, was deliberately promoted by Bismarck for years. He saw it as the best way to distract the country's attention from the painful Vosges wound. Thus, he helped France win Tunis (letter to Ferry of May 2, 1881), stood by its side at the Congo Conference, and diplomatically supported the French conquests in the Indies and Madagascar. This aggressive policy brought the Republic, presided over by Grévy "in tails" since MacMahon's abdication, into a certain conflict with England, and on the other hand, it did not make it independent of Germany. Jules Ferry fell even before the Peace of Tientsin had brought the French conquests in the Indies to a close. The calculation that France's desire for revenge could be permanently suppressed through colonial policy proved to be false. The following years brought the country into serious internal crises, which more than once brought war with Germany close. These were the years in which the Bulgarian unrest increased tensions between Austria and Russia. France could count on Russia's help in the event of war. General Boulanger was the Minister of War in the cabinet formed after Ferry's fall due to a strong increase in monarchist support. Spurred by popular sentiment, Boulanger allowed himself to be carried away by demonstrative military border measures (troop concentrations, barrack construction, etc.) against Germany, which, combined with the renewed reinforcement of the French army, aroused fears of a French war of revenge. Since at the same time the French party seemed to regain the upper hand at the Russian court (the first reinsurance treaty had expired without renewal), Germany responded with a major army bill that stipulated an increase in the presence of 41,000 men for 7 years (septennate). (Passed on March 11, 1887, after prior dissolution by the so-called Cartel Reichstag.) Meanwhile, the French Ministry had also

calmed down. However, a month later (April 1887), the spectacle began again. A French border commissioner named Schnäbele had been arrested on this side of the border. France was furious. But the ministry rejected mobilization by 7 votes to 5, and at the same time, Schnäbele was sent back after it was "established" that he had only crossed the border at the invitation of a German. Boulanger was finished for the time being. This French confusion is said to have made such an embarrassing impression on the Russian Tsar that the Pan-Slavic-French party at his court fell into disgrace for a time. Thus, the conclusion of the second reinsurance treaty between the Tsar and Bismarck becomes clear from this perspective as well. The Panama scandal provided new grist for the Boulangists' mill. Ferdinand Lesseps, the "founder" of the Suez and Panama Canals, had obtained permission from the Chamber for a lottery, which was prohibited by law, by bribing some deputies. This corruption of the republican parliament, combined with a uncovered fraud involving orders and offices involving President Grévy's son-in-law, aroused deep unrest throughout the country, which the Boulangists skillfully exploited for their own ends. Grévy fell. But later, the French government itself intervened forcefully: Paul Déroulède's revenge-crazy Patriot League was dissolved, its leader arrested, and Boulanger himself indicted. This was too much for him. He fled across the border and died by his own hand in Brussels two years later. But the image of this country, constantly shaken by internal crises, should not obscure the fact that after 1871, France consolidated itself faster than one might expect, and that, amidst all the domestic turmoil, it did not cease to consistently pursue its foreign policy . p. 982 (#1002) # 982 Bismarck's Legacy. The ever-increasing antagonism between Germany and Russia naturally showed French policy the path to be taken. Just as Bismarck could not eliminate this antagonism, but at most could only deflate it, so he was only able to occasionally disrupt the ever-increasing intimacy between Germany's western and eastern neighbors, but not prevent it. He never harbored any illusions regarding Germany's relationship with France. For, apart from the never-eradicable revenge propaganda based on the Republic's domestic political needs, the Franco-German tension was one of the strongest elements in England's continental political calculations. V. Conclusion. If one surveys Bismarck's foreign policy system as a whole, it is initially purely continental in orientation. His primary goal was to secure the new state created in 1871. Colonial policy was initially pursued solely from the perspective of protecting German trading companies. Bismarck was not yet familiar with world politics in the sense of simultaneously economic and cultural German expansion (only the two together give rise to the concept of

German imperialism). As a means of securing this, the German statesman utilized a complex network of alliances and agreements, direct and indirect threats and support. After some hesitation, the close relationship with Austria-Hungary, directed purely defensively against Russia, became the focus of this security apparatus, so that neither Germany was committed to the Balkan interests of the Danube Monarchy, nor was the latter to German settlements with France. This alliance was flanked by the reassuring agreement with Russia, which corrected the Austrian alliance, curbed the French policy of revenge aimed at Russia, and thwarted England's traditional interest in a split between Germany and Russia . On the other flank, Italy's entry permanently pushes Italy away from France—reducing the natural antagonism between Austria and Italy to a minimum—while simultaneously creating a bond with England through its anti-French Mediterranean interests. In addition to these two flank safeguards, Romania, with whom Bismarck made firm agreements regarding his relations within the Triple Alliance, was added in the game against Russia. This foreign policy system, a complex, elaborate mechanism of forces, was perhaps too complicated, perhaps too tailored to the prodigious personal talent of its creator. And we have seen how, toward the end of Bismarck's period, new complications emerged, while old ones revealed their ultimate roots—both seemingly no longer resolvable by the old means. It was not only the rapid strengthening of France and the intensification of the German-Russian antagonism that heralded a new era. It was, above all, the gigantic growth of Germany itself that pushed it out of its previous continental-oriented political system and onto the scene of the imperialist struggles between England and Russia, America and Japan. But this does not change the fact that Bismarck's foreign policy system actually achieved its goal of securing Germany as comprehensively as possible in all situations during his time. In his Reichstag speech of February 13, 1896, the representative August Bebel set the following guidelines for German foreign policy: "Germany must work towards obtaining through appropriate alliances what it lacks as a naval power, given our overall circumstances, our position in Europe, and the relationship we have with our neighboring states. Let us pursue a policy that will bring capable friends to our side in the decisive hour." Anyone who has learned that the foreign policy of a modern state is something other than an appendage of domestic party politics will have to admit that Bismarck's foreign policy almost completely fulfilled these demands for its time. p. 984 (#1004) # 984 Two Just Americans. ENGELBERT PERNERSTORFER. IN Two Just Americans. In an earlier article in the "Glocke" (II. 25) I wrote about a series of statements by neutrals who do not swim in the current of general anti-German sentiment. Even then I was able to cite

the voice of a true American who, in an unbiased and, with regard to general public opinion in North America, commendably brave manner, spoke out about the alleged neutrality of the United States.[1] Now I would like to draw your attention to two further books, both of which deserve the highest recognition. We German Social Democrats are not entirely innocent of the negative opinion of Germany that is generally held abroad. It is not surprising that the German Social Democrats, as the most radical party in the Reich, also exercised the sharpest criticism of the internal conditions of German politics. That was one of their tasks. The material for criticism was plentiful. But the German Social Democrats were nevertheless mistaken in one thing. Criticism of Germany usually went hand in hand with an often excessive glorification of non-German conditions. The fiercest struggle with our Western enemies will never prevent us from recognizing what we owe them in culture and public life. But that doesn't mean we need to completely forget the great advantages Germany has over the so-called "democratic" countries. English and French democracy has its very dark underbelly. We have recognized this clearly, especially now during the war. It has also not escaped us that many German institutions that seemed very undemocratic to us also have their bright sides. As far as foreign policy is concerned, everyone knows today that English and French democracy had as little say in it as the weak German one. The phrases must finally be done away with. The word "republic" must eventually lose its magic. Bebel already said what was necessary about this in Amsterdam in 1904 . Worshipping the fetish of formulas is reactionary, not socialist. We Social Democrats have always proudly considered it our duty to "speak what is." We have allowed ourselves to be deceived by appearances more often than human frailty allows. Now that we have gained a different relationship to state and nation, this will hopefully change, albeit not as quickly as we would like. Today, we still have to let a stranger tell us what the German state is worth and what distinguishes it from others that are praised as model democratic states. This stranger is George Stuart Fullerton, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University in New York, Honorary Professor at the University of Vienna, and the first American exchange professor for Austria. Not only did he spend long and repeated stays in Germany, gaining practical knowledge of German conditions, he also studied them theoretically, which is all the more commendable given that he is neither a politician, nor an economist, nor a professor of constitutional law, but a professor of philosophy. A careful study of the book demonstrates that he has clearly grasped and presented the political and social nature of Germany. One would hardly find one or two insignificant errors in even the most insignificant detail. But even in his

assessment of these conditions, he displays a pleasing impartiality. He does not see slavery in the German sense of order. He says: "To whom does the German ultimately obey?" 2 The Truth about Germany. Translated by Dr. Ernst Sieper. Munich. Oldenburg. 1916. VIII. 141 pp. The translator unfortunately died recently. He was a university professor. In Munich and before the war, one of the most zealous champions of German-English understanding. p. 986 (#1006) # 986 Two just Americans. End?... He obeys the state." And further: "One should not close oneself to the truth that the much-discussed, willing obedience of the German to recognized authorities has its roots in the conviction that it is not obedience to an arbitrary power, but that he bows before the state, which works for his interests and of which he himself, as his feelings tell him, is a part." The following sentences are particularly significant: "It is absurd to claim that the German people sigh under a yoke of any kind. As long as there is life and growth in a nation, there will be discontent and a tendency to introduce reforms. And it is good that it is so. We Americans have, and not to our detriment, the same spirit. We are never satisfied; it's a good thing. The same applies to the Germans. But any reforms they introduce will probably not be unaffected by their traditions and the actual situation they find themselves in. We Americans essentially have a continent of our own. We live in a villa. The German occupies one floor and thus has a clearer awareness of his neighbors. He cannot introduce reforms without keeping this fact in mind." He discusses the school and education system with particular emphasis, praising its democratic character in comparison to others. He emphasizes the absence of actual slums, which makes English and American cities so ugly. Of course, he does not forget the work in the field of social policy, which, however deficient we may consider it, is still exemplary throughout the world. However, he deals in depth, with profound expertise and penetrating understanding, in two chapters with militarism. ("In fact, no nation is as militaristic as Great Britain is navalistic.") He praises the love of peace not only of the German people, but also of the German state. What he says about the various imperialisms is not new, but well put together. Fullerton has written a book for America. He wants to guide his countrymen to a fairer assessment of Germany. p. 987 (#1007) # Two Fair Americans. 987 Nevertheless, the translation of his book was a good deed. It deserves to be read by German Social Democrats, so that they, too, will be led to a fair assessment of their own country. In doing so, they may also be cured of their overestimation of foreign countries. Especially with regard to England, of which Fullerton says: "People sometimes point to England as a prime example of the triumph of democracy. But the British Empire is as undemocratic as any political power

can be. Only one in nine British subjects has a share in the government." It is well known that in France, too, it is not the people who rule, but the plutocracy. But repeatedly and clearly pointing this out is especially necessary for German Social Democracy, where the number of those incurably suffering from the French and English diseases (Gallomania and Anglomania) is so exceedingly large. The second book is by John William Burgess, a former professor of constitutional and international law at the North American University of Columbia. He, too, knows Germany. He spent many years here. While Fullerton speaks as a political layman, Burgess is, so to speak, an expert. He has studied history, constitutional law, and international law professionally. He writes, although with pronounced sympathy for Germany, essentially, indeed as an American. He rejects the "frenzy of anti-German sentiment" that has gripped the United States. When, at the end of the preface, dated March 1915, he speaks of certain signs that Americans are beginning to free themselves from the spell of "excited and misguided feelings and to look at things more freely and objectively," the situation has unfortunately changed since then, and we are practically on the verge of military entanglements with the United States. 3 The European War: Its Causes, Its Aims, and Its Probable Results. Leipzig. S. Hirzel. 1915. VIII, 170 p. 988 (#1008) # 988 Two Just Americans. Above all, Burgess emphasizes his scientific justification for the investigation he has undertaken. For nearly fifty years, he says, he has been accustomed to reading and interpreting diplomatic documents on a daily basis, and for nearly forty years it has been his profession to teach how to read and interpret such documents. As such a legitimate expert, he investigates the pretexts, the immediate, and the underlying causes of the war on the basis of all relevant documents, i.e., the Blue Books. It is a real pleasure to read the extraordinarily astute investigations that lead to the crystal-clear conclusion that the encircling powers had prepared for war and that their diplomats had played a fundamentally dishonest game before the immediate outbreak of the war. He sees the underlying cause primarily in England's determination to wrestle down its dangerous competitor, Germany. He judges England's democracy even more harshly than Fullerton: "In the true sense of a constitutional government, the English form of government is despotism." Of Germany, he says: "The present economic and political organization of the German Empire, which even in its constitution bears the more meaningful name of a German Confederation, is in many very important respects the exact opposite of that of the united British Kingdom and colonial empire." Its economic system is by far the most effective and, in the truest sense, democratic that currently exists or has ever existed in the world. There is

currently no large state on earth in which such a general and equal distribution of the intellectual and material fruits of civilization among the entire people prevails as in the German Confederation. And there is no state, large or small, in which the general standard of civilization is so high. Education is universal, and ignorance is completely eradicated. There are no dens of vice, no proletariat, no general impoverishment; prosperity is general, and a sense of duty is the prevailing principle of life in public and private life. Civilization is understood here as synonymous with culture. EP p. 989 (#1009) # Two Just Americans. 989 life, at high and low. The country's institutions are designed throughout so that each individual is placed in the position and sphere of activity for which he or she is best qualified, and thereby, loss through wear and tear in economic operations is avoided." We will not endorse this judgment as a whole. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy as the honest opinion of a man who is thoroughly a supporter of the democratic institutions of his homeland and who cannot be denied an understanding for assessing political conditions. In any case, it is of the utmost interest and very likely to give us food for thought that two such highly educated and informed men as Fullerton and Burgess independently arrive at such favorable assessments of political Germany. This democrat also views German militarism significantly differently than German democracy does programmatically. In this, too, he agrees with Fullerton. For him, German militarism has an essentially defensive character. He places great value on the military spirit and military capability, and he reminds his countrymen what they owe to this spirit. This is a particularly instructive chapter. He doesn't hesitate to say, with particular reference to the struggle between the Northern and Southern states through which slavery was eradicated and the unity of the states established: "I don't know how we could have prepared our armies for the task to which they were called without the Germans, who knew military drill, military discipline, and military organization almost man for man." And further: "The North could never have defeated the Confederate armies without the Germans." In his historical review, he does not forget to enumerate in a very exhaustive manner all the violence that the United States had to endure from England until not long ago. In a special section, Burgess deals with the immediate cause of the war, the relationship between Austria and Serbia. He concludes that the crime of Seraevo "has affected not only the honor, but the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the highest degree." What he says on this point is of great importance. Our enemies say that Germany's greed for land and power is to blame for the war. In Germany itself, there will be few unfortunate people who share this opinion. On the other hand, there are already people in

Austria who believe that Austria's harsh demands on Serbia were the direct cause of the war. These are the kind of people who, while always quick to offer all sorts of excuses to all sorts of enemy states, lack any sense of justice when it comes to their own state. Even if one is not an over-patriot, one must admit the obvious fact that Austria has tolerated a lot from Serbia for a long time. Another such fact is that the murder in Serajevo was prepared in Serbia itself, with the assistance of Serbian dignitaries. Now, the smart-asses believe, Austria should never have demanded that Austrian confidants participate in the police and judicial investigations that were to be conducted into the murder. This would be a direct encroachment on the sovereign rights of an independent state, which it should never tolerate. But, if I remember correctly (perhaps I'm mistaken), a similar case has already occurred, specifically between Austria and Serbia. When Prince Michael Obrenovich was murdered in Topschider on June 10, 1868, the murderers fled to Hungary. The Serbian government requested Austria-Hungary to allow them to have the murderers investigated through their agents. The Austrian government granted permission. Just imagine—Austria did not feel its dignity violated by Serbia's request. Moreover, Serbia was still a sovereign state at the time! Of course, one would say the case is not the same. Correct. p. 991 (#1011) # Two Just Americans. 991 But at least the essence of the analogy can be stated. Those who put forward the theory of Serbia's "injured dignity" are either those over-pacifists who genuinely believe that the immediate cause of a major war is also its cause, or they are politicians who stand in the sharpest opposition to the government and therefore consider themselves justified in expressing their opposition to the government through hostility toward the state. They are also those who are always ready to invoke the "dignity" of states when it comes to other states. Whenever the dignity of their own state is mentioned, they shrug their shoulders contemptuously. It is comforting to hear a fair word on this matter from a completely unbiased democrat abroad. Much inconsistent and foolish stuff has been written about Belgian neutrality. However, there are quite serious scholars of constitutional and international law who deny that it was an obligation for the German Reich to respect Belgian neutrality. Burgess also places himself in this group. The question now has more theoretical and historical value. Bethmann-Hollweg's statement of August 4, 1914, admits the violation. This statement alone is authoritative for the situation. In the opinion of millions of Germans, and probably of an increasing number of people on earth, Germany had the right to do so, and this will be decisive for the historical judgment. It should also be noted that Fullerton does an excellent job of illustrating to his compatriots Germany's endangered geographical position. He challenges

them to consider what the state of peaceful security in the United States would be like if Mexico and Canada were militarily strong states, and if, separated only by a narrow channel, the island of Japan lay opposite the mainland. This object lesson should be enough to lead a North American to a better understanding of ... p. 992 (#1012) # 992 Two Just Americans. understandings of Germany's great difficulties. Both authors stand with the keenest sympathies on Germany's side and believe that only through Germany's victory will the interests of the United States be safeguarded. Burgess says: "It seems indisputable to me that every true American interest, moral and material, demands the maintenance of the German Empire in its present organization and position of power in Central Europe. Neither the disguised autocracy of the East nor the Gallic Republic in the West can be mentioned in the same breath as the German Empire as a source of true freedom, real progress, and general welfare." We agree with these words with the reservation that we strongly and incessantly emphasize the firm hope for essential reforms, that is, for considerable changes. The German people, as warlike as they are peace-loving, want peace. They will gladly be prepared for a peace that grants our enemies every opportunity for development and freedom of movement. But we are conscious of the responsibility of this historic moment. We are pleased to hear, through the words of a free citizen of the free United States, Burgess, expressed what is our own unshakable conviction: "The Germans will preserve the Reich as long as there is a breath left in them, and they will lie down to die wrapped in its banners before they submit to the rule of the Slavs, the Gauls, or the British." There may be cases where it is highly praiseworthy to violate a rule of etiquette out of tact. Books have two effects: they make some haughty, others modest. If there is no knowledge with which to encompass the world, there is a feeling: love. H. Sonntag. p. 993 (#1013) # The Danish Municipal Elections. 993 TH. STAUNING: The Danish Municipal Elections. Although political elections in Denmark had to be postponed due to the international situation, municipal elections, which must normally be held every four years, were held. These elections are scheduled to take place in all municipalities in the country in the first half of March and are therefore now concluded. Since 1908, universal suffrage has existed for all taxpayers in the municipality, both men and women, and also for married women whose husbands pay taxes. All privileges previously enjoyed by the highest taxpayers have been abolished. The right to vote is universal and equal for all who have reached the age of 25, and all voters are eligible to vote simultaneously. There are approximately 1,200 municipalities in Denmark, of which just over 1,100 are rural municipalities with a predominantly agrarian population. Elections are

held according to the proportional system and are therefore based on lists drawn up by parties or electoral associations. Gradually, significant interest has been attached to the participation of the Social Democrats in municipal elections. Twenty-five years ago, they did not have a single representative in the municipal administration. In 1893, the first two Social Democrats were elected to the Copenhagen City Council, and in 1896, a few comrades were also elected to various other city councils. This trend has continued ever since, and after the aforementioned law was passed in 1908, the advance continued. In the 1913 elections, the Social Democrats fielded lists in all the cities and in just over a third of the rural municipalities. The result was that the Social Democrats received 160,000 votes and approximately 1,100 seats. In the country's capital, Copenhagen, 27 Social Democrats were elected to the city council, while the bourgeois parties elected 28 city councilors on three different lists. In some provincial towns and several larger rural municipalities, the Social Democrats gained a majority (e.g., Nakskov, Naestved, Horsens). In recent years, Danish Social Democracy has experienced vigorous growth; a whole series of new organizations have emerged in the rural municipalities, and this has resulted in an energetic party movement. Participation in the municipal elections was thoroughly prepared everywhere, and Social Democratic lists were put forward in a significantly larger number of municipalities than in 1913—probably in more than half of the rural municipalities and, of course, in all provincial towns. The difficult times brought about by the war have powerfully revived the sense of unity within the party. There is an excellent understanding within our party of the great importance of solidarity, and we observe no serious attempts to disrupt or dissolve the party's trade union and political organizations. Regarding the municipal elections, the party acted in complete unity; the nomination of candidates took place within the organizations, and the working class cast its vote for the Social Democratic lists with admirable unity and understanding. At the present moment, it is not yet possible to determine the overall result of the elections across the country, but a significant increase in the Social Democratic vote can already be noted. The party has moved forward with firm steps from election to election, and the recently concluded elections mark a significant breakthrough for our party. This is particularly evident in the fact that the majority was won in the capital of the country, in the Copenhagen City Council. Here, 30 Social Democratic city councilors were elected with 62,506 votes, while three bourgeois parties together received 54,795 votes and 25 representatives. Of these, 17 belong to the Conservative-Liberal Alliance, 2 to the Clerical Party, and 6 to the Liberal Party (from which the Zahle Ministry

originated). This brilliant victory is of decisive importance for our party and for the implementation of our party program, but also politically it is of the greatest importance as an acknowledgment of the policy pursued by the Liberal Ministry with the support of the Social Democratic Party (especially in our relationship with foreign countries). In addition to the magnificent result in the country's capital, where the Conservative Party suffered a colossal defeat (a loss of 6,000 votes and five seats), a whole series of victories in all parts of the country must also be mentioned. The Social Democrats maintained their majority in Nakskov and Horsens and increased it by one seat in Naestved. Furthermore, majorities were won in several provincial towns; we are referring to Aarhus, Randers, Veile, Slagelse, Korsør, Nyköbing on Fyen, and Helsingør. The gains in the rural municipalities were also significant. In many places, a majority was won; in others, we were only one vote short of a majority. While in yet other places, where our party participated in the election campaign for the first time, a breakthrough was made and the first Social Democrats entered the municipal councils to represent the interests of the working class. The Danish working class looks with pride at the election results, for they show us the growing understanding of socialism and the value of strong solidarity. With unyielding practical sense, the large staff of party representatives will now carry out work for the benefit of the working population. This work, as an insurmountable program on the next election day, will lead the party to new victories. Dr. JOHN SCHIKOWSKI: HOW The Origin of Art Styles. The extent to which art should imitate nature is a problem on whose solution aesthetic theorists have not yet agreed and are unlikely ever to agree. What is certain, however, is that art does not reach its ultimate and highest goal in mere imitation of nature, and it is also certain that a perfect, complete imitation of nature is impossible. Even the art movement whose leaders have made the strict reproduction of nature their banner, even the most extreme and consistent naturalism, must always somehow alter the underlying natural models in its creations. It must transform the forms and colors of nature that it wishes to make appear in a work of art, depending on the nature and purpose of the work. 52/3* p. 996 (#1016) # 996 The Origin of Art Styles. It is in this transformation that true artistic creation lies. Through this transformation, the work of art is distinguished from mechanical reproduction, the painting or drawing from the photograph. In this transformation, the individual artist, like the entire art epoch, expresses its individuality. The way in which nature has been transformed in a work of art is called the style of the work of art, and a historical examination of the entire development of art shows that in the way each age transforms, i.e.,

stylizes, nature in its artistic creations, certain regularities prevail, which art theorists have long striven to investigate. Establishing the external characteristics of the individual styles presented no particular difficulties, and nowadays anyone who has even the most superficial knowledge of art knows what is meant by the Greek, Gothic, Rococo, etc. The problem of the origin of art styles is considerably more complicated; that is, the solution to the question: on what preconditions does the prevailing art style depend? Among the numerous theories that have been proposed regarding the origin of art styles, two opposing basic views can be distinguished. One teaches that technical, craftsmanship-based skill determines style. She examines ancient Egyptian sculpture, for example, and notes that it dispenses with all finer detail, contenting itself with a few generous forms, and explains this peculiarity by the Egyptians' technical inability to handle the stone material more skillfully and to shape it more richly. She sees that the Greeks invented a multitude of new sculptural tools and techniques, and that, hand in hand with these technical improvements, a new style in sculpture developed. Finally, she also points to the oil technique, which was introduced in Italy during the early Renaissance and was accompanied by a profound revolution in painting. This theory, as one can see, has some plausible aspects, but recent research has nevertheless shown that it is not valid. For example, the ancient Egyptians, alongside their strict, generous art, simultaneously had an absolutely naturalistic sculpture aimed at the finest detail. 997 (#1017) # The Origin of Art Styles. 997 whose most famous creations are the wonderful portrait statuettes of the "Scribe" and the "Village Mayor," which prove that the sculpture of that time need not shy away from even the most difficult technical tasks. And when oil painting had already reached its highest perfection, at the end of the Italian Late Renaissance, its style suddenly changed, and the highly developed craftsmanship served, as Baroque art, a conception that was diametrically opposed to that of the Renaissance. From these examples, one can see that technical skill cannot possibly have a decisive influence on art style and its transformations. And hence the second theory, recognized today by modern art research, arose, which teaches that it is not ability but will that determines style. The artistic will takes certain directions not because the necessary technical tools have been invented, but the other way around: because the artistic will has taken a certain direction, the technical tools necessary to achieve the goal are invented. The artistic will, however, is nothing other than a reflection of the general worldview dominating the respective period, which in turn grows out of the respective economic structure of society. And just as we can distinguish two fundamentally different worldviews in the intellectual development of

humanity, one of which is directed more towards this world, the other more towards the beyond, so there are also two types of artistic will and two artistic styles that, succeeding one another, dominate the great epochs of art history. These were formerly called the naturalistic and the idealistic styles; we will call them the organic and the abstract, because these terms better capture the essence of the matter. A brief historical overview will most conveniently inform us about the nature and dominance of these two styles. Older art research found it strange and inexplicable that the art of primitive peoples is never naturalistic, but always shows a far-reaching transformation of natural forms and colors. However, anyone who considers the childlike worldview, the fundamental religious mood of these lower cultured peoples, will find the nature of their artistic practice entirely understandable. Primitive man fears nature, whose excessive forces he is unable to master, and instinctively flees from the frightening and confusing multiplicity of living natural forms into the realm of clear, calm, eternally unchanging abstract forms. Thus, his art transforms organic, living forms into simple, almost mathematical figures and gives them colors that have no equal in nature. Fear of the overwhelming power of nature is the fundamental mood from which the first, primitive, abstract style is generated. Anyone who has ever seen Negro sculptures, with their strict geometric forms and garishly colorful paintwork, will be familiar with the external characteristics of this style. Gradually, however, man learns to recognize nature and master its forces, thereby entering into a completely different relationship with it. He no longer fears it, but begins to love it. With deep devotion, he immerses himself in all its tangible manifestations and seeks to recreate them in their organic forms and vibrant colors. This joy in mastering nature, this intimate empathy, this complete absorption in the natural world of the senses is the fundamental mood that dominated Greek art during its heyday and here allowed the other style, the organic, to emerge for the first time in the development of art. Greek art also transforms natural forms, not according to abstract, mathematical, but according to organic norms, by continuing, as it were, the creative activity of nature and transforming its creations into works of art in purer, fuller, more perfect forms and colors. However, there are peoples who, although they already stand at a high level of culture and have subjugated the forces of nature to the extent necessary for their practical, technical, and economic purposes, nevertheless cannot be satisfied with the knowledge and shaping of sensually perceptible nature. They no longer fear nature, as did the primitive peoples, but nature is not enough for them. They ponder and investigate what they suspect lies behind the world of the senses; they seek to fathom the riddles of life. p. 999 (#1019) # The Origin of Art Styles. 999

This world concerns them less than the next. They are attracted not by the external, constantly changing appearance, but by the innermost, eternally unchanging essence of things. And so their art, too, takes refuge in the realm of abstract forms, and a style emerges that is fundamentally related to the primitive, but incomparably richer and more mature. We first encounter this developed abstract style in the works of ancient oriental, Egyptian, and other art. And after Greek and Roman cultures had displaced it for several centuries, at the beginning of the Middle Ages it became dominant in Europe, along with the pronouncedly metaphysical, afterlife-oriented Christian-Oriental worldview: its monuments are the creations of early Christian, Byzantine, Romanesque, and Gothic art. The modern era, with its inventions, discoveries, and the revival of real science, then led to a mastery of nature on a completely different scale than the ancient Greco-Roman cultural nations had ever imagined. People once again settled confidently and self-assuredly on earth; the mystical dreams and enthusiasms of the Middle Ages vanished, and an unprecedented joy of life, a "pagan" cult of the senses, took hold of humanity. It was the era of the Renaissance that saw the flowering of this new worldview. And hand in hand with it developed a modern, organic style, consciously based on its essentially related antiquity, which has remained dominant up to the present day and found its consistent expression in modern artistic Impressionism. There was only one setback in this half-millennium-long period: that was the time of the so-called Baroque, when abstract tendencies again temporarily made themselves noticeable in art. These tendencies can easily be explained by the prevailing mood of the Counter-Reformation at that time, which gave rise to a new religious movement and deepening in Catholic countries. The Jesuits were the supporters of this movement, and not without reason is the fully developed Baroque style also called the Jesuit style. Thus we see that in the entire course of development of human culture, every newly emerging worldview also has a p. 1000 (#1020) 1000 The Origin of Art Styles. corresponds to a new conception of art, and that it is not technical skill that determines the transformations in artistic creation, but rather the prevailing spirit of the times that seeks and finds its aesthetic expression in the artistic style. Explaining how this spirit of the times, the characteristic worldview of the era, develops from the economic structure of society would be a very worthwhile task for our modern cultural and economic historians. Unfortunately, even the most elementary preparatory work for this is still lacking. The recently deceased Müller-Lyer, however, promised to present the results of his research in this area in the 9th and 10th volumes of his "Stages of Humanity." However, these volumes have not yet appeared, and I do not

know whether the relevant preliminary studies from his estate will be published. And the practical application of these general theoretical insights? It is this: It is unjust to approach the creations of earlier artistic epochs with the arrogance of one who knows better and to ridicule their supposed incompetence. For in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, they do not express a lack of skill, but merely a differently directed artistic will. And it is just as premature and unjust to ridicule the first manifestations of a new, still emerging art style, whose tendencies and goals contradict the previous ones we are familiar with, and whose understanding requires, above all, a thorough immersion in the changed worldview underlying it. "For a long time, they considered themselves merely powerful magicians who could manipulate wind and weather at will. Now, as the dark storm has arisen against their will, they have lost their cheerfulness, but not their confidence. They resolve to let the storm sing a Rossini aria, the lightning flash symmetrically like Chinese fireworks, and the thunder roll in time. Even the most cunning thief can be lured from his hiding place, whether he is hiding in dense forests, underground caves, or the dark corner of a house. But even the heavenly police are not clever enough to drive arrogance from the hiding places of a human heart." Boerne, p. 1001 (#1021) DIE GLOCKE, Issue 53, March 31, 1917, Year 2. Reprinting of all articles is permitted with detailed source references. WILHELM KOLB: Workers' Party or People's Party? It would be like carrying coals to Newcastle to try to justify the necessity of a reorganization of German politics at this point. As the Reich Chancellor said in one of his last speeches, it is no longer up to the discretion of the relevant official bodies whether they want the new orientation or not; rather, it is now simply a question of the form and extent to which the forces unleashed in the German people by the war find their state and political expression. In this respect, however, much depends on the attitude of the Social Democrats, their strength, and their political influence. While one can expect with some certainty that the standstill in the Reich's domestic political development will be broken, one should not underestimate the strength and significance of the restraining forces. These are present not only in the Conservative Party and the groups politically close to it; there are also still numerous opponents of a democratization of German politics within the Center Party and the National Liberal Party. Containing and breaking this resistance is one of the most necessary prerequisites for guaranteeing success in the coming domestic political struggles. It would, however, be a considerable underestimation of the difficulties to be overcome if one were to seek them solely among the opponents of the political reorientation. Even among the parties whose political interests are most closely linked to the efforts to give German

politics a new direction, various inhibitions are becoming apparent, the overcoming of which is by no means as easy as it might seem after discussions in the press and at meetings. This also explains, for example, the reticence of the Reich Chancellor, who, insofar as he has taken a position on the issues so far, has not gone beyond general, non-committal statements. This statement is by no means intended to excuse the Reich Chancellor's attitude, but merely to point out the fact that he is not solely to blame if things have not moved more smoothly so far. Despite all this, the statesman has a duty to remove the obstacles to his plans, or at least to make a serious attempt to do so. Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg has not done so yet, and to that extent, the accusations leveled against him in public are entirely justified. The reorientation will come. What its ultimate result will be, however, depends not only on the more or less goodwill of the government; it will be determined at least as much by the attitude of the Reichstag and the influence it can bring to bear. For the time being, it is not even known whether there is a reliable majority in the current Reichstag for a radical reorientation. In any case, opinions on this matter vary widely, even among the parties that are particularly committed to it. A reorganization of German politics simultaneously requires a shift in the balance of political responsibility from right to left. In this respect, however, things are still very much in the making. In assessing the situation, one must not overlook the fact that this aspect of the problem is of particular importance for the government. Without a reasonably certain guarantee that the conduct of state affairs will not be disrupted, no government, regardless of the chancellor at its head (#1023) Workers' Party or People's Party? 1003, will embark on far-reaching experiments in redirecting domestic policy. One can define the concept of state necessities as narrowly as one will—it can hardly be seriously claimed that the left wing of the current Reichstag, either in terms of its numerical strength or its political structure, offers a sure guarantee for their conduct. As long as the strongest pillar of a democratically oriented policy—Social Democracy—operates on such an uncertain, shaky political foundation as is currently the case, the opponents of the reorientation have very strong trump cards in their hands, the playing of which will at least not facilitate the government's implementation of its plans. In any case, a reorientation initiated in the current Reichstag and under the current conditions would produce a very unsatisfactory result. It is a sine qua non for a thoroughgoing reorientation of German politics that Social Democracy come to terms with its own political reorientation as soon as possible, for a reform of the political conditions and circumstances that corresponds to the justified expectations of the German people only has a

reasonable prospect of success if Social Democracy can be considered a reliable factor in future German politics. - even if the situation is no longer as brilliant for Social Democracy as it was in the second half of 1914, it is still very favorable. What it loses through the split of the opposition elements, it can more than amply compensate for by gaining new supporters. The war has given a powerful impetus to the social revolution. The number of people who have no personal interest in the consolidation of the private capitalist economy and the resulting political conditions has grown enormously. 53/1 p. 1004 (#1024) 1004 Workers' or People's Party? Although the state and the bourgeois parties must take this fact into account to a certain extent, it is also clear that the degree of consideration for the interests of the propertyless classes is determined primarily by the political influence of Social Democracy. A social democracy that relies almost exclusively on the industrial and commercial working class, whose policies on important issues of tax, agricultural, customs, and trade legislation are one-sidedly focused on consumer interests, will naturally only be able to exert relatively narrow political influence even after the war. It is no coincidence, nor is it a necessary result of economic and historical developments, that social democracy has so far been unable to gain a solid base of supporters outside the actual working class. The cause of this thought-provoking phenomenon does not lie in the nature of social democracy. Neither its principles nor its goals have stood in the way of a significant expansion of its political, agitational, and organizational sphere of influence. Class struggle, too, need not necessarily restrict the political and agitational sphere of action of social democracy. If seemingly insurmountable obstacles stood in the way of gaining supporters from the middle class, the intellectuals, the agricultural sector, and the white-collar workers, the cause of this must be sought in the same area that also houses the source of the internal conflicts within Social Democracy. The complete standstill in the development of socialist theory, which hampered the party's policies and tactics, erected a barrier that Social Democracy could not overcome, despite all its efforts in its agitation and political canvassing. It is true that, depending on the favorable election situation, it also won votes outside the working class, but lasting success was impossible. What was gained in one election was lost again in the next. In particular, all attempts to gain a firm foothold among the rural population remained almost entirely unsuccessful. Must this be so, or does social democracy not also have the possibility, indeed a historical duty, to expand the circle of its supporters far beyond the working class? As the political advocate of merely proletarian class interests, social democracy will remain a minority party with correspondingly limited political influence for the

foreseeable future. In order to realize its far-reaching goals, its efforts must be directed toward winning the majority of the people, for neither democratization nor, much less, the socialization of society can be achieved against the will of the popular majority. As already noted above, neither the goals and principles of the party nor the preservation of specifically proletarian class interests stand in the way of an expansion of the political sphere of influence. To the extent that proletarianization progresses through the accumulation of capital, proletarian class interests develop into general popular interests. The only thing that can be done, therefore, is to awaken understanding for this economically and historically established fact beyond the actual working class. However, the previous method of political and principled education of social democracy was not suitable for this. In many cases, the previous method actually alienated large sections of the electorate who do not represent private capitalist class interests. Even the "Bible-minded" literal Marxist will not deny that the economic, social, and political interests of a very large portion of bourgeois voters are not identical with the capitalist class interests of the bourgeoisie. The agitation method, as well as the policies of Social Democracy, did not even remotely take this fact into account. The concepts of "bourgeois parties" and "ruling class" were confused like cabbage and turnips , making it easy for the actual bourgeoisie to focus its policies primarily on the preservation of capitalist class interests without thereby bringing it into disrepute with the masses of bourgeois voters. In contrast to the Center Party, there was also the way in which the Social Democratic side handled religious questions, which made it easy for the Center Party to keep its voters on board even when it grossly violated the interests of large sections of them. However, not only the often misguided method of agitation contributed to the artificial hampering of the Social Democrats' campaigning activities; the fact that the most diverse views on the goals of Social Democracy and the path to their realization prevailed not only among Social Democracy's opponents, but also within its own ranks, also contributed to the artificial limitation of the Social Democratic Party's sphere of action. As a result of the sterility in which the development of socialist theory found itself, the crucial problem for the politics and tactics of Social Democracy—how the transformation of the capitalist into the socialist social order is accomplished—was completely neglected. What was written about it mostly followed the lines of imaginative speculation. The fact that theory must continually orient itself anew to living developments was almost completely ignored, at least insofar as the officially recognized party theorists were involved. The contradiction between theory and practice grew ever greater, and as a result, interest in socialist theory was paralyzed. One

could write a separate chapter on this highly alarming phenomenon. The dogmatized belief in the miraculous effects of the revolutionary formula was artificially nurtured, and this caused ever new difficulties for the internal development of the party. The party's theoretical educational work found itself in the same dead end as its politics. How many members of the Social Democratic Party are sufficiently informed about the concept of the socialist ultimate goal to be able to give clear information about it to inquisitive non-Social Democrats? p. 1007 (#1027) Workers' or People's Party? 1007 The formulation of this ultimate goal was certainly familiar to the comrades actively involved in party life: - Transformation of capitalist private ownership of the means of production into social ownership and transformation of commodity production into socialist, for and by society. But what could they do with this theoretical formulation of the ultimate goal in practice? 99 What does "socialization" of production and the means of production mean? Who and what is society? The term is highly interpretable, and even among theorists there isn't agreement on it. In any case, it wasn't of much use in political-practical agitation. If socialization isn't synonymous with nationalization—and it isn't synonymous—then what is it? How does it take place in practice? These are questions to which one must be able to provide a satisfactory answer in agitation if one wants to win over convinced supporters. In the Erfurt Program, Kautsky provides an explanation of the "ultimate goal": "The ultimate goal of development, once the proletariat has taken control of the state, is the unification of all large enterprises into a single social economy and thus the transformation of the state into an economic cooperative." Indeed, does one really believe that with such an "explanation" of the socialist ultimate goal, one can hammer it into, for example, an "anti-collectivist peasant's skull"? And even if it is possible in one case or another to construct an approximate concept of the socialist ultimate goal, who today still believes that the transformation of capitalist into socialist society will be accomplished through this abbreviated process? It is impossible to win supporters for social democracy outside the working class with such a theoretical method of enlightenment on a larger scale than before. And yet this must happen. It is also entirely possible. Why should we not be able to win convinced fighters for democratic socialism among farmers, intellectuals, state, municipal, and private officials? In fact, the socialist idea has already struck strong roots in agricultural circles, for example—albeit unconsciously. What is the widespread agricultural cooperative system other than the only possible preparatory work in this area of private capitalist economics for the socialization of production and, subsequently, also of the means of production? No one can seriously believe

that the socialization of the agricultural means of production will occur if the workers take possession of state power and then summarily decree the "socialization" of the land, agricultural machinery, equipment, etc. Anyone who believes they can reach our farmers with such simple yet radical methods of socialist enlightenment knows them very little. A socialist agrarian program can never be constructed on such a theoretical foundation. The socialization of production and the means of production can and will take place in the most diverse forms, both in agriculture and in industry and trade, partly through the commune, partly through the state, and partly through other public corporations taking the place of capitalist private owners. A more precise orientation regarding this cannot, however , be gained through abstract theories and theoretical speculations, but only through close contact with living developments. The theory as well as the practice of social democracy must be based on these. This "reliance on the given order of things," as it is called in the Dresden anathema against heretical "revisionism," means neither a departure from the standpoint of class struggle nor the denial of any socialist principle, but rather 1 p. 1009 (#1029) Workers' Party or People's Party? 1009 It is the logical consequence of a rational view of the historical development of capitalism toward socialism. The socialization of production and the means of production is a socio-historically ongoing process whose completion is incalculably distant, but whose results we ourselves will still witness for a good part of. The establishment of such historically confirmed facts does not diminish the socialist ultimate goal's fundamental significance, nor its ability to inspire the masses. It is a false illusion to believe that socialism could be the result of a revolutionary mass action that would occur at some point in the future, through which the proletariat would gain possession of state power. State power is not a miracle machine capable of creating a new social order; in no way does the dogmatic belief in such miracles, which the class-conscious proletariat must accomplish, have anything to do with scientific socialism. When social democracy finally thoroughly dispels these illusions and places its theory and political practice on the firm ground of historical reality, then it will have gained the foundation upon which it can develop into a great people's party victorious against all reactionary forces. Only then will there be a guarantee that socialism will prevail in all areas more quickly than has been possible so far. As long as revolutionary ideology is not completely surrendered to a catastrophic collapse of capitalist society, social democracy cannot pursue a consistent, generous democratic-socialist policy geared toward achieving positive results. Last but not least, it will be a very important task to eradicate the downright senseless ideas about the

historical concept of class struggle and to give this concept the meaning and interpretation it truly deserves. The corruption of this concept by the "radical" phrase has caused enormous damage to Social Democracy. The extent of the confusion about the concept of class struggle within its own ranks is demonstrated by the assertion by one of the opposition papers that their fight against the party majority is a class struggle. One could hardly commit a worse abuse of the term "class struggle"! Not even class-conscious workers, let alone those voters who have yet to be won over to Social Democracy, have any use for such dogmatic formulas of faith. The class struggle is a historical category and may only be valued as such. Its necessity and indispensability can be made comprehensible to any reasonable person, provided one understands its historical significance. It was not class struggle itself that harmed social democracy, but the hopeless confusion surrounding this concept and the resulting class incitement, as perpetrated by the class struggle theatrical fanatics. If one adheres to its historically conditioned meaning in discussions on the topic of class struggle, then it is easy to refute all objections. Anyone who knows their Marx doesn't need to be told such truisms. But how many of those who proudly call themselves "Marxists" know the teachings of the great master? And how many of them are capable of applying them to the current state of economic and historical development? Quite a few are devout followers of dogmatized creeds that have nothing whatsoever to do with the scientific elements of Marxism. Item! The party's theorists face the task, as great as it is rewarding, of picking up the broken thread of Marx's social science and continuing it. Heinrich Cunow and Karl Renner have already begun this in a commendable way. Great and enormous are the tasks that Social Democracy is called upon to solve. The socialist idea must be spread to ever wider circles. Fertile soil, in which the sown seeds will flourish and bear rich fruit, is available in abundance. We will not win the masses we need to advance our goal with the radicalism of phrases, but rather with a radicalism of the people's self-education in political and economic democracy. Only in this way will it be possible to mitigate and shorten the birth pangs of the new society. WALDEMAR SKLARZ: England after the War. On the theaters of war in the East and West, especially in the southeast, events are moving toward major decisions. It is not without reason that the English press is forbidden to mention the Salonika operation. But, whatever the events of the coming weeks and months, it is perhaps appropriate to point out that the view so widespread in Germany that the war would end under all circumstances in the autumn of 1917 may prove to be one of those optimistic hopes, of which so many have proven to be erroneous in the course of this war. While

Entente diplomats and the best-informed political circles in neutral countries have expressed the conviction that the autumn of 1917 will bring an end to the general slaughter through a settlement between the two groups of powers, it is equally certain that England is making preparations on a grand scale for the continuation of the war in 1918. Be that as it may, just as important as the question of when the war will end is a second question: what then? What after the war? The chauvinists on both sides have it easy. The English, French, and Russians, p. 1012 (#1032) 1012 England after the war. and their followers say: Germany must be dealt with once and for all. They always add, incidentally, that it is only a matter of eliminating the present German regime. Indeed, leading English statesmen declare explicitly and seriously that no one is thinking of wanting to destroy the German people themselves. The English Blockade Minister, Lord Robert Cecil, expressed it in the following formula: one might as well want to destroy the equator. The extent to which English political circles have gone in their preoccupation with essentially domestic German affairs, and the firm roots of the conviction that England must reorganize the German Reich internally, is demonstrated by the fact that distinguished English politicians, such as the Speaker of the House of Commons, Lowther, are intensively considering the question of what kind of German government would be required if England were to negotiate the conditions for a peace agreement. The calm and objective manner in which these matters are being discussed on the English side simultaneously allows us to draw conclusions about how, despite everything, the current military and political situation and its development in the near future are being assessed. One might be inclined to see this attitude as an attitude, a bluff. But there is too much to argue against this view. Completely unbiased American evaluators who had visited England explained to me some time ago that people in Germany probably had no real idea of the firm determination of the entire English people to fight this war and of their conviction that it would bring about the full fulfillment of English war aims. One of these Americans quoted the words that the supervising English officer had uttered to him during the search in Kirkwall: "We care a bloody dime about what you blessed Neutrals say or think about us. We know that we have got to see this thing through." In plain German, that means: "We don't give a damn about what you dear Neutrals think or say about us. We know that we have to carry this thing through." p. 1013 (#1033) England after the war. 1013 All these details, which would be a trifle, a simple exercise in memory, to add up many times over, lead again to the question: what then after the war? What does England want? This question can be answered briefly and simply: England wants war after the

war, and it has long since made its preparations for it on a grand scale. The inventor of the idea of war after the war is actually not an Englishman in the strictest sense of the word, but a colonialist, the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, Hughes. He expressed the pan-British mass mood in a beautiful image when he spoke the words: "The cancer of German competition is running through the fair body of British trade." "The cancer of German competition is running through the fair body of British economic life." When Hughes came up with his idea, he was the man of the day, and all of London cheered him when he presented his thoughts there. He then invented the Entente's economic conferences, which began in Paris and the next of which was to be held in Rome in April to discuss the question of how, above all, the Germans could be placed at a disadvantage after the war, especially in relation to the Entente states and the neutrals, even with regard to important raw materials. After initially being scheduled to take place in March, it has now been postponed again, to May. On the whole, however, the Entente's experts have gradually realized that Hughes's ideas, at first glance, seemed very ingenious and brand-new in their magnificence, but that their intrinsic value did not go beyond the significance of a political advertising tool astonishing in its uniqueness. The reservations and factual objections to the program, or rather to Hughes's slogans, which arise from the implementation of the plan to make virtually the entire world, with the exception of the German Reich, a closed economic state, and the German Reich itself an excluded economic state, are obvious . 1014 (#1034) 1014 England after the war. From the outset, it had to be considered that almost all Entente states and neutral countries were somehow competing with each other in important areas of the world market. To pick out just a few points: Russia and the British Empire (Canada, Australia, India) are both large grain producers for the world market. France and Italy both seek markets for wine, fruit, plants, silk, various types of foodstuffs, fine products, automobiles, and other goods. France and England are both in competition in the technical field, in the textile industry, in the manufacture of precision mechanical products, instruments, automobiles, machines, and airplanes. It also had to be considered that the implementation of Hughes's program simultaneously affected the interests of South America and other world economic areas. However, the most capable minds in England have since succeeded, if not in removing the obstacles that stood in the way of the annexation of the United States, then at least in arguing them away. And this was achieved after a branch of the Association for the Promotion of Mutual Trade between England and the English Colonies was founded in Canada just last year, with an expressly declared tendency against American competition. Even the work

currently underway to expand cotton cultivation in all suitable areas of the British Empire has not impaired the annexation of the United States, although it has been unreservedly declared on this subject that England must do everything in its power to make itself independent of foreign countries in the supply of important raw materials—especially cotton. Given these things, one must certainly expect that the joint efforts of Great Britain and the United States will succeed in at least theoretically preparing the whole of South America for annexation to— p. 1015 (#1035) England after the war. 1015 to win the new British world economic system. However these things may develop, which leave free scope for many lines of thought, one main point remains, namely the objection that they were always only efforts to achieve a negative goal, namely to hinder and suppress German competition, to cut Germany off from the sources of the most important raw materials and from the world markets, to deprive it of the means by force and cunning to fully develop its capabilities and to prove its honest efficiency. The guiding principle here is the memory of the essentially similar attempt from earlier times to suppress all German industrial products, when they began to compete seriously with British goods on the world market, by imposing a brand that marked them as supposedly inferior. The memory of the attempt with the "Made in Germany" policy. "Made in Germany" was supposed to be the worst thing one could say about any product, and it became the strongest recommendation that could be invented, despite the fact that Reuleaux, the German Reich Commissioner, had sent the succinct overall verdict to Berlin about the German products exhibited at the World's Fair in Philadelphia: "Cheap and bad." If German industry had advanced from the "cheap and bad" state to its later heights, what achievements could be expected of it when, already placed on entirely different foundations, it was forced to compete with the utmost The exertion of all forces to engage in a war of annihilation for the mere assertion of German economic life. A Germany so driven to struggle for mere existence, to satisfy hunger in the simplest sense of the stomach, to obtain the most indispensable necessities of life, had only one way out: it had to make unprecedented efforts and achieve unprecedented feats to break through the economic encirclement, and this incentive to peak performance could only result in the creation of new values in all areas, of such inner content that no coercion, no oppression, and no disrepute could erase them. If nitrogen was extracted from the air in Germany, why shouldn't many other things, previously barely dreamed of, become reality? In this way, this people was only driven to achieve achievements that the entire rest of the world had to lag behind, achievements that would therefore prevail against all resistance, and in

general competition, Germany soon found itself further ahead than ever before. No, England's efforts in the war after the war are not limited to the negative result of pushing Germany back by hindering the development of its powers. Behind them, rather, lies the overriding positive goal of placing England's industry and trade so securely in the first place in the world through their own achievements that they no longer need fear being crushed by German competition. From the German point of view, nothing would be more alarming than a false assessment of England's measures and successes, born of political hatred. One may condemn the means employed by England in the strongest terms, but one must not fail to correctly assess the successes achieved by England through these same means. Seeing clearly, especially in one's own affairs, is the basic condition for finding the paths that can and must be taken to avert impending future dangers. In England, it was immediately understood that the most important thing was to obtain reliable information about the details of the foundations on which Germany's economic successes are built. Accordingly, a special economic intelligence service was set up to organize the war after the war. The search of ships of all nations and of postal traffic throughout the world, established under the blockade—right or wrong—the import and export supervisory committees established in various countries , and the institutions associated with these measures, provided information that could hardly have been more reliable, richer, and more accurate. And good work was done in utilizing this material. From all letters and business papers, regardless of whether they were of hostile or neutral origin, the figures, documents, and data relevant to any branch of English industry or trade were extracted. Everything was neatly categorized and processed, and the result is that England was able to create a card index of the world economy, and in particular of competition in all areas of the world market, based on the latest and otherwise almost unobtainable material, the likes of which exists nowhere else in such grandeur. The extent of the institution is given by the fact that the card index alone contains approximately 250,000 names and addresses of non-English companies and individuals, with precise information on the nature and success of their activities in any area of world trade. It has already been stated that this enormous work, and indeed England's efforts in general, are not solely dedicated to the negative endeavor of hindering German industry and trade from developing their internal strengths. The positive goal is incomparably more generous and diverse. It can be summed up briefly as follows: in all areas of economic, technical, and scientific activity that are significant for the world market, England must gain leadership through the value of its achievements. This work program for the future, for the war after

the war, includes the following points: 1. Development of a large chemical industry. Complaints by the English about the competition from German dyes are well known. But by establishing a chemical industry on a large scale, England simultaneously wants to secure the chemical by-products that are so important for the armaments industry, of which one need only mention coal tar products, which play such a large role in the manufacture of explosive projectiles. From the same perspective, the technology of tungsten smelting was pursued with tenacious zeal during the war, and the English claim to have achieved great success in both areas. 2. Development of a large industry of chemical-medicinal products and nutritional supplements, the so-called branded goods. Sanatogen, Biomalz, Odol, and other products of this kind are to be replaced by English ones on the world market. Without passing judgment on the intrinsic value of the results achieved by the English in this regard, it must be said that the number and scope of the companies founded are significant. From Salvarsan substitutes to various beauty care items, little is left out. 3. Development of a large optical industry that supplies every product, from the largest to the smallest. This is competition that is clearly directed against Gorizia, Zeiss, and the Rathenow industry. 4. Development of shipbuilding, which has always been one of England's major industries. The principle of establishing and mass producing a specific type has been transferred from American automobile construction to English shipbuilding. These guiding principles are already being fully implemented, and dozens of steamers are being built according to a single design, although the customers must, of course, forgo any special requests. These ships have so far been considered almost exclusively for freight transport. They are steamers of approximately 8,000 tons with a speed of 11 knots per hour. 5. Introduction of the same American principles in English automobile construction, particularly in order to successfully counter American competition. Here, too, mass production of individual models at low prices, in the style of the well-known American cars. There is a certainty in English expert circles that the superiority of English quality workmanship will far surpass American achievements. 6. Expansion and promotion of the aircraft industry on a large scale. In English expert circles, there is a conviction that the airplane, or more correctly, the generalization of flight, is one of the greatest technical achievements of the near future. Aircraft have already been built in England that have reached an altitude of 7,000 feet with 21 people on board. One needn't take all the plans of English aircraft builders seriously, but perhaps the idea of coupling a number of the largest gigantic machines together to create a kind of flying express train is no mere figment of the imagination. Experts may well discuss this. On closer examination, it

becomes clear that in England, special attention is being paid to all industries that are of decisive importance for warfare technology. Explosive projectiles, optical devices in the broadest sense of the word, automobiles, airplanes—all of these are things in whose production England aims to become the world leader. It is significant that these efforts are being directed with equal intensity toward the production of drugs and medical supplies, which England has so far imported in large quantities from Germany. For example, in England, they are considering the question of establishing their own belladonna cultures, which provide the vital atropine. Thanks to its rich natural resources , coal and iron, England has always held a particularly strong position in the world economy. In the utilization of the resulting power, a development is imminent that is probably not yet fully appreciated even by neutral countries and even by England's allies. The nationalization of the English coal mines is more than a mere war measure. The leading miners' union has declared its firm determination not to allow a simple reversion to the previous state of free, private capitalist management of these resources. And from political circles, there soon emerged the suggestion that, by supplying or refusing coal from the most important mines in Wales, the state had a powerful means at its disposal to exert pressure on foreign interests as desired and needed. Alongside industry, there is export trade. The establishment of a state-supported export trading bank is intended to serve this purpose. Its capital is stated at 10 million pounds sterling. It is intended to enable English manufacturers to gain access to foreign markets, where necessary, also by granting long-term loans. One of its main tasks is likely to be the promotion of export syndicates, in which medium-sized and smaller English manufacturers generally intend to join. These plans, too, are receiving the support of influential circles who want to do everything possible to prevent English economic life from being dominated, following the American model, by a few overpowering trust structures that absorb all competition. It is perhaps appropriate to point out that in Germany, in very important areas of economic life, things are moving toward American conditions. To highlight a detail that demonstrates the precision of English work against German competition, it should be mentioned that, among other things, the question of the German share in the Indian hide trade was considered with particular attention. By providing funds to attract Indian traders and by establishing a special hide processing and tanning enterprise, it is intended to definitively prevent German participation in the Indian hide business. Everything that has been said here in detail on these matters has been more or less of an economic and technical nature. Perhaps of far greater importance, however, because they have an internally guiding

influence, are the aspects that are to be brought to bear in shaping England's internal economic and social conditions. The new things that are being developed can be summarized under two major aspects: first, the training and recruitment of women for quality work in trade and commerce; second, the establishment of a new English agriculture, the creation of a separate peasant class. In a wide variety of industries during the war, and especially in the actual war industries, women were called upon in all areas to cooperate and replace the missing male workforce. From the end of March, even in grenade factories, a maximum of 20 percent of the workforce may be male; all other work must be performed by women. They have proven themselves in all areas, and in England, the conviction has been gained that the permanent, equal participation of women, even in advanced technological fields, is simply a matter of training and education. In England, the government is determined to do everything possible in this area; special technical training institutes for women have been established, and the approach taken to the task at hand is demonstrated by the fact that 200 women are being trained in aircraft construction in a single institute. In Germany, the general view is still held that women, by their natural aptitude, are not suited to so-called quality work; and, with a few exceptions, one will always have to be content with their involvement in the production of mass-produced items as purely mechanical laborers or, in other fields, only to a limited extent, as assistants. The view: "Woman belongs in the home" is applied to the economic sphere: "Woman belongs in cheap factory work." Why? Even the simple activity of an embroiderer requires such a degree of care, patient work, and persistent diligence that no one would deny at least these qualities to the vast majority of women. Since they have suddenly been able to replace postmen, tram conductors, garbage collectors, grenade throwers, machine operators, and even civil servants, and since, furthermore, numerous women were already working in laboratories and similar institutions during peacetime, it is simply not clear why a sensible training program should not be able to impart to the vast majority of women the knowledge and practice necessary to perform valuable and well-paid work. It is nothing more than an expanded repetition of the same things that appeared when women first appeared timidly in offices, in university lecture halls, and in public life in general. There can hardly be any doubt about the influence that women's participation in the manner indicated here will likely exert, not only on the development of economic affairs, but also on the shaping of social and socio-political conditions, and on the position of women within civil society. The decisive factors in England have expressed themselves sufficiently clearly—both official figures and representatives of

organized labor, as well as the women themselves. At the conference of women workers' associations in January of this year, the recognized leaders of the female working class have already formulated their demands. Mrs. Lewis Donaldson, the chairwoman of the Women's Workers' Association, made the following statement: In order to participate fully in the reconstruction of the country after the war, women must be liberated from the present state of subjugation. Women will not imitate Joan of Arc after the war and quietly return to the plough and rough housework. Having contributed to the liberation of the country, they will not simply give up everything they have won in the process, nor will they simply quietly leave their good positions in industry, commerce, and the civil service to return to the domestic kitchen and perform unpaid and unappreciated work. p. 1023 (#1043) England after the war. 1023 or to be limited to the lower grades of factory work. However, facing the future, women must have enough of a sense of community to unite and avoid wage-cutting among themselves and against men returning from the field. Miss Mary MacArthur, the representative of another large women's union, also emphasized the need for a general organization of working women, especially in view of the impending developments. Women emerge from this hell, she said, with broken hearts and bleeding feet , but at the same time with unfamiliar, new, and in a certain sense terrible ideas. Not only have women changed, but men's views of women have also changed. Before, women were merely the mothers of men; now, in the war, they have risen to the dizzying heights of machine gun manufacturing. The right to vote, which was denied to mothers, will have to be given to female machine gun manufacturers, for better or for worse. Organized male workers are also vigorously advocating for women's rights under the new conditions. As a basic condition, they are demanding, first and foremost, the granting of the right to vote in the House of Commons through a regulation that would immediately give approximately 6,000,000 women the right to vote. The influence of these trends on England's social development cannot be overestimated. Child welfare and education, schools and homes, worker protection, and social policy in the broadest sense of the word will take a development that is hardly even fully understood in Germany. England, which has always prided itself on being 50 to 100 years ahead of the continent in civil and social institutions, is here breaking new ground that will lead to a bright, new future for the broadest masses of the working people and thus for society as a whole. p. 1024 (#1044) 1024 England after the war. Of equal, profound importance for the restructuring of English conditions as this development of the position of women in the economy and society is the reconstruction of English agriculture, which is

being initiated at the same time. The nutritional difficulties, which the war events increasingly caused for England as well, have helped to gain ground in the idea that the existence of the most extensive and productive agriculture possible is a matter of life and death for the United Kingdom as well, and that everything must be done to re-establish a numerous class of medium and small farmers in England. In the course of the war, and especially recently, the English government has intervened more and more directly in the production conditions of agriculture. After initially only giving advice on what crops should be planted and which means should be best used, the government finally proceeded to compel cultivation within certain limits and to the division of large estates that were not being farmed appropriately. The in-depth study of agricultural matters that became necessary as a result has shown that the present agricultural system in England, with its distribution of all land into a relatively small number of vast estates and only a small number of independent farms, is untenable if future requirements are to be met. The plans are to create numerous new farms by dividing large estates, and to promote and expand agricultural purchasing and labor by encouraging cooperatives, farmers' banks, and the joint ownership of the most modern agricultural machinery, which would otherwise be unaffordable for individuals. Through the maximum development of its productivity, English agriculture should be enabled to produce so cheaply that it can even compete successfully with foreign production areas, which are favorably positioned due to their natural advantages and their general agricultural conditions. It should be noted that this should not be supported by tariffs, which would make essential foodstuffs more expensive for the people. If one summarizes all the details that can already be seen today in England's emerging post-war renewal, the following picture emerges: in industry and trade, striving for leadership on the world market in all important large-scale industries, especially those with a technical and scientific basis, through quality work and performance; in labor relations in agriculture, industry, and commerce, a tremendous forward development through the introduction of women's work on a large scale, based on prior, appropriate training for women; in the country's general economy, a complete transformation through the creation of a numerous peasant class. That this new England would be stronger and greater than the one before the war, that it would contain a far greater source of strength, requires no explanation. If he then succeeds in realizing his plan to integrate all his overseas possessions into a firmly established all-British economic union, the world empire will enjoy a level of political and economic power never seen before. Is it perhaps also on the way to a complete reorganization

of its domestic political structure? Voices are growing louder reporting a strong growth of socialist thought and, at the same time, the emergence of republican currents. That these latter are not harmless daydreams is evident from the fact that people have been concerned with the question of how the republican idea could be counteracted. The suggestion that the Prince of Wales should not marry a foreign princess, but a British woman, flesh of the nation's flesh and blood of its blood, met with general approval. In this war, other difficulties have arisen besides the social and political objections that stand in the way. The royal house, in any case, needs a policy that makes people forget its purely German origins. Some time ago, during a visit to a hospital, King George pointedly remarked to a wounded soldier, so that everyone around could hear: "The Germans are only swine." And care was taken to ensure that this demonstrative denial of the royal family's blood affiliation became public. But the course of an inner necessity cannot be stopped by stirring up sentiment. A brief glimpse of the future was recently illustrated in the New York magazine "Life." "Mom, give me a penny, I want to see the stuffed last king in the panopticon," a boy says to his mother. That may be only a wish and a hope, but not a probability. But, after all, in England, the king is merely an ornament on the state building. If one day the ornament no longer seems contemporary, perhaps even disturbing, it is removed. A calm, matter-of-fact movement of the hand, and everything is done. England's politics are not affected by this; the shaping of its destiny has always been carried out by its strong men, today, for example, Lloyd George, Lord Northcliffe, and Hughes. All three come from the people; Lloyd George and Hughes even, as the beautiful expression goes, from the depths of the people. The English Prime Minister owes the foundations of his career, his education, to the help of his uncle, a cobbler. He was never ashamed of it; as Prime Minister, he had himself photographed with his uncle, and above all A few weeks ago, he delivered the eulogy for the deceased. The plebeian Lloyd George, as someone recently called him in a German newspaper, and his tendency dominate the present and future of England—the worldview it considers correct and expedient. p. 1027 (#1047) The Fight Against Tuberculosis. 1027 The freedom to freely entrust the leadership of a state's destiny to someone who, in the opinion of his fellow countrymen, has proven himself to be the right man through his political activity, is being tested. CURT BIGING: The Fight Against Tuberculosis. There are no reasons to doubt that the men returning from the war, unless they were protected by a special post from the rigors of the weather, the effects of physical and mental shocks, and the harmful effects of a poor diet, had, as a result of the general weakening of their organism, an increased susceptibility to constipation. But

They are not alone in this danger. The war, with all its accompanying symptoms, has meant that almost everyone, and especially the less well-off sections of the population, has suffered a not inconsiderable loss of physical resilience. Even professional physiologists do not deny that widespread chronic malnutrition exists. Added to this is the constant worry and anxiety that everyone feels, even if none of them are in the pioneers or a flying brigade, the daily repetition of "What will happen?" One can say without any doubt and with complete justification that the majority of our people suffer from psychological depression. Please, that's no disgrace. It would be more of one if that weren't the case. Hunger and worry ask the specialists what can better plow the soil for consumption! The women who are pregnant now or will give birth next year are incapable of giving us a strong generation. They themselves are just barely full—what is now called being full, but how are they supposed to give their offspring enough to produce a strong child? That, on the other hand, cases of rickets among young children may decline somewhat in the coming years as a result of the forced feeding of root vegetables is no substitute. What about infants? Their natural nutrition is a problematic matter. Either the mothers are physically unable to breastfeed (why should they?) or, since the care of the entire family rests solely on their shoulders, they are kept away from home during the day for economic reasons. And the stocks of artificial nutrition are far worse under current nutritional conditions than in peacetime. And on top of that, the price of milk is being raised! The children who are now reaching school age are also showing, as medical examinations show, a deterioration in their state of health. These frail little ones, whose health is below average in earlier years, are now expected to sit in the classroom for hours every day, engaged in an activity that is certainly strenuous for them. Should this be entirely without consequences? At an age when body and mind require comparatively considerably more energy for function and development than is the case with adults? At an age when people can always eat because they must, or a disastrous standstill will occur? There is no question here that these children are sick or will soon become sick. That would have to be proven. But there is certainly a general impairment in this age group, too, which could play a decisive role when it comes to whether the organism in question can resist an infection that is not entirely without concern even for a fairly tactful person. This applies not only to children now reaching school age, but also to all others, especially up until puberty, as schooling, even in our advanced decade, is anything but a fountain of health for our youth. For those sections of the population who are able to send their children to (higher) school after the age of fourteen, this situation lasts until the sixteenth or eighteenth year

(when they receive their first-year or secondary school leaving certificate). The wealth of material to be mastered in the upper grades cannot be considered suitable for increasing the physical resilience of the students. Even if sport at this age unfolds its beneficial effects inside and outside of school to a far greater extent than, say, ten years ago (not to mention before), it is still not even remotely a fully-fledged counterweight to the undeniable damage caused by malnutrition and extreme mental strain, which, if not generally, then at least in a not entirely insignificant number of cases, even leads to over-exertion. All of this could still be tolerated, since we are dealing with a relatively small number and, moreover, with a class that has itself created the conditions under which its youth suffers and tenaciously strives to maintain them. Of far greater economic and public health significance is the fate of the working-class youth, who form the foundation of the national structure. Numerically far superior and less favored in general living conditions, it exerts a much greater influence on the health of future generations. The shortage of labor and the increased activity of the war industry demand more intensive professional work from it than before, and above all, largely the kind of work that was previously only performed by adults. Of course, this has simultaneously increased earnings, but even though the war has revalued all kinds of values, the old, long-recognized fact still rightly persists: health cannot be bought alone. Certainly, no one in this country has yet starved to death as a result of the war, but we must not close our eyes to the fact that our food system is, albeit a minor one, still an evil. And the earning potential for young workers of both sexes is not so great that they are able to habitually procure the extra fats and carbohydrates actually necessary for growth and work in the form of sardines in oil, goose breasts, and large quantities of cake. We must therefore reckon with the fact that the majority of our fellow countrymen, insofar as they are now or later considered as fathers and mothers, from the child in the womb to man and woman in the prime of their strength (or what is left of it), have suffered a weakening that is as general as it is profound. All the more profound is that the difficult food situation will not be limited to the duration of the war. However much we moan about the high food prices, world trade prices are certainly not cheap (we will have to import bread grains and meat from abroad after the war, because no one seriously imagines that we can stabilize the current rations as a "rocher de bronce" for reasons of economy), and sugar, whose importance as a foodstuff we have only learned to appreciate now that we do not have it, we will continue to export in larger quantities than many would like to improve our currency, p. 1030 (#1050) 1030 The Fight Against Tuberculosis. so that Schmalhans can

take on permanent commitments as our kitchen master. Even if we assume the continuation of higher wages—otherwise there would be a catastrophe—money is of no use to us if we cannot buy enough with it. So, for the time being, we have no prospect of paralyzing the "general physical weakness" (in both senses). We must calmly face the possible, and even very likely, consequences and do everything in our power to stave off their fingernails. We must accept that all the conditions for increased morbidity from tuberculosis of all kinds exist for the coming years and perhaps even decades, and take measures to contain this danger with certainty from the outset. With regard to the organization of tuberculosis control, we are fortunately not faced with an as yet unknown fact, as was the case back then, when it was necessary to create an organization for the distribution of food. That we will not feel like abandoned orphans in the intensified fight against tuberculosis and need not fritter away precious time on the months-long process of gathering the data needed to form the basis of the entire organization, we owe to the men who have been organizationally and statistically active in this field so far, and whose work would have been who knows how much more successful if they had had the resources at their disposal for a few years that the war costs us in two weeks. But what has existed in this area so far must have been nothing more than reconnaissance and outpost skirmishes. The battle has yet to be fought. We can do nothing better than to connect the new, great operation to the existing institution. First, there is a wealth of experience here, and second, above all, forces are available that would otherwise have had to be developed first. We have the "well-worn paths" that alone enable us to make rapid progress. First and foremost, doctors are tasked with the role of workers in the people's vineyard. The work of the industrial inspections and schools must go hand in hand with their work, supported by propaganda capable of gaining popularity. A central office must be created that is authoritative for the major guidelines without dictatorially schematizing the detailed work. The central office will be responsible for distributing materials, processing the results supplied by the sub-organizations, and determining the use of state (only state) subsidies. To manage all this, it is necessary to transform this central office into an authority. Considering the enormous amount of work that needs to be done in the field of public health after the war, now, if ever, is the time to approach the creation of a Ministry of Medicine, as Comrade Haenisch recently demanded in the Prussian House of Representatives. The health system has been a ministerial subtenant for long enough. The numerous reorientations that are becoming necessary in a wide variety of areas would be postponed ad kalendas greecas if a degree of

decentralization does not give the individual departments greater flexibility. One of the most important preparatory steps is to ensure the provision of early diagnosis even under unfavorable conditions (on the part of the doctor). As already proposed[1], compulsory courses should be established for future doctors during their studies. Similar courses should be held for doctors already in practice, arranged in such a way as to be attended regularly and at a time and place that does not interfere with daily professional work. Where necessary, cash compensation should be provided if a loss of remuneration due to participation in the course can be proven. Since even a doctor is not satisfied with ideals, he can, if he has a sufficiently large but financially weak clientele so that he can just about get by (especially if he has a family), demand compensation for the material disadvantages resulting from his necessary participation in the course. Busy statutory health insurance doctors are usually unable to devote the time necessary to examining each individual patient in order to recognize the first, barely noticeable signs in the early stages. It might be worth considering whether it would not be advisable to grant them, as of course to all other doctors who diagnose such a previously unnoticed early stage for the first time, confirmed by a follow-up examination at a competent institute, a special fee from state funds. By no means to encourage diagnostic ambition—it will certainly leave nothing to be desired anyway—but merely to compensate for the not inconsiderable additional expenditure of time and effort. That is still cheaper than allowing the disease to take root so that the patient has to stay in a sanatorium twice or three times as long. Among the technical aids for making an early diagnosis, the X-ray procedure occupies an outstanding place. In large and medium-sized cities, as well as in smaller towns with universities, it will be easy to affiliate the tuberculosis control organization with the relevant institute with a certain amount of goodwill. This is of course only a local one. Moreover, it will also be possible in smaller towns with a reasonably solvent population to set up an X-ray laboratory at municipal expense, perhaps with the agreement that it may also be used for the purposes of the municipal hospital, for example in the sense that the X-rays or Examinations of suspected tuberculosis cases should only take place on certain days and at certain times. To the objection that the city might refuse to spend funds for this purpose, it can be countered that, first, the city must have an interest in participating in the fight against tuberculosis among its own citizens (not to mention certain ideological aspects that could still be cited), and second, that the cost of an X-ray facility is not prohibitive. Incidentally, there is a good solution. How about if, after the war, instead of slapping together Hindenburg and Mackensen memorials, we proposed the

construction of an X-ray laboratory wherever a conspiracy to raise funds for this purpose emerges? I believe that even without monuments, we will not forget what these men achieved, and if honors must be commemorated in bronze and stone, then a plaque should be placed above the portal of the institute: "To Hindenburg's honor, to the people's health." And many a poor wretch who has walked from this threshold on the road to recovery will remember the great general with more sincere gratitude than if he sees the symbol of the monument-loving epidemic in the marketplace and says to himself that for it the sculptor Professor X. received 20,000 marks and the city councilor Y. the Order of the Red Eagle. For very small towns and rural communities, the question must, of course, be resolved by other means. The craftsman and farmer are neither able nor sufficiently agile to travel to the city if the doctor tells him he needs an X-ray of his lungs. Even if he is reimbursed for the fare. p. 1033 (#1053) The Fight Against Tuberculosis. 1033, he would not be easily persuaded to do so, because such a journey, which takes at least a day, would mean financial loss for him due to the loss of his work. It would be worth considering whether X-ray railway cars could be operated for this purpose. The establishment of such mobile stations would certainly not be more expensive than the permanent ones. The cars would have to run on a rotation schedule announced several months in advance and would stay at specific collection stations for a certain time. The necessary electrical power would be supplied by the local or interurban power station; where both are lacking, an easily installed internal combustion engine. How these cars can be made usable for narrow-gauge and standard-gauge railways is a matter of technology. In the worst case, one would set up a narrow-gauge and a standard-gauge station, and if one takes into account that even medium-sized towns can accommodate a permanent X-ray institute, two or three mobile ones should suffice for each province. If two or three vehicles are connected together, there is sufficient space for the actual laboratory, a consulting room, a waiting room, and accommodations for the doctor and staff. School and statutory health insurance doctors (as well as private physicians) would have to identify suspected cases based on family history information regarding tuberculosis, which must be obtained from every patient, regardless of their ailments, and examine them at regular intervals. If necessary, admit them to an observation ward for X-ray examinations. This family history information is to be recorded by school doctors upon admission of each child, and by statutory health insurance doctors upon admission of each new member, even if no case of illness exists. In this way, important and, above all, uniformly collected, unscreened material for statistical purposes is obtained over time. Furthermore, the work

is simplified because, if a patient defaults or transfers to another health insurance fund, the previous one can request the questionnaire from the previous one without the need for new paperwork. By creating a form for each relevant case over time (treatment, course, and outcome must also be entered), one gains an overview of the work that will probably have to be done in the coming years. 53/3 p. 1034 (#1054) 1034 The Fight Against Tuberculosis. It is clear that such an innovation, which also involves some inconvenience for the public, such as the regular presentation of suspected cases to the doctor, is only feasible if comprehensive information about the necessity and goals of these measures is provided at the same time. The health insurance companies, which in some places (Berlin) arrange for instructive lectures on health care, have already shown the way. Schools are particularly well-suited to support this propaganda activity, especially in rural areas and in medium-sized and small towns, where they also represent an authority for the parents of their students. A special propaganda center of the Tuberculosis Control Organization compiles the lectures, has slides produced, and, upon request from local organizations, supplies the country with such lectures. Based on the slide material provided, these lectures are given either by local doctors or, where these are lacking, by specially trained traveling speakers. Leaving these lectures to the teachers would be less advisable, as they might not be able to answer questions from the audience in this area that would be desirable for pedagogical reasons. Given the often underappreciated influence that psychological factors exert on the course of a tuberculous infection, adequate support must be ensured for families whose caregivers are forced to undergo treatment in a sanatorium. This support should, of course, only be provided where the caregiver's income is completely lost, and only up to a certain income. Where husband and wife jointly bear the burden of supporting the family, the family must be compensated for the loss of the father's work. All of this must also apply in cases where the patient is not covered by a health insurance fund. Otherwise, the patient, even if receiving treatment free of charge, will not attend, so as not to deprive his family of the fruits of his labor. He will prolong and aggravate his suffering, and by endangering those around him, he may cause more costly damage than the amount of three to four months of family support. Similarly, men whose wives require sanatorium treatment are to be paid an economic allowance up to an income level yet to be determined, and in the case of boys up to 18 years of age and girls up to 16 years of age, in an amount approximately equivalent to the wages and maintenance costs of a housemaid. This measure is self-explanatory given the possibility of child neglect in a leaderless household. Likewise, for

pregnant women suspected of tuberculosis or who have been treated in a sanatorium within the last three years, a cash allowance for the maintenance of a household helper is recommended during the second half of their pregnancy. At the same time, the provision of nutritional supplements in kind (again up to a certain income level) is also possible. A demand too obvious to really need mentioning is the creation of cheap, healthy housing outside the cities, with special consideration for families at risk of tuberculosis. Of course, these are things that can't be accomplished overnight. But much could be achieved simply by establishing inexpensive summer retreats. Primitiveness has no bearing on this. After the war, the material used for the barracks in the prisoner camps will be thoroughly disinfected, slightly remodeled, simply furnished, and placed near a good road in a state forest. This will provide adequate summer retreat for people who are neither sufficiently well-off nor unreasonable enough to take a "suitable" summer stay. Finally, measures are necessary to prevent the haphazard proliferation of tuberculosis patients. The heightened sex drive that we often find in these generally weakened and overstimulated patients strongly suggests the danger of a population increase that is entirely undesirable from a public health perspective. In addition, tuberculosis-affected women become increasingly weakened with each new pregnancy, creating a vicious circle that finds expression in an upward morbidity curve. Mandatory reporting of tuberculosis combined with a marriage ban for tuberculosis sufferers would be pointless. This would only result in a rapid increase in the number of illegitimate tuberculosis sufferers and the number of criminal abortions. At the same time, the number of sexually transmitted tuberculosis-affected men would probably also increase, thus effectively driving out the devil through Beelzebub. Education in sexual matters and knowledge of contraception imparted by a medical advisor are the aids we must provide to those suffering from tuberculosis. And even if this results in the loss of a few 53.3° p. 1036 (#1056) 1036 Via Peking to Expressionism. Ten thousand miscarriages predestined for consumption each year, this is not a harm, but rather a benefit for which future generations will thank us often enough. Certainly, we have to incur heavy losses of human life. But it is not the numerical compensation that benefits us, but the qualitatively increased one! KARL KORN: Via Peking to Expressionism. The Three Leaps of Wang-Lun. Chinese novel by Alfred Döblin.[1] FIRST success of the reading attempt: one throws the book against the wall. SECOND success: one throws it against the wall, perhaps with even fiercer fury. But strangely enough, one doesn't let the tome fester in a corner, as one cursedly swore, but grudgingly enters into a hand-to-hand combat with it for the third time. And now it begins to dawn

on the sympathetic reader that he's done for. In ever-growing astonishment, he notices that the inhibiting resistances of his consciousness are dissolving, that the book is beginning to overwhelm him, until he finally, breathlessly, succumbs to its spell and isn't released until he's raced through to the last page. Afterwards, the reader then realizes that his emotion in mastering the book corresponded exactly to the pace of the presentation, that he has become the prey of a style whose sovereign energy testifies to this very catastrophic overpowering of the reader. Believers in Cubist and Expressionist painting report similar effects of an artistic attack. Perhaps the analogy between that pictorial and this literary style is expressed most naively in the indignation with which the public, coming from their usual peaceful, aesthetic leafy walks, expecting artistic enjoyment, reacts to the demands of this new art. Like Picasso, Kandinsky, Marc, and Archipenko, the author of this novel seems to have first put his characters through the sausage machine and then processed the disjecta membra, their chopped-up limbs, in the centrifuge, so that in the depiction he risks, noses and eyes and toes and intestines are jumbled together in confusion, and the horrified spectator believes himself to be at the mercy of visions of a kind of spinning sickness. Just as those visual artists atomize and chaoticize views and figures, the author atomizes and chaoticizes the psychology of his people. But strangely enough: with that new type of painting, one must, it seems, be a gifted person to partake of its blessing; whereas this writer will soon find even the philistine, the stubborn sacrificial lamb of all previous artistic jokes, eating out of his hand. Here's the thing: Mr. Döblin's style is clearly adequate to his theme, the object of his representation. Such an achievement is certainly not earth-shattering. With every successful work of art, it is self-evident that its method of representation, its compositional technique, corresponds to its subject. This alone proves its method, its technique, to be necessary, precisely a style. But in contrast to the seemingly esoteric style of the new art, in the special case of this Döblin work, it is perhaps a ray of light in the darkness of the bourgeois's contrite mind, as the Expressionists and Futurists are wont to affably stigmatize us, who refuse to purchase their works of art, for the bourgeois to learn how one can grasp the style from the subject matter, thus not remaining hopelessly excluded from these paradises. Indeed: What is China to us, the setting for these Wanglun-esque leaps? It is more insignificant than nothing; it is the absolute, the most bizarre transcendence of all our European experience. But if we now realize that in the chaos of this psychological Chinoiserie, here and there, on this edge and in that corner, elements of the European—for us, the human—soul appear, we not only gain a modest clue for critical orientation, so that we can

now confidently stammer our little rhyme about "truth" and "reality," but it also begins to dawn on us that in this special case, applied to such an exotic object, the chopping and centrifuging method of Futurism may represent the only possible, and therefore absolutely necessary, form of design and representation, the congenial style. The Chinese person is as distant from us as a creature of Sirius, a kind of thing-in-itself, inaccessible to the functions and categories of European consciousness. If he is to be presented to us at all, how could this be done other than in the psychological elements of apperception accessible only to us, but in such a way that the incommensurability, the exotic nature of the problem, is overcome precisely through the new, futuristic arrangement of those elements? Döblin's Chinese is thus a conglomerate of European psychological elements. The only possibility of dealing with him is provided by futuristic-cubist technique. Futuristic-cubist technique and expressionist psychology do not exclusively dominate this wonderful novel, however, since its theme is not only the Chinese man, but also the Chinese masses. Wang Lun, its hero, criminal, and saint at the same time, is the leader of one of those partly social and political, partly religious-mystical popular uprisings, such as first became known to wider circles of the European public in the Taiping Rebellion and later in the Boxer Revolts. The entire epic of such a rebellion, its initial seepage from countless rivulets of the rural and urban proletariat, with a strong sediment from the declassed dregs of the propertied classes, its avalanche-like swell, its impetuous flooding over all dams of the social and political order, right up to the steps of the Manchu throne, its final end in a demoniac frenzy of unspeakable horrors, is unfolded before us at cinematic speed. The sweeping rush of this tempo is the second stylistic characteristic of the work. All details, the entire state-based fixity of things, are overturned; the movement itself is both the content and form of the representation. That this modern epic cannot get by with the trusting tools of naturalistic description lies in the nature of its material as well as its intentions, and thus, through the boldest violation of linguistic tradition, it creates the impression-
 instrument with which it transcribes every being into becoming, everything static into something dynamic. But expressionistic in its individual psychological motivations and innervations, futuristic in its gestures, the twitching objectifications of its people, impressionistic in the tempo and arrangement of mass actions: the style always corresponds to the respective task, each formal remark simultaneously notes something factual. Yet the incredible flexibility of this verbal art is not even crudely exhausted by a few convenient catchphrases. Midday boats of dreamy happiness sail amidst the smoking sea of blood of

events; sweet, bewildering female profiles emerge, as if from the master novellas of the Renaissance, and again figures glimpsed from the abyss of the psychology of Karamazov's Dostoyevsky. But the factual detail, the topographical, sociological, folkloristic, and demonological local color, is truly fabulous. Where the author, a young Berlin physician, got all this from, only God knows. Compared to this abundance, the exotic feats of JV Jensen and his school are meager reporter's notes. At times, one cannot help but suspect that one is reading a very skillful translation of an original Chinese work. But be that as it may: even those who are less inclined to appreciate the stylistic problems the novel raises will, after overcoming the initial formal inhibitions, find themselves captivated by the subject matter. After all, its theme is rooted in the strongest interest not only in current events, but in the entire historical period to which we will have to adapt in the near future: in world politics on the broadest scale. To have placed one of the fantastic objects of these coming world-historical conflicts within the realm of psychological possession by the European is the merit of this Chinese novel, whose "leaps" symbolize perhaps even more the scope of the author's empathetic synthesis than the shattered soul of his hero. Whoever speaks the truth is often hated and condemned by those who only preach. p. 1040 (#1060) 1040 Bell Cannons. KARL BRÖGER: The Bell Cannons. Hung in the pews high above the teeming year, high above the teeming world, cradle and shrine to the dead entered their ringing bell life and slept imprisoned in their sound. This wild time tears the bells from the tower, prepares them as howitzers for the swirling spring storm. Above the bloody altar of war roars the cannon that was once a bell. When the gunner fires the first shot, the world listens. From the barrel springs the unchanging spirit of the bell, ringing and yelling. From all the cannons, howitzers, and mortars spring song and glorious sound. With power the bell has awakened in every gun; it rings and laments and rejoices over the battle. Heaven and earth are captivated by a single tone, echoing with the eternal bell song: Peace! Peace! There are people who live on the chymborasso of meanness. It is impossible to defeat them; they are always right. The wit that seeks them out sinks, breathless, at the foot of the mountain and confesses with shame that a stick is better than a lance. Boerne. When they have a small newspaper under their fist, they rejoice that they have stemmed the tide of time! They resemble the stupid devil who covered the spring in Donaueschingen with his hand and laughingly exclaimed: How surprised they will be in Vienna when the Danube suddenly stops flowing! Boerne.p. (#1061) # A p. (#1062) # 32101 055309718 p. (#1063) # 1110 DATE ISSUED MAR 1 0 1988 FILIN 15 2006 DATE DUE p. (#1064) #